The coup and its consequence

By V. R. Raghavan appeared in "The Hindu" on October 23, 1999

A COUP is not unusual in Pakistan but the context of the coup de main delivered by its military makes the latest one especially unique. The sword-bearers of Pakistan have set out to clear the Aegean stables of corruption and malfeasance. It remains to be seen how long it would take them to relearn the lesson that the man on horseback is no match to the popularly elected political leader, when it comes to legitimacy and the public's fealty. In the interim, the consequences of the coup will be felt even outside Pakistan. They might lead to outcomes the military would find difficult to cope with.

The coup of 1999 is unique in the confidence of its makers. The assumption that it will be accepted by the world and the major powers, at the turn of the century, demonstrates an amazing belief in the military's legitimacy to rule. The reasons which allowed the acceptance of earlier coups, i.e. cold war compulsions, the Afghan imbroglio, etc., have disappeared. The anxieties on terrorism originating in Pakistan, which affects a swathe of the globe from the United States through Europe to Asia, have on the other hand increased manifold. A military leadership with close linkages to terrorist groups in and outside Pakistan would only worsen the international response to military rule in that country.

Earlier coups in Pakistan were made to ostensibly clean the political impasse which had led to a breakdown of governance. The economic condition of Pakistan was never as perilous as it is now. Economic failure was never the reason for earlier coups. Pakistan was not then as heavily involved in trans-border terrorism as now. The public in Pakistan, however, was rarely as disillusioned as now with the political leadership across the board. It is ironic that the people of Pakistan, who well know the ills of military rule, were reduced to seeing the military intervention as a lesser evil, than governance by the elected but short-sighted political leaders.

In a world which has changed greatly in its perceptions of human rights, of liberal political values and of peaceful political change, the military of Pakistan reflects wholly different beliefs. What explains that attitude and the confidence in its infallibility? Why is military coup endemic to Pakistan? The answer lies in the role the military has arrogated to itself. Pakistan's military not only claims to be the defender of Pakistan but also the guardian of Islam. It is part of its doctrine, which is preached through military journals and effected in the training of its rank and file. Even amongst officers, the outward display of religious zeal is commonly to be witnessed.

The role of guardians of national values is considered to bestow on the military the right to intervene even against the constitution of the republic. The military determines when and by whom the erosion of national values has occurred. This time the military has gone on record that tampering with it was one of the reasons for the intervention. This places the military on a par with if not higher than the nation and the State itself. It would therefore suggest that in its determination to preserve itself, the military is willing to tamper with the nation. No wonder then that coups are considered perfectly legitimate by the military in Pakistan.

Political legitimacy to military rule does not come through proclamations backed by guns. It is granted through acquiescing in military rule, by nations who have the power and the capacity to influence international polity. The role of the United States and its cold war allies in sustaining military rule in Pakistan and even justifying it played no mean part in the building of the military ethos in Pakistan.

There is now talk of Pakistani military officers having lost out on the liberal American outlook, by not having been trained in U.S. military colleges. This is one of the reasons given for repealing the Pressler sanctions. There is even mention of Gen. Musharraf having missed out on such benefits by training only in the U.K.! It only needs to be stated that coups in Pakistan were more frequent in the years when a higher number of Pakistani military officers trained in U.S. military institutions. The relationship between a few months or a year's training in the U.S. and the building of a modern military outlook is at best an arguable one. What is therefore needed is not so much military training in western values, but action which firmly makes military intervention unacceptable.

It would be interesting to see the unfolding of military rule in Pakistan in the coming weeks. There is no guarantee that the Pakistani military is not divided into factions. It is known that some of the senior officers are related to the Muslim League leadership. Some senior officers, including a Corps Commander, were not long ago summarily retired by Gen. Musharraf. An army officer in the Intelligence Bureau resigned rather than take orders from the army in pursuance of his civilian duties. It is reported that not all Corps Commanders were in the know of the Kargil plan until it backfired. This had led to some rumblings. The Punjabi and Mohajir ratio amongst the Corps Commanders is also a factor of some importance. It would not be surprising if the seemingly united military shows up dissensions in the future. This would be more likely if the political impasse continues, or the economic pressures mount, or if the law and order situation and the sectarian violence worsen further.

Mr. Nawaz Sharif, though incarcerated, still has some cards in his favour. He is the legitimate political leader chosen in a fair and free election. The parliament and his party had not acted against the interest of the State. The charges of anti- State activities being contemplated against him are evidence that his political legitimacy worries the military. When Mr. Sharif and Ms. Bhutto were earlier dismissed from office they were not prevented from again seeking election. On what grounds can Mr. Sharif be denied that right in the next election, if it is held? The promulgation that Gen. Musharraf, as Chief Executive, is above the legal and constitutional provisions shows the military's anxieties on its legitimacy being questioned. The frantic search for some camp followers who can give the desperately needed civilian camouflage to the military is evidence of its vulnerabilities.

The view is being put out in Pakistan that politicians are the cause of all ills. It is said that an early election would not lead to stability. The alternative proposed is to have an interim government for up to five years. Such an interim arrangement will comprise men of integrity and skills and would be legitimised by a referendum. This is expected to cleanse Pakistan of all its ills and allow it to risk another popularly elected government. The expedient of an interim government does not explain how major decisions would be taken and implemented. It is not clear what the military's response would be to major aid and lending groups' demand that military expenditures be brought down, as a condition for economic aid.

The consequences of Pakistan being ruled by a military leadership with long association with the Taliban and proven anti-India beliefs are not be underestimated. The major issues of Kashmir, nuclear risk reduction, economic and trade initiatives, etc., would have to be put on hold until the situation becomes clearer. The urgency being impressed upon India by some powers to hasten the negotiation on Kashmir would now be out of place, at least in the near future. The military, having cold shouldered the Lahore Declaration, is unlikely to work for its restoration. The impact on Afghanistan of a military leadership ruling in Islamabad would at best be unpredictable. The lowering, let aside the elimination of terrorist support from Pakistan, would become unrealisable. In the interim, when things do not work out within its boundaries, Pakistani military will raise the ante on the Line of Control and in the Kashmir valley. The coup bodes ill on many fronts.

(The writer is Director, Delhi Policy Group and a former Director-General of Military Operations).