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Address by
the Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee at the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, Washington, DC on India’s Strategic
Perspectives.
It is a great privilege for me to be here in Washington, before this
distinguished gathering at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
to speak on ‘India’s strategic perspectives’. I would like to thank
Carnegie President Jessica Mathews for the opportunity, and Ashley Tellis
for the initiative and arrangements. Friends,
I have been in public life now for over 40 years, a good part of it in
Government, at different times, as Minister of Finance, Commerce and
External Affairs. I have been here in my capacity as each of these. Times
have certainly changed. The last time I was here, in Washington, in 1995,
the world was very different. Public discourse on India-US relations was
dominated by the baggage of the past rather than by a vision of the future.
It was a perennial puzzle: how could two democracies, one the oldest and the
other the largest, be so much at odds in their perception of the world? Today,
we see an objective convergence in many areas, in the area of values as well
as interests, not least over the big issues of the day: democracy,
fundamental freedoms, economic vitality on the one hand; and terrorism,
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, maritime security and
international peace and stability on the other. India’s
strategic perspectives have been shaped by geography, history, our own
native culture and vision, and geopolitical realities and imperatives.
Geographically, a few facts are particularly relevant. First, that India is
both a continental and maritime nation with a territory of over 3 million sq
kms, a land frontier of 15,000 kms, a coastline of 7,500 kms, and a
population of 1.1 billion, the second largest in the world. Second,
its location at the base of continental Asia and the top of the Indian Ocean
gives it a vantage point in relation to both West, Central, continental and
South-East Asia, and the littoral States of the Indian Ocean from East
Africa to Indonesia. Third,
India’s peninsular projection in the Ocean which bears its name, gives it
a stake in the security and stability of these waters. Nehru once said: “I
look at India….on three sides, the sea, and on the fourth, high
mountains….History has shown that whatever power controls the Indian
Ocean, has in the first instance, India’s sea borne trade at her mercy,
and in the second, India’s very independence itself”. Fourth,
it shares borders with eleven neighbours, most of whom do not share borders
amongst themselves. Fifth,
it is an energy deficient country located close to some of the most
important sources of oil and natural gas in the Gulf and Central Asia and
adjacent to one of the most vital sea-lanes through which 60,000 ships
transit every year. [Its
natural features, particularly the high wall of the Himalayas to the north,
and the vast Indo-Gangetic plain, incline natural movements to and from the
north-west of India, from West and Central Asia to the plains. Curiously,
while the plains attracted invaders, conquerors, and military campaigns,
from Greece (Alexander) to Central Asia (Babur), the reverse was not true,
though the 4th century B.C. Mauryan emperor Ashoka did leave his mark in
Afghanistan through his edicts eschewing war and exhorting Buddhist
non-violence and peace.] Historically,
India has been a fundamentally ‘open’ society. It has received and
absorbed major influences from outside, like Islam and Christianity, and
radiated cultural influences, outward. It was, with the Arab, Persian and
Sinic civilizations, a source of cultural influence in Asia. India was one
of the great well-springs of human intellectual and spiritual achievement,
of the metaphysical insights of Hinduism, and the pacific mission of
Buddhism. It is customary to talk of strategic perspectives in terms of
‘hard’ power: our strategic perspectives were those of trade, religion,
culture, spirituality, and the arts; and later, the political morality of
Gandhi.
[Developments from the 17th century onwards fundamentally altered these
traditional orientations and moorings of India’s external relations with
the outside word in profound ways. European mercantilism grew into the
maritime domination of the Indian Ocean, disrupting traditional trade and
contacts between India and its regional maritime partners to the east and
west. Further north, in mainland Asia, it introduced relationships of
domination and rivalry between imperial powers where earlier only local
powers played out their dynastic destinies]. Several
developments in the 20th century, with their roots in imperial history,
affected India’s relationships with its historical neighbors in Asia.
Perhaps, the most fateful, was the Partition of India and the emergence of
hard frontiers in the form of a hostile and revanchist Pakistan to the west
and east of India. As a result, for the first time in its 4000-year history,
India found itself physically separated and shut out from its historical,
cultural and commercial surroundings to the north-west of India and vice
versa. Viewed
from this perspective, it can be argued that the 20th century has been a
decided aberration in the pattern of India’s historical and traditional
relationship with the outside world. [On
the economic side, the historical experience of the British East India
Company and imperialism in general, left India suspicious of foreign trade.
Post-Independence, this found expression in efforts to build a self-reliant
economy wary of integration to the world economy. The model stood us in good
stead for a while. It helped set up a technical and industrial base, and
turn from a food-deficit to a food surplus country. Self-reliance gave us
self-confidence.] [While
colonialism disrupted our traditional historic links, the Cold War delayed
their restoration. In retrospect, this was an era of shadow boxing; a hall
of mirrors. The breakdown of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War
liberated India (and much of the developing world), from the false
problematic of ‘East’ and ‘West’. It provided an opportunity to
recover our traditional, historical reflexes atrophied in the chilly theatre
of Cold War, and rediscover our real interests.] [The
end of the Cold War coincided with a balance of payments crisis, the
liberalization of the Indian economy and the phenomenon of globalization.
The revolution in information and communications technologies offered us the
opportunity to transcend the limitations imposed by colonialism and its
legacy of hard frontiers of the 20th century. Educated sections of our
society found themselves in a good position to take advantage of
globalization, though in parenthesis, it is ironic that the shrinking of the
world as a result of technology and communications should be accompanied by
an evolution of border controls that all but chokes travel and movement for
the peoples of the developing world.] Over
the last two decades, India has recorded an average annual growth of around
6% and is now the fourth largest economy in the world in terms of purchasing
power parity. Foreign exchange reserves have gone up from US $ 1 billion in
1991 to US $ 140 billion today. The size (GDP) of the economy has since
doubled. We hope to redouble it by 2010 by a sustained annual growth of
around 8%. Several recent studies suggest that India will be one of the
three largest economies in the coming two-and-a-half decades. Our
demographic trends and our human resource base constitute two of our
strongest assets. Our ‘over-population’ liability of yesterday is now an
asset. Some 550 million Indians out of our billion-plus strong population
are below the age of 25. The middle class of over 300 million is rising
steadily. We have the second largest reservoir of trained manpower. Our
universities and centres of higher education turn out over 2 million
under-graduates every year. Our IT workforce is 650,000 today, and will
exceed 2 million by 2010. Our
capabilities in high technology areas, including developing our own
super-computers, complete nuclear fuel cycle facilities and placing our own
satellites in orbit, are now proven. India’s comparative advantage in
knowledge-driven areas of economic activities has made it attractive both
for outsourcing IT-enabled services and as a Research & Development hub.
190 out of the 500 Fortune companies already outsource to India. We
hope to maintain our comparative advantage in areas well into this century.
The IT segment of the Indian economy itself is expected to grow from US $
1.5 billion in 2002 to US $ 17 billion in 2008. We are trying to replicate
this achievement in areas of biotechnology, biogenetics and pharmaceuticals. It
would be prudent to bear in mind that we have achieved what we have achieved
within a largely unfavourable social, economic, technological and
international environment, and mostly on our own effort, without the benefit
of special relationships and access to markets that most other major
economic powers, other than China, have had. But
notwithstanding these achievements and prospects, the economic challenges
are many and daunting, and remain: unconscionable levels of poverty; wide
income and economic disparities; regional imbalances; a large and largely
backward rural and agricultural sector; infrastructure constraints; chronic
shortage of energy resources; and lack of adequate access to markets in the
region and beyond. India’s share of world GDP is less than its share of
the world population by 9 per cent. Nevertheless,
seen in the long term, even our relative backwardness can be turned to our
advantage. As we address the high levels of poverty and illiteracy in India,
given our demographic profile and economic trajectory, there is a good
chance that long after other countries plateau economically, we will still
be growing. I
would like to set out some of our key strategic priorities against this
background. These can be addressed in terms of what we can call, to take a
leaf from the Chinese book, the ‘Four Deficits’: a historical deficit; a
security deficit; an economic deficit; and a global decision-making deficit.
One
of our primary strategic challenges is to restore our traditional linkages
with the region and re-integrate ourselves to our immediate and extended
neighbourhood, especially the region west of India to Central Asia and
beyond, what I have called a strategic historical deficit. Advances
in information and communications technologies have helped us overcome
physical barriers to mass culture and access to IT-enabled business, but
land-routes remain the primary medium of trade with our neighbours to the
West and East. We would like to see India well connected with Afghanistan
and beyond in the north, and Bangladesh, Myanmar and beyond to South-east
Asia, taking advantage of India’s huge market through a network roads,
trade and transport corridors, gas pipelines, tourism and communications etc
in a zone of co-prosperity. With
this in mind, we have been active in trying to take advantage of
arrangements like SAARC, ASEAN, BIMST-EC, the Mekong-Ganga Initiative, and
trilateral cooperation with Thailand and Myanmar. We realize that not all
our neighbors may be comfortable with this vision and India’s place in it.
Bearing that in mind, we have been ready to enter into normal, preferential,
asymmetrical and free trade and development arrangements with those of our
neighbors who are willing, provided of course our security concerns are not
compromised. The
biggest challenge to this vision comes of course from our western neighbour.
Our quest for a return to the grain of historical contacts to India’s
north-west, gives us a vested interest in peace with Pakistan. It is not an
accident that virtually every major initiative for peace, be it Simla, or
Lahore or Agra, or Srinagar, has come from India. There
have been several positive developments in our relations with Pakistan over
the last one year-and-a-half. The ceasefire of November 2003 is holding. The
composite dialogue has entered a second round. People-to-people exchanges
have acquired a momentum of their own. The Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus service
started despite terrorist threats and attacks. At
the same time, we cannot still say for sure that the peace process is
entrenched. The infrastructure for terrorism in Pakistan and
Pakistan-controlled territory, remains. We do not hear of operations like
the ones being conducted by Pakistan, in cooperation with the US against the
war on terrorism at its western frontiers, towards its eastern borders with
India. More importantly from the point of view of our strategic interests,
trade and transit with and through Pakistan remain highly circumscribed. It
is only when India and Pakistan resume direct, bilateral trade and transit,
that there will be a vested interest in peace in both countries.
Trade
and transit with Pakistan would be good not only for our two countries but
also Afghanistan and Central Asia. India has had a traditional and
long-standing relationship with Afghanistan. Today, Afghanistan needs
economic support, markets and assistance. India has committed more than US $
500 million to reconstruction in nearly every region and province in
Afghanistan. India has also made modest contributions to the Afghan National
Army. India could do much more, if normal relations and trade and transit
through Pakistan could flourish. We are concerned about signs of the
resurgence of the Taliban, and the growth in drug cultivation in, and
trafficking from, Afghanistan. The
restoration of traditional links with Central Asia is not important only for
the sake of trade and economy. Traditionally, Central Asia has been at the
crossroads of trade and culture, a major hub in the Silk Route. This is the
region through which Buddhism spread as far as Mongolia and Korea. It is
also the region through which Islam enriched India. Today, it is a theatre
in the battle between fundamentalism and tolerance, extremism and moderation
in Islam with fundamentalist outfits actively trying to destabilize the
secular Governments of the region. India
has a secular polity that shares with liberal democracies, values of
democracy, fundamental and religious freedoms. It is, by virtue of its
inherited historical character, composition, size, population, economy and
military strength and experience, a natural bulwark against fundamentalist
extremism and a factor for peace and stability in Asia. By nature, India is
not inclined to export ideologies, even ideologies it believes in and
follows. India would rather promote democracy in the region by precept and
example. Freer traffic between India and Central Asia would be a factor in
favour of moderation and democracy there. Beyond
the immediate region, India has vital interests in the Gulf and South-east
Asia. The Gulf forms parts of our strategic neighbourhood and important
source of energy, home to over the 3.5 million Indians, and a major trading
partner. Parts of it are also a source of ideology, funding and recruits to
the cause of Islamic radicalism and terrorism. Iraq remains volatile.
Iran’s nuclear intentions and the response of the international community
have introduced a new factor of uncertainty in an already highly disturbed
region. South-east
Asia too plays an important role in our strategic perceptions as a dynamic
partner in our growing economy and on account of our ethnic and cultural
ties. We also have a vital interest in preserving the traditions of peaceful
coexistence and syncreticism amongst their diverse ethic and religious
communities against the intrusion of dogmatic, alien, fundamentalist and
extremist religious tendencies. Let
me now turn to our security deficit. 21st century India faces peculiar
security challenges. We live in a dangerous neighborhood. Few other
countries in the world face the full spectrum of threats to their security
as India does, from low intensity conflicts to an unfriendly nuclearized
neighbourhood. Our response to such an environment has been anything but
militaristic. First,
India is located at the centre of an arc of fundamentalist activism,
terrorism and political instability between North and East Africa and
South-east Asia that has witnessed some of the most dramatic acts of
terrorism over the last decade, from the US embassy bombings of Nairobi and
Mombasa, through incidents in Morocco, Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Bali and
Jakarta, not to forget the Bombay blasts of 1992. In the catalogue of
terrorist events, it is not often realized that, the Bombay blasts were,
arguably, the original act of mass terrorism, eerily similar in modus
operandi and targets to 9/11 in its synchronized, serial character and
targeting of state and economic symbols. Second,
though innately pacifist through its history, India has, since independence,
faced aggression and conflicts with its two largest neighbors. At least one
has been openly hostile and adventurist through this entire period. There
are unresolved territorial and boundary issues with the other. Talks have
commenced with both, but the situation is not yet such that we can lower our
guard. Third,
India faces on a daily basis, a proxy war from across its borders using
terrorism and local insurgencies. There are also spillovers of internal
conflicts in neighbouring countries and threats to internal security from
extremist movements from within. Fourth,
India is faced with an unfavourable nuclear and missile environment. Apart
from two declared nuclear weapon states with whom we have had a history of
aggression and conflict, and proliferation emanating from, and to, the
region, we have to contend with the possibility of WMDs falling into the
hands of terrorists and non-state actors in our vicinity. Fifth,
we have to contend with instability and failing states in our neighborhood
providing the breeding ground for terrorists and other non-state actors Last,
the maritime security environment requires more attention. As already
indicated, the Indian Ocean region from East Africa to South-east Asia is an
area busy with fundamentalist, terrorist, and militant, separatist or
extremist organizations, and criminal syndicates involved in trafficking in
drugs, arms and humans, and piracy. 60,000 ships, and much of the energy
from the Gulf to East Asia, transit through the Stratis of Malacca every
year. It
has important ports and three vulnerable choke-points at Bab-el-Mandab, the
Persian Gulf and the Malacca Straits. As the recent tsunami and countless
cyclones of the past have shown, it is also a region prone to disasters. These
security concerns are not unique to India. To some degree, most nations face
them in some degree or the other. But few face them all together like India
does. But what they underline is a convergence of our security concerns with
those of the international community at large, and with the US in
particular, over fundamentalist activism and terrorism; proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction; security of shipping, energy and the sea-lanes
in the Indian Ocean region; and peace and stability in Asia. In all these,
India finds itself at the front-line. We
do not have the time to dwell on each of these at any length. But I would
like to touch briefly on our approach to, and our role, in maritime security
in our region. Our approach to it is essentially cooperative. We now have
coordinated maritime patrolling arrangements with Indonesia, Thailand and
Sri Lanka. Our Navy has been providing hydrographic assistance to Indonesia,
Seychelles and Mauritius, and maritime security cover for Summit Conferences
in Mozambique. The Coast Guard and Navy have been active in anti-piracy,
disaster relief, and environmental management and response operations. The
Navy has also been conducting joint exercises in the Indian Ocean with the
US, France, Singapore, Russia and Oman amongst others. In 2002, we provided
escort operations for high value US naval assets passing through the Malacca
Straits. The Indian Navy holds the MILAN Naval Exercises off Andaman and
Nicobar islands every two years. On the security of Malaccas, we are
comfortable with its management by the littoral states and would be happy to
join a regional initiative, if necessary, and if the littoral states are
comfortable with our participation. I
would like to highlight three aspects of our economic deficit. First, the
energy deficit. India is a heavily energy deficient country. Of all the
variables that could hinder India’s economic progress, energy scarcity and
dependence are probably the most serious. 70% of our crude oil is imported.
Per capita energy consumption presently is only 1/5th of the world average.
Considering a high growth rate of around 8% of GDP per annum in the coming
years, growth of oil demand is projected to be 6% per annum. If so,
dependence on oil imports could rise from 70% to 80-85% over the next two
decades. It
is therefore imperative for us to look for cost-effective and long-term
alternatives to meet our energy requirements. Indian oil companies are
currently actively involved in a search for energy in the form of oil and
gas fields, pipelines, LNG, and other new and non-conventional sources. But
most hydrocarbon resources underline our dependence on limited reserves, and
others, for this critical requirement. They also carry scope for avoidable
strategic energy rivalries. If
indeed India is to realize its economic potential, India needs alternative
sources of energy. Foremost among those available, is nuclear energy. India
has indigenously developed technologies for nuclear energy. But, as in many
other areas of dual use or high technology, India faces serious impediments
of access to materials and components. India’s nuclear tests were a
response to an increasingly untenable security environment. We have already
announced a restrained and responsible doctrine for its role in our
security. Our nuclear energy and security programmes are separate.
Restrictions against India’s nuclear energy programme are anachronistic.
US and India have now commenced a dialogue through the NSSP and the energy
dialogue to address some of these restrictions. Their easing will impact
favourably on our economic prospects over the next 2-3 decades. The
second constraint is a technology deficit. Technology control regimes going
back to the Cold War, and restrictions on transfer of dual use, nuclear and
space technology imposed after our first atomic test in 1974, remain. One of
the reasons for the economic gap between India and other comparable
countries is the restrictive and discriminatory technology regimes imposed
against India for 30 years. If India is to play its part as an engine of
growth and factor of stability in Asia, it should be in the interest of the
US and others that such regimes are liberalized as quickly as possible. The
third is the agricultural deficit. Agriculture is still India’s chief
livelihood. From a chronically famine-prone and food deficit country, India
has moved to becoming first self-sufficient, and now a food exporting
country. Yet, most agriculture in India is still that of subsistence
farmers. While they do not have the benefit of access to, and integration
with, the world economy, they suffer from the vagaries of both nature and
the globalized market. This
is an area where the interests of the rich countries and their farmers, both
traditional and commercial, diverge. We are trying to address the issue of a
fairer deal to the problems of this vast agricultural sector, in the WTO.
Unless this issue is addressed as an issue of livelihood that affects 600
million people in India alone, we run the risk of a schizophrenic economy
where one half prospers from the globalization, and the other suffers. This
would neither socially nor politically sustainable. The
last issue that I would like to touch on is the global decision-making
deficit, or India’s place in the major decision-making bodies of the
world. If globalization is inexorable, multilateralism has to be its life
sustaining mechanism. The world has changed dramatically since the
constitution of the United Nations and its present composition of Security
Council members. In the interim, the bipolar, confrontationist edifice of
the Cold War has collapsed. The Cold War structure of global governance
stands dismantled, but an enduring replacement that can address the economic
and security challenges of our times and the future, is not in place. As
a new order struggles to be born, the obvious reality in our increasingly
globalized world is the growing interdependence among nations. No one
country, whatever its economic, technological, and military eminence, can
take on the exclusive responsibility of ensuring peace and order in the
whole world. In Asia alone, new powers, like China and Japan, have emerged.
The European Union may have suffered a jolt, but the idea remains powerful.
Russia may be facing problems of transition, but is too important to ignore.
A unipolar world is clearly not a sustainable proposition in the long run.
India’s vision of a multipolar world is one of partnership among the
nations. It does not visualize the creation of poles in opposition to one
another. It has sought geometries across continents, like the
India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) Forum, the Russia-China-India
consultations, the Group of Four for United Nations Security Council reform.
The early reform and reinvigoration of the UN system to reflect changed
ground realities acquire a certain urgency in this context. By any criteria
– size, population, economy, military power, role in international
peacekeeping, responsibility in international affairs, future prospects,
etc. India is a natural candidate. I
have today, highlighted those factors that prevent India from realizing its
potential to contribute to international peace, stability and development.
Asia hosts a diversity of political experiences and experiments ranging from
monarchies and military dictatorships, to nascent and established
democracies. The region also faces the menace of terrorism and trafficking
in, and proliferation of arms and drugs. In the midst of this, India stands
as a bulwark against fundamentalism and extremism, a centre of economic
gravity, a beacon of democracy despite challenges of human diversity,
poverty and economic disparity, a bastion of stability, and a symbol of
peaceful coexistence and non-violence. India
is not an aggressive country; it does not harbour any territorial ambitions;
it does not espouse or export any particular ideology, except the spirit of
peace, co-existence and tolerance. It has a strong military only to defend
itself and protect its territorial integrity. It is one of the world’s
oldest civilizations, but a new nation; the largest democracy of a
bewildering mix of people and populations that has learnt to accommodate and
assimilate over the ages. It is a country with the second largest population
of Muslims in the world, who have suffered loss of political power to the
Europeans and partition after that, to embrace a secular constitution. It
does not provide recruits to a global ‘jehad’. Today, when a more mobile
world looks for models of co-existence, where minorities live abroad as
immigrants or expatriates, India’s historical experience of co-existence
could be a valuable reference point. Which
brings me to my last point this evening, India-US relations. The US and
India have often been referred to as ‘estranged democracies’. Perhaps
history itself to blame. It is a striking historical coincidence that India
came under the grip of colonialism just as the US found its independence.
When India gained independence, the world entered the period of the Cold
War. As if destined to ignore each other, the US and India looked in
different directions. Today, more than ever, the US and India realize that
they share common values and security concerns; and that there is an
objective convergence of interests. It is crucial that India and the US work
together with the international community to find a new order for the 21st
century. The
United States has the richest collection of strategic think tanks in the
world. We are here in one that has made a big contribution to the literature
of international relations, and the practice of conflict resolution. I look
forward to a closer partnership not only at the level of government, but
also, scholars, thinkers and people in general.
Thank you, ladies and gentlemen. |