Editorial appeared in "The Times of India" on August 18, 1999

The draft document on Indian nuclear doctrine prepared by the National Security Advisory Board and released for discussion by the caretaker government is a coherent and sober text which represents well the middle-ground of the nuclear debate in this country.

Even though the NSAB excluded out-and-out critics of the Vajpayee government's decision to test nuclear weapons last May, there was considerable heterogeneity in the outlook and views of its members on basic issues like no-first-use, minimum versus maximalist deterrence, the desirability of adherence to the CTBT and the like. That such a group has nevertheless been able to come up with a consensual position on the aims and objectives of India's nuclear capability, the nature of its nuclear forces, the question of credibility and survivability and other aspects of doctrine is commendable. Equally worthy of approbation is the government's decision to release the draft for public debate. Of all the existing nuclear weapon states, India is unique for the quantity and quality of the public discussion which preceded and followed its decision openly to go nuclear. None of the other NWSs conducted anything even remotely similar to what India did. China, Russia, the US and Britain certainly did not; France had a debate of sorts prior to going nuclear but not quite as comprehensive as the one India had. By spelling out its doctrine in black and white, India is also demonstrating its maturity as a nuclear power. One does not have to accept the NSAB's logic in order to recognise that the doctrine it has evolved is measured and precise.

At the same time, the draft should not be seen as something which is cast in stone. As it stands, the document raises several problems which need to be fully discussed. The first is that of costs. While the NSAB has wisely avoided quantifying the credible minimum deterrent, its emphasis on survivability and retaliation ``even in a case of significant degradation by hostile strikes'' means India's arsenal is not going to be particularly small. In terms of delivery, the draft advocates a triad of aircraft, mobile land-based missiles and ``sea-based assets'' -- presumably submarine-launched missiles -- and ``space-based and other assets...to provide early warning, communications, damage/detonation assessment''. When the cost of a robust command and control system is also factored in, it is clear that the fiscal impact will be far greater than what the Vajpayee-led government claimed would be the case after the Pokhran II tests. The NSAB's call for ``highly effective conventional military capabilities'' as a complement to nuclear forces will further increase the financial burden. Secondly, the NSAB doctrine calls for various security and safety-oriented mechanisms but given this country's notorious record of public safety, there are bound to be widespread misgivings on this account. When the government finds it impossible to prevent even routine train accidents, how competent is it to shoulder the responsibility of handling ``sufficient, survivable and operationally prepared'' nuclear forces? The notion of ``designated successors'' to the Prime Minister in the event of a decapitating first strike is also bound to raise constitutional and political complications given the fractious nature of India's polity. Apart from these questions, many other issues will arise following public scrutiny of the document. The scope and opportunity given for this discussion will help to validate both the draft doctrine and the democratic sovereignty it seeks to protect.