By Narendra Gupta appeared in "The Hindu" on August 17, 1999
The writer is a retired Air Vice-Marshal

The Control of sovereign air space or the air envelope over our national land areas, island territories and territorial waters is the prime task of the Air Force. Therefore, throughout all phases of tension or conflict, Air Defence Operations are prominent in securing our air space. In the present situation, post-Kargil, tensions are high and the air defence forces on both sides of the border are on alert. In normal peace time also, no country with an inimical neighbour lets its air defence guard down. This is so because Air Operations are the first line of defence against any foreign adventurism.

Air Defence has to guard against an adversary attempting to inflict any damage to the nation's vital interest. The unacceptable activity could be the para dropping of infiltrators or saboteurs or the dropping of arms for such people as happened some years ago at Purulia. These could include photo or electronic reconnaissance about our defence installations, of our radars, surface-to-air missiles, visual observation posts and command and control organisations and the related communications.

In the present circumstances, the French-built maritime reconnaissance Atlantique, in addition to carrying air-to-surface weapons and air-to-air missiles is known to be equipped with sensors for locating and recording the signatures of ships, surveillance radars, missile guidance radars and other electronic emissions it comes across.

The Air Defence Organisation in India has a number of regional Air Defence Direction Centres (ADDC). An ADDC controls in the designated geographical area, in real time, all air defence activity and all air defence assets including early warning posts and visual observers. It has information on all friendly and scheduled traffic and is therefore able to locate unknown or unfriendly tracks. Thus, by the process of elimination, threat identification is carried out and, if required, defensive weapons on readiness are designated to engage a doubtful or a patently hostile intruder.

Amongst the weapons or readiness are anti-aircraft guns and surface-to-air missiles for local defence and armed interceptor fighters. At an air base, these planes are located at the Operational Readiness Platform (ORP). The jets on readiness are placed in concrete shelters, called blast pens, with technicians on duty to assist in the immediate start up and taxi-out. In an adjoining protected room, called the Operational Readiness Room (ORR) are the Air Defence pilots in their flight suits and on full combat readiness. The ADDC has telephonic and other communications with all ORPs under its control. There are laid down standard operating procedures for the aircrew and the fighter controllers who carry out the interceptions on radar. For example, they have clear orders on the subject and are made fully aware of the 1991 agreement between India and Pakistan about combat planes of both countries staying a minimum of 10 km from the international border; the minimum distance for helicopters being 1 km. There was an active ORP at Naliya air base on that fateful Tuesday morning. At the ORP were two MiG-21s armed with the French Matra Magic air-to-air heat-seeking missiles and 23 mm machine guns.

In the case of the intruding Atlantique, its electronic sensor capability is well-known and therefore there was every good reason to take it to be a combat or spy plane. It could not possibly be on a training sortie so close to the border inside the 10 km sanitised zone. There was no prior information on the aircraft movement. It came close to the border at a height of about 3,000 feet travelling at a speed of about 370 kph (i.e., at about 6 km a minute or a little more than a kilometre every 10 seconds). It entered the prohibited 10 km and carried out a series of manoeuvres for about 15 minutes. Just this behaviour identified it as hostile to the controllers at the ADDC. It was obviously carrying out electronic reconnaissance and possibly looking for navigable creeks through which infiltrators and their weapons could be brought into Gujarat.

The fighters at the ORP at Naliya were scrambled at 10-57 a.m. The orders heard simultaneously on loud speakers at the ORR, blast pens and at the Air Traffic Control (to clear the ORP planes for immediate take off) may have been something like, this ``Mission 21 Scramble, Scramble, Scramble. Initial vector 010 (degrees), make Angels Two (height 2,000 feet. It is important to keep the interceptors below radar pick up height of the adversary and yet have them on your own radar). Contact Gypsy Control (the controlling radar unit) on Channel five''.

The two MiGs were airborne within two minutes. After take off the two pilots made radio contact with Control. Alpha, the leader, was Flying Officer Squadron Leader Prashant Bundela Bravo, the No. 2, was Sanjeev Narayan. The fighter controller at the ADDC had the two fighters and the Atlantique on his scope. He then started giving interception instructions to Alpha and Bravo. For a positive visual identification, the MiG pilots came close enough to recognise the intruder as an Atlantique with Pakistan Navy insignia. This was conveyed to the controller. The MiGs were kept on the Indian side of the border. The intruder was painting also on the airborne radar of the MiGs fire control system. By now he was about 10 km inside Indian air space. Alpha came close enough to indicate with hand signals that the Atlantique should follow him and land. It was at this time that the intruder started behaving in a hostile fashion. He did not comply with the internationally laid down procedure of lowering his undercarriage to indicate that he would land. Instead, he turned towards Bravo. This was considered a threatening manoeuvre. The ADDC declared the Atlantique hostile and cleared the pilots to fire missiles. Alpha manoeuvred his jet to a suitable position and fired one missile. It leaped forward and hit the hostile aircraft in the left engine.

The Atlantique started losing height and gliding northwards towards Pakistan. It appeared to go out of control, began a left turn and crashed on the border. It disappeared from the ADDC radar. The fighters were asked to disengage and given a vector to base.

It is apparent that while carrying out its mission the Atlantique was under the surveillance and control of the nearby Pakistani ADDC at Badin. That is why it was only at 3,000 feet. This was to ensure radar pick up by Badin radar and minimise chances of being noticed by Indian radars. The story by the Pakistani Inter Service spokesperson, Brig. Quereshi, that it was under the control of the civil ATC at Karachi, is clearly incorrect. Flying at 3,000 feet near or inside Indian air space in Kutch, it could not possibly appear on the distant Karachi radar. It would be interesting to hear the tape recorded conversation between the Badin radar controller and the crew of the Atlantique.

It is ironic that a French-built reconnaissance plane was shot down by a French-built air-to-air missile.