By Amos Perlmutter appeared in “The Washington Times” on November 17, 1999

Amos Perlmutter is professor of political science and sociology at American University and editor of the Journal of Strategic Studies.

 The failed rocket attack on U.S. and U.N. offices in Islamabad, Pakistan is not an isolated event. Nor is it necessarily the work of Osama bin Laden, the Saud terrorist based in Afghanistan. It could be the work of a motley group of fanatic, armed, Muslim terrorists. In addition to the Afghani Taliban, the following revolutionary Islamic movements and guerrillas operate in Pakistan: Jamaat a-Islami, Lashkar-e-Tayya­ba, and last but not least the Jehad a-Kashmiri, which played a role in supporting the Pakistani army in its war against India in Kargil last summer. It is not indisputable that one or more of these groups are involved in the rocket attack.

The Pakistani army has become a hotbed for Islamic radicals and terrorist groups. During the Afghan war against the Soviet Union, Pakistan was a strategic center for training militant Muslims under the supervision of the CIA. Some of these professionally trained groups now are allies of the Pakistan Army. The arrest in Islamabad of Ramzi Ahmad Youssef, the terrorist response for the attack on the World Trade Center in New York, who was brought to justice in New York, revealed a pattern of operations conducted by Islamic militants in Pakistan and their connections with the Pakistani army.

The U.S. administration must face the reality of the present Pakistan. During the Cold War it was the dar­ling of the United States, which helped its military when the Nehru family of neutralists, socialists, and pro-Soviet leaders dominated India. Thus, the United States as a counterbalance to the pro-Soviet India supported Pakistan, so unstable it finally divided into two states -Pakistan and Bangladesh. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the emer­gence of a pro-Western Indian government that realized the importance of the United States to India politically, economically and militarily, has caused a sea change in relationships. Unfortunately, the administration is still engulfed in a Cold War anachronism.

The Pakistani army, the center of anti-Indian sentiment, rallied radical Islamic forces to the cause. Pakistan is a poor country, and recruitment to the army benefits the poor who are inclined to Islamic fundamentalism. In fact, the hundreds of Islamic seminaries have become breeding grounds for terrorism and centers for the recruit­ment of junior officers to the Pakistan army. Thus, the army has become a harbinger for Islamic ideological orientations. The Afghani Taliban has played a key role in conjunction with the Pakistan army policy of recruiting radical Muslims. In the case of Kashmir, Gen. Pervaiz Musharrraf, the illegal and illegitimate leader of the recent mil­itary coup, has supported the Jehad el-Kashmiri terrorist organization. Brahma Chellaney, an Indian strategic specialist, writes in The Washington Times, Nov. 13, "The coup leader belongs to the com­mando Special Services Group, which has played the main role in training and arming Indian Sikh and Kashmiri separatists. In an address to his nation after seizing power, Gen. Musharraf publicly pledged 'unflinching' support to Kashmiri militants."

The administration hope that the political change in Pakistan will enhance Indian-Pakistani relations is false. In fact, for all intents and purposes the Lahore Agreement that brought upon the cease-fire in the Kargil War is no longer valid. You cannot expect the present military leader of Pakistan to behave any differently than former military leaders have in the past. For half of Pakistan’s 50-year history, it has been dominated by the military.

According to Mr. Chellaney, it was the military ruler Mohammad Zia ul-Haq (1977-1988) that "began secretly training and arming Indian Sikh and Kashmir militants."  What prompts the administration to be literally mute on such radical change where a military dictator has overthrown a democratically elected government?

What happened to the neo-Wilsonian Clintonians? Why are they so silent? Silence is the political equivalent to legitimizing the regime. Is it in the false hope that cautionary support of the Pak­istani military will enhance a better relationship with India? This runs against the reality of the situation. What is most disturbing is that Pakistan is an ally of China, our foremost rival in the Pacific and South Asia. Is it because Pakistan has become a nuclear power? The Soviet Union was, and we did not shy away from continuously challenging it. Why should we behave differently concerning Pakistan than we did with the Soviet Union? It is indeed disturb­ing that the administration continues to misread the balance of power in Asia.

China, communist or otherwise, is going to be America's rival in the Pacific into the early decades of the 21st century. To meet this challenge, we must design a strategy of encircling China with friendly states. This does not mean endorsing a belligerent policy toward China. This becomes obvious when reading the political map of China and its aspirations. We can no longer appease China. This is a policy of futility. The aggressive Chinese should recognize that friendly allies of the United States encircle them: Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, the Philippines, Indonesia and India. India should serve as the central strategic ally of the United States as Germany was during the Cold War.

Unless Pakistan changes its domestic Islamic and radical ori­entation and brings and end to the Talibanization of its political and religious culture, and unless Pak­istan realizes that playing between the United States and China is no longer an option, there will be no sound and satisfying American policy in Asia and the Pacific.