| Introduction The United Nations Organisation was conceived at London in 1941 as
the successor to the League of Nations, which was perceived to have failed in its most
important function, that of preventing a second world war. Twenty six countries at war
with Germany and Japan, met in Washington on Ist January 1942, where they expressed their
faith that the anarchy of international relations must be controlled. The Charter of the
United Nations, as signed in 1945, set out a code of behaviour by which nations would work
together to eliminate aggression, and promote economic and social security. The central
aim of the United Nations Charter was to "maintain international peace and
security, and to that end, take collective measures for the prevention and removal of
threats to peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression".
Chapter Vl of the Charter regarding pacific
settlement of disputes, obliges parties to a dispute that is likely to endanger
international peace and security, to seek a solution by "negotiation, enquiry,
mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or
arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice". Chapter VII of the
Charter confers powers on the Security Council to take resort to the use of armed force,
should various other measures fail, in order to maintain or restore international peace
and security, under this Chapter, member states are also required to provide armed forces
and other assistance and facilities for the purpose In pursuance of this latter provision,
in April 1947, the Military Staff Committee (also provided for in this Chapter),
apparently produced a report which agreed that the five permanent members should provide
the bulk of the armed forces, but members of the Committee were unable to agree on the
size and locations of such forces and the balance of contributions, thanks to the degree
of political mistrust that then prevailed. The military arrangements foreseen in the
Charter therefore never became reality (and probably just as well when viewed in context
of what we witness today), leaving the United Nations without the means of enforcement to
promote what was the central aim.
Concept and Evolution of United Nations
Peacekeeping Operations
In the early years of the existence of the United
Nations therefore, while the use of military personnel on a large scale, and under the
exact terms of the Charter, was being discussed with diminishing prospect of agreement,
experiments in using them on a far smaller scale evolved almost by accident. Small groups
of unarmed military observers formed part of the United Nations missions in Greece in
1947, in West Asia and India/Pakistan in 1949, this became a regular feature of United
Nations peacekeeping missions, and continues to this day, even in missions where armed
military contingents are deployed.
It is no doubt well known, that there is no specific
provision for peacekeeping in the United Nations Charter. It is an invention of the United
Nations Secretary General and his Secretariat, and evolved as a non-coercive instrument of
conflict control, at a time when Cold War constraints precluded the use of the more
forceful steps permitted by the Charter. During the Cold War, neither of the two Super
Powers were amenable to United Nations intervention against their allies or within their
spheres of influence. Hence an improvisation - peacekeeping without combat connotations
- emerged.
As it evolved over the years, peacekeeping became an
extraordinary art because it called for the use of the military personnel not to wage war,
but to prevent fighting between belligerents, to ensure the maintenance of cease-fires,
and to provide a measure of stability in an area of conflict while negotiations were
conducted. To that extent, it is important to distinguish between the concept
of"collective security" and peacekeeping in the international environment.
Whereas the former is a punitive process designed to be carried out with some degree of
discrimination, but not necessarily impartially, the latter is politically impartial and
essentially non-coercive. Hence peacekeeping was, and has always been, based on a triad of
principles that give it legitimacy, as well as credibility, namely, consent of the
parties to the conflict, impartiality of the peacekeepers, and the use of force by lightly
armed peacekeepers only in self-defence.
The premise on which international peacekeeping is
based is that violence in inter-state and intra-state conflict can be controlled without
resort to the use of force or enforcement measures. Needless to say, there are many
theorists, and I dare say, a few practitioners, who are of the view that force needs to be
met with force. An objective analysis of the history of conflicts would make it evident
that the use of force and enforcement measures, particularly in internal conflicts, tend
to prolong the conflict rather than resolve it speedily. This is not however, to suggest
that the use of force is to be ruled out altogether; in certain circumstances, use of
force may well be called for as a catalyst for peaceful resolution.
Enforcement actions, by their very nature, are
subjective and biased towards one side or another, as such, if prolonged, which they
invariably will be, particularly in intra-state or internal conflicts, they tend to be
counter-productive. Peacekeeping initiatives, on the other hand, will also only often
ensure a status-quo, and thus be equally counter-productive, unless complemented by
associated initiatives as peacemaking (working towards a negotiated political solution),
and peace-building (working towards the restoration of an equitable economic and social
order, among other nation building activities). Peacekeeping operations, being more
objective and nonpartisan, lay a stable base for the pursuit of peacemaking and
peace-building. Quite often however, a measure of stability brought about by cessation of
hostilities, is not exploited speedily to progress peacemaking activity, and there is a
reversion to conflict, for which ironically the peacekeepers are blamed, rather than those
who should have exploited the advantage.
The Cold War Era
In the first 45 years of the existence of the United
Nations, in so far as conflict resolution is concerned, there were many significant
instances where peacekeeping was not applied. In super power confrontations like the
Berlin and Cuban missile crises, the United Nations had only a peripheral role. In
situations where super power interests were directly involved, as in Czechoslovakia and
Hungary, as also in some Latin American conflicts, the United Nations played only a
marginal role. West European nations did not permit any significant role for the United
Nations in conflicts like Northern Ireland, the conflict between the United Kingdom and
Iceland over fishing rights, and the Falklands war. Similarly, the United Nations was
excluded from a role in a number of conflict situations in Asia and Africa, the Chinese
occupation of Tibet, the Sino-Indian and Sino-Soviet border conflicts, the war in
Indo-China, the Vietnamese action in Kampuchea, the Chinese action against Vietnam, and
the conflict in the horn of Africa.
Notwithstanding these exclusions, United Nations
peacekeeping operations covered various corners of the globe in furtherance of one of the
primary purposes of the United Nations Charter, namely, maintenance of international peace
and security. United Nations peacekeeping in the form of military contingents, had its
beginning with the establishment of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) in the Gaza
Strip and the Sinai in end 1956, after a cease-fire had been arranged. The force consisted
of contingents from eight countries including India. The success of the UNEF, appears to
have induced the Security Council to readily accept a request by the Congo in July 1960
for intervention on attaining independence from Belgium. The United Nations accepted
responsibility for ending secession and re-unifying the country. The Rules of Engagement
were modified to cater for the use of force in defence of the mission, in carrying out
humanitarian tasks, and in countering mercenaries. The other major undertakings
attempted by the United Nations during the Cold War era were the Cyprus operation (which
still continues), and the Namibia operation, which oversaw that country's transition to
independence, and may be considered as one of the success stories.
Post Cold War Era
With the end of the Cold War, United Nations
activities in the maintenance of international peace and security increased considerably,
the impact being both quantitative and qualitative. As of end 1998, the United Nations had
mounted 49 peacekeeping operations; of this, 15 were established in the forty years from
1948 to 1988, whereas the other 34 were set up since 1989. In January 1988, 11,121
military, police and civilian personnel were deployed in United Nations peacekeeping
operations, and the annual budget for peacekeeping was $230.4 million; in December 1994,
at the height of such commitment, 77,783 personnel were deployed and the annual budget was
$ 3.6 billion. However, by end 1998, the total number of military personnel and civilian
police monitors deployed had come down to approximately 14,500. The corresponding figures
for the number of countries contributing contingents showed an increase from 26 to 74 and
down to 37; still very significant. Of even more significance is the over-riding priority
given to Europe with six of the seventeen missions now in place; the others being four in
West Asia, four in Africa, two in other parts of Asia (namely the outdated mission in
India/Pakistan, and the other in Tajikistan), and one in the Americas (Haiti). The irony
is that the deployment in Europe is in addition to a significant regional investment.
The qualitative change is even more important, in
that most of the recent conflicts have taken place, or are taking place, within states, or
between units that were part of unitary states till they began to fall apart. They have
not always been fought by national armies, but by pare-militaries and irregulars; in which
process, civilians have been the main victims ( 90 % today against 10 % a decade or so
back). In many cases, state institutions have collapsed; in a few cases, there are no
governments. As a result, humanitarian emergencies have forced the international community
to intervene. This is why the demands on United Nations peacekeeping have gone well beyond
traditional peacekeeping, and encompassed activities like demobilisation of troops and
armed paramilitaries or irregulars, promotion of national reconciliation, restoration of
effective governments, the organisation and monitoring of elections, provision of broader
support to humanitarian aid missions, including protection of"safe areas" and
escort of relief convoys, and so on. United Nations peacekeeping operations have therefore
become more expensive, more complex, and more dangerous.
Problems and Prospects
General
The increasing demands placed on the international
community for intervention in conflicts across the world today, the wide range of
activities that need to be covered, and the greater complexities and dangers of peace
operations, have thrown up a number of issues, both dilemmas and challenges, that need to
be recognised, analysed, and catered for in the conduct of future peace operations. There
are more than enough lessons from the recent experiences of peace operations undertaken by
the international community, be they United Nations operations or multi-national
operations undertaken under the umbrella of Security Council resolutions - Angola,
Cambodia, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Somalia, and the former Yugoslavia.
Sharing of Responsibilities
The most important aspect to, emerge from the
experiences of the last seven years, is that the United Nations organisation was never
designed to handle commitments of the magnitude of Cambodia, Somalia, and the former
Yugoslavia, not even individually, whereas all three were undertaken, more or less
simultaneously, in 1992/93. It is therefore a tribute to the dedication and selflessness
of the United Nations Secretariat and the personnel who took part in these operations,
that they achieved even what they did, which, notwithstanding all the criticism, was
certainly not insignificant. Hence, there is an imperative need for building institutional
capabilities for the maintenance of international peace and security. An appropriate
division of responsibilities between the United Nations and other international actors in
the spheres of preventive action, peacemaking, peacekeeping, enforcement action, and peace
building, needs to be arrived at in order to enable more effective and comprehensive
responses to conflict situations around the world.
Such division of labour should obviously, take
advantage of the different capabilities and interests of regional organisations, national
governments, and non-governmental organisations. Current experiences indicate that the
United Nations may be most effective in the fields of preventive action, traditional
peacekeeping, humanitarian missions, mediation, and peacebuilding activities through its
various agencies. In time, regional organisations would need to assume a greater role in
assisting the United Nations in the maintenance of international peace and security, but
for the time being, these organisations could play a role in economic development,
peacemaking, and confidence building at the regional and sub-regional levels. For the
foreseeable future, it would appear that enforcement action to counter flagrant breach of
international conventions like outright aggression against a member state (as in the case
of the Iraqi action against Kuwait), will have to be undertaken by coalitions of"the
willing and the able", but under the umbrella of specific Security Council
Resolutions. Inevitably, this option will only be viable when the national interests of
key countries are sufficiently engaged by a particular development.
It is essential however, that the concept of sharing
of responsibilities for the execution of missions for the maintenance of international
peace and security be clearly understood. A mission is either undertaken by the United
Nations, or by a regional/subregional organisation, or a multi-national force, with; a
clear direction. There must never be any question of shared responsibility for command and
control for any aspects of execution within a mission, as was attempted in the former
Yugoslavia at later stages of the operation, between the United Nations and NATO, with the
disastrous results we are aware of. It is also important to stress that, for an operation
to be successful, there will invariably be a need for complementary efforts by other
players, in support of the main effort by the designated authority.
Anticipation and Monitoring
Analysis of some of the successful, or even
relatively successful, operations in the recent past, reveals the absolutely inescapable
need for the international community to anticipate events in potential trouble spots to
the extent feasible, monitor the actions of the major players or parties, and set in
motion, moves to defuse, or at least minimise the effects of, growing tensions. There can
be hardly any discussion on the suggestion that investing in social and economic
development is one of the surest ways of building a solid foundation for the long term,
within and between societies. This means addressing the roots of the conflict, and
trying to build a conflict response mechanism into the structure of development projects,
particularly in countries where the potential for conflict is high.
This can best be achieved by institutionalising
arrangements for constant collection of data from various regions through all available
agencies - United Nations, Governmental, non-governmental, and so on- in regard to the
state of affairs, particularly in potential conflict areas. This data would need to be
constantly updated, monitored and disseminated to various international actors/agencies
who have a role to play in ensuring the maintenance of international peace and security.
Cells could be set up for the purpose on a regional or sub-regional basis, appropriately
manned and equipped. Whereas it would appear more rational for such cells to be set up and
run by regional organisations, with the United Nations having access and inputs, given the
intense distrust and mutual suspicion that currently prevails in so far as the objectivity
of regional organisations is concerned, it may be prudent till a better climate of
international cooperation in governance is attained, to set up United Nations cells at
selected regional centres, for this purpose; needless to say, such cells must be manned by
international civilian, police, or military staff provided by member states on United
Nations payroll (for which obviously, the international community must provide funding).
It is indeed a serious reflection on the callousness
and indifference of the international community that in the case of developments in the
former Yugoslavia, Somalia and Rwanda for instance, neither those responsible for
negotiations, nor those who were tasked to undertake operations as they were set up under
the directions of the Security Council, were provided the maximum available information
and data on the events that led to the crisis, the stances of the political leadership of
the opposing sides, the nuances that were to significantly affect the attitudes of the
parties to the conflict, the military status of the belligerents, factual details of the
mission area, and so on.
Significant advantages that would accrue from an
institutionalised arrangement are that should it become necessary for the international
community to get involved in any of the measures towards ensuring the maintenance of
international peace and security, either by way of preventive action/deployment,
peacemaking, peacekeeping, enforcement action, and so on, up-to-date information and
analysis of the potential trouble spot can be readily made available, to the Security
Council, the negotiators, peacemakers, and key personnel of a mission that may be set up.
Together with this, is the other major advantage that should it be necessary to set up a
United Nations peacekeeping mission, a nucleus staff of civilian, police and military
personnel can provided by the concerned cell; this would not only ensure that the Mission
headquarters and sub-ordinate headquarters have personnel who have worked together before
and are aware of standard operating procedures, but also provide expertise about the
geo-political dynamics of the mission area, belligerent leadership stances, military
status of the various parties, and so on, all very important inputs for the successful
conduct of a mission
Political Resolve for Preventive Action and
Peacemaking
There can be hardly any disagreement that it is
better to prevent conflicts through anticipation by the institutionalised arrangements
suggested in preceding paragraphs, discreet diplomacy, and in some cases, preventive
deployment (as in the former Macedonian Republic of erstwhile Yugoslavia, which
incidentally, I had the privilege of setting up when I was still the Head of Mission) The
United Nations and other international actors must therefore invest a great deal more in
preventive action. Successful preventive action can be highly cost-effective, saving lives
and sparing general destruction; it is obviously considerably cheaper thank!an operation
to restore a broken peace, and covers a spectrum of activities that goes well beyond the
traditional notion of preventive diplomacy, and the new mechanism of preventive deployment
It must encompass a broad range of political, economic, social and humanitarian measures,
aimed at averting or de-escalating conflict. However, the dilemma will invariably be that
of determining whether national sovereignty is being trangressed, or should be
trangressed, asymmetry of response by the leadership of the parties to the conflict, the
possibility of misreading a developing situation until it is too late, or the lack of
interest or will on the part of the international community at critical moments,
Afghanistan and Rwanda are two notable examples.
For negotiations connected with preventive diplomacy
or for peacemaking, the international community requires dedicated and trusted envoys,
whether they be to pursue the efforts of the United Nations or a regional organisation,
the erstwhile Secretary General of the United Nations had apparently indicated difficulty
in securing the services of such persons. This lacuna must be resolved, as experience has
revealed the need for suitable eminent persons to undertake effective negotiations that
really provide the basis for the success of a mission or its lack of success.
It is a matter of record that it is not possible to
have successful peacekeeping without a determined and successful peace process.
Peacekeeping and peace-building activities are not self-sustainable, they have to be
nurtured by a process of negotiations, or peacemaking, during which the parties to the
conflict are made to redefine their interests and develop a commitment to a political
settlement. The fact that most successful missions in the last decade, or even the
partially successful ones - Namibia, El Salvador, Cambodia and Mozambique - were the
result of years of negotiations, in which many third-party international actors, including
the USA, participated, is no accident Although the wars in these areas went on for a long
time, they illustrate that it is better to take the time to get the details of a
settlement right, than to initiate a peacekeeping process that is flawed in its concept
and content, as so glaringly made apparent in the inadequately planned and prepared United
Nations deployment in the former Yugoslavia and Somalia. It takes firm political resolve
and unified concerted action from outside actors to make the parties to the conflict come
to terms with one another, and work towards a negotiated settlement. In so far as Somalia
is concerned, after a futile effort, the international community "washed its hands
off" the affair, and have left the people to their fate. In the former Yugoslavia,
after a long period of indecision, symbolism and rhetoric, during which many lives were
lost and considerable destruction wrought, powerful third parties, with the USA leading
the field, played a critical role in coercing the parties to the conflict to a negotiated
settlement, as well as in advancing the peace process after the settlement was arrived at,
it will remain a matter of eternal shame that the international community, because of
utter incompetence, lack of foresight, and poor statesmanship, did not secure a negotiated
settlement in end 1992, on more or less the same terms as that negotiated in Dayton in
November 1995.
Clarity of Purpose and Setting an Achievable
Mandate
If there is one lesson that emerges very distinctly
from the experience of recent operations, it is the imperative need for the Security
Council to carefully deliberate over decisions for the setting up of peace operations. The
Yugoslav and Somalia operations were set up under pressure; in the former case from the
European Community, and in the latter from the electronic media. Because these were set up
without adequate preparations and a framework of an agreed settlement, both suffered from
what came to be known as "mission creep"
In the case of the former Yugoslavia, whereas the
United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), as it was called, was set up with a mandate
for tasks connected with three United Nations Protected Areas (UNPAs) in Croatia, and for
which the military, police and civilian personnel, and the equipment had not yet arrived
in full even by end-June 1992, the Security Council commenced conferring extensions of
mandate without ensuring that the negotiated base for execution of such additional tasks
had been laid, and without providing for the resources in personnel and equipment. In the
six months between end-June and December 1992, I received nine extensions of the mandate,
namely, reopening of Sarajevo airport for humanitarian purposes, establishment of a joint
commission and functions in "pink zones" in Croatia, monitoring of heavy weapons
around Sarajevo, immigration and customs functions on UNPA boundaries that run along state
borders, deployment in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) for escort of humanitarian aid convoys,
monitoring of demilitarisation of the Prevlaka peninsula, deployment of observers at
airfields and monitoring of the "no fly zone" over BiH, control of Peruca Dam,
and preventive deployment in Macedonia; I need hardly mention that I never came close to
having the resources for the execution of all these tasks even till I left the Mission on
2nd March 1993. What I must mention however, because it is not often well understood, is
that the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina exploded in our faces while we were setting up
for the mission in Croatia, and even so, till I left the Mission on 2nd March 1993,
UNPROFOR never had a mandate for "peacekeeping" in Bosnia-Herzegovina. I have
dwelt with this aspect at some length, to emphasise the requirement for a clear mandate,
and the allocation of resources for the purpose.
One gets the impression that the lesson has been
learnt, but given the propensity for expediency in international politics, it would not be
perverse to suggest that should similar situations arise in the future, there is every
possibility that we may go the same route. Such a situation may well be avoided by some
structural reform of the Security Council. Decisions pertaining to the setting up of
missions, the mandates conferred, the composition of the force, the rules of engagement,
reviews of conduct and performance of such missions from time to time, and so on, cannot,
and must not, be the sole prerogative of two or three powerful members of the Security
Council. The decision making process must be more broad-based, and the consultative
process even more so. Any reform of the Security Council should seek to achieve four main
objectives: clarification of the role and mandate of the Council; reconstitution of its
membership, broadening of the base of participation and transparency in the work of the
Council, and strengthening the effectiveness and credibility of the Council.
Availability of Forces for Peace Operations
There is no greater legitimacy for the use of
military forces, and for that matter, civilian police, than for the maintenance of
international peace and security It should therefore be a matter of honour and privilege
for countries to provide such forces for peace missions. However, the practical experience
in this context is rather dismal. The inordinate delay in the arrival of troops in the
mission area was a most frustrating feature of the missions that were set up for the
former Yugoslavia and Cambodia, and to some extent, Somalia, even more inexcusable was the
inadequate response for Rwanda. One of the measures that has now been instituted to
overcome this inadequacy is the earmarking of"stand by" forces by member states;
most commendable and needs to be pursued with vigour. As of today, this arrangement
provides for about 100,000 personnel pledged by 74 member states. However, it is a moot
point whether such "stand by" forces would, in fact, be available immediately on
demand, the Rwandan experience indicates that political expediency and domestic
compulsions will always dictate the responses of member states.
Needless to say, because of the increasing dangers
inherent in the conduct of peace operations, there is greater reluctance on the part of
contributor nations to expose their troops to what is perceived as "some other
parties' war". This attitude cannot but be condemned as perverse In a world that is
shrinking every day in terms of communications, mutual accessibility and inter-dependence,
we owe it to succeeding generations that we make it a safer place to live in. In so far as
dangers to troops are concerned, I can state without fear of any contradiction from my
fellow military professionals, irrespective of the countries they may belong to, that no
self respecting soldier, sailor or airman, would have any reservations whatsoever in
participating in any peace operation provided the mandate is clear, achievable, adequate
resources are provided, and he is assured that it has the political backing and support of
the international community. The very reason for sending military personnel into a mission
area is that there is an element of danger, which by their training they are reasonably
well equipped to face up to; if there was no danger, there is no reason why a group of
civilians cannot undertake the task. Having stated that however, it needs to be emphasised
that because the military as a well disciplined force, undertakes an allotted mission
without questioning the political merits and demerits, a greater responsibility devolves
on those who confer the mandate.
Having analysed the aspect of ready) availability of
forces for United Nations peace operations in some detail,-I am of the view (contrary to
the establishment view), that the only real answer for meeting crisis situations that call
for speedy deployment of military forces for the maintenance of international peace and
security, is to raise and maintain a standing United Nations Force of a defined
composition, properly organised and trained, and adequately equipped, to be available to
the United Nations for immediate deployment when authorised to do so by the Security
Council. Reservations about costs, and possible biased utilisation at the behest of the
more powerful members of the Security Council, are aspects that need to be resolved in
context of the restructuring of the Security Council. Utilisation of such a force is
premised on its early replacement by another force duly constituted by the United Nations,
by regional organisations, or by a multi-national force, as decided by the international
community.
Rules of Engagement
This is one of the more misunderstood aspects of
United Nations peacekeeping operations. It is generally well known that traditional
peacekeeping operations do not preclude the use of force in self defence. But what is not
generally well known is that the use of force in self defence can be extended to such use
in execution of the provisions of a mandate, subject to clarity in this regard, and an
acceptance by troop contributor countries, of some inherent dangers of retaliatory action
by belligerents.
The rules of engagement for each mission are drawn up
by the Force Commander or Head of Mission, based on the mandate, the resources available
to the force, the terms of the agreement arrived at with the parties to the conflict, the
prevailing ground situation, and so on. In all operations other than those that fall in
the category of Chapter VII operations, it is to be assumed that the use of force will be
restricted to the minimum necessary to deal with a given situation, and without any bias.
In the light of recent experiences of dealing with intra-state conflict situations, it
would however, appear prudent to ensure that all future peacekeeping contingents be
equipped for the "worst case" scenario, so that they can respond appropriately
in self defence in case attacked.
Command and Control
Command and control of United Nations operations (or
regional or multinational operations for that matter), is a vital aspect which needs to be
understood by all member states and governments, in as much as, there can be no
compromises. There is only one option in so far as command and control of an operation is
concerned. All forces deployed in a mission area, must take their orders from the Head of
Mission or the Force Commander, and implement them in the correct spirit. It is for the
Head of Mission or the Force Commander to be careful and discreet in decisions that are
sensitive; some guidance from United Nations Headquarters in New York may be necessary on
occasions, but backing for the Mission Headquarters must be unqualified. All this however,
means that the United Nations hierarchy, and the mission headquarters, must be so
organised and structured, as to breed confidence in the contributor nations, and personnel
who form part of a mission.
The system followed in earlier years, where
commanders and staff were gathered together at short notice (as in the case of UNPROFOR),
and whose allocation was based on equitable representation related to troop contributions,
may have worked when the pressures on operations were not as significant as they are
today; that system is not workable under present day conditions, increasingly dangerous as
they are. Heads of missions and force commanders must be appointed early, and be
associated with the negotiating process that precedes the setting up of the mission, and
with the framing of the mandate by the Security Council, this would assist considerably in
ensuring that an achievable mandate is given to the force, and realistic rules of
engagement are drawn up. Equally, a nucleus staff of military, police and civilian
personnel for the headquarters must be drawn from existing United Nations organisations,
where personnel would have worked together for some time, and therefore understand one
another, and have a working knowledge of United Nations procedures; this would be feasible
if there are some United Nations organisations oriented towards peacekeeping activities,
such as regional cells for data collection and monitoring, or regional United Nations
training centres in selected locations, or a United Nations Staff College, functioning on
a regular basis, thus providing the bank from which to draw on the personnel when
required.
Use of Force in the Conduct of Peace Operations
As mentioned earlier, United Nations peacekeeping
operations allow for the use of force by peacekeepers in self-defence. This provision has
considerable flexibility in application, and has been more than adequately demonstrated in
the conduct of missions in the past. There have been many instances where troops operating
on United Nations missions have resorted to the use of force ranging from the classic
interpretation of protecting one's own person from attack, to using armed force against
those who attempt to interfere with the execution of the mission, whether it be protection
of a designated area, or a convoy carrying humanitarian aid, or dealing with mercenaries
acting against the lawful government, or any other such operation. The main point to be
stressed in this context however, is that the Security Council mandate setting up such an
operation, must unambiguously state that such use of force is authorised, and most
importantly, ensure that the contingents are equipped for the purpose. It is of course
essential that troop contributors are made aware of the heightened dangers to their
personnel. The rules of engagement must then include this provision for dissemination to
all personnel in the mission. Parties to the conflict must also be made aware of the fact,
and application of such force executed in an unbiased manner.
In cases where enforcement action under Chapter VII
of the United Nations Charter is considered the appropriate response following a major
breach of peace, or an act of aggression, certain parameters need to be understood and
catered for. There has to be adequate political will, including the will to bear the
possible human cost of the military operation, the will and capacity to absorb the
financial burden; and the availability of troops well prepared and equipped for the task.
This is a rather tall order for the United Nations to be expected to fulfil. That is why
it has been suggested that, for the foreseeable future, it would appear more practical for
such operations to be assigned by the United Nations to coalitions of "the willing
and the able".
The Grey Zone
Experiences over the last few years have revealed
that there are some developments peculiar to the type of intra-state, ethno-religious
conflicts the international community is being increasingly called upon to deal with.
These developments seem to fall between the two hitherto well defined modes of response to
conflict situations, namely that of peacekeeping or enforcement action, and are to do with
the belligerents testing the will and determination of the international community
represented on the ground by the military forces operating in the mission. Commanders at
various levels must learn to recognise the nuances of such situations and be trained to
deal with them in an appropriate manner under given sets of circumstances. Some of the
examples of such contingencies are as follows:
When an armed group in a conflict unilaterally blocks
the route of a relief convoy, preventing it from gaining access to a population in
distress, it is not resorting to use of weapons, but is effectively blocking the route. A
variation to such a situation is that the route is blocked by unarmed women and children.
- When an area deemed to be under the protection of a
United Nations force is attacked or over-run by a party to the conflict.
- When a group or detachment of United Nations
peacekeeping troops comes under massive attack from a faction with superior firepower.
- When peacekeepers are taken hostage.
- When a "no fly zone" is violated
Coordination with Aid Agencies
As discussed earlier, international peace operations
envisage, among other functions, assistance in the provision of humanitarian aid. In this
context, the inter-action between the United Nations forces in the former Yugoslavia, and
aid agencies like the United Nations High Commission for Refugees(UNHCR), and
non-governmental organisations (NGOs), as also the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC), merit some reference. It took some time for an institutionalised arrangement
to be set up, primarily because of the magnitude of the problem, and the fact that all
organisations were struggling to cope with their own internal dynamics in the early
stages, under fairly adverse conditions. In the process, some very serious reservations
about one another developed, and it took a great deal of effort at various levels for it
to dawn on all concerned that they were in fact working to a common purpose.
In so far as aid agencies are concerned, it is
essential that their efforts be coordinated, both in terms of aid effort, as well as the
assistance desired from the military; the best arrangement would be for the UNHCR to be
the lead agency. But then, most NGOs appear to have an agenda of their own and are
reluctant to subordinate themselves to any other organisation; their argument being that
they have to show results to those who fund their activities, and whose aims and purposes
may not totally coincide with that of the international community. At a seminar I attended
at Oxford University in October 1995 on the subject of the role of the military in
humanitarian emergencies, I was shocked to note the intense distrust of the military by
most NGO personnel, as a result of their inter-action in the field in various mission
areas, sadly, at the end of the three day- seminar, my impression was that the gap between
the military and the NGOs, had not narrowed, but may well have widened. This is a factor
that senior commanders would have to apply themselves to in the field, and the United
Nations Headquarters as well as other international actors, may well consider applying
themselves to so as to correct the wrong perceptions that seem to persist on all sides.
The Media and Public Information System
The importance of the media, both electronic and
written, in whatever activity is undertaken, cannot be overstated. There is possibly no
other single factor that has a greater influence on the evolution, preparation, and
conduct of a peace operation, than this. Some operations in the recent past were rushed
into, without adequate preparation and thought, purely because of pressures generated by
media reports, in other cases, conduct of operations in mission areas has been influenced
by media coverage, even to the extent of being against the better judgement of commanders
on the ground. It is therefore imperative that the international community recognise the
impact of this vital aspect, and while using it to good effect to further the cause of
international peace and security, have the strength to resist its pressures for deployment
of forces without all implications having been taken into account, and full preparations
made.
A related aspect is a recognition of the equally
vital importance of providing qualified staff and essential equipment for running an
effective public information system as part of any peace operation, as it is being set up;
wherever this has been done well the mission's success has been largely assisted. And
where it was conspicuous by its non-existence for many months, as was the case in the
former Yugoslavia, the mission was seriously handicapped, because particularly in cases of
ethnic intra-state conflict, truth is invariably the first casualty. In fact, in such
operations, this vital tool is required from the outset in order to deal with the
dis-information put out by the parties to the conflict, as also by unprincipled media
persons.
The Way Ahead
The end of the Cold War and the relative success of
Operation Desert Storm, induced a sense of euphoria that the international community was
geared to deal with dangers to international peace and security in a more effective manner
than hithertofore. However, the experiences of Somalia, former Yugoslavia, Liberia,
Angola, Rwanda, and those in some of the former republics of the erstwhile Soviet Union,
quickly dispelled these expectations, and in fact, may well have induced a sense of
retrenchment in regard to peace operations. Even so, there can be hardly any doubt, that
as and when new conflict situations arise, the international community and the
belligerents, will turn to the United Nations for attempts at resolution. Hence operations
for the maintenance of international peace and security will continue to be required, and
must therefore continue to receive the attention they deserve, both in terms of political
support, and military preparation.
International peace operations whether under the
aegis of the United Nations, regional organisations, or multi-national groupings, are the
only answer to conflict resolution, when all else fails But it must be emphasised that the
root of most conflict lies in deprivation in society, and to that extent, maybe some early
investment in potential conflict areas towards building society, would be more cost
effective. In this context, as stressed earlier, maximum efforts need to be directed
towards preventive action by the international community; in this effort, whether it
should be the United Nations or regional organisations, is a matter of statesmanship
An analysis of current trends on the world scene
suggests that the international community needs to concentrate on three specific areas in
terms of a possible requirement-for intervention at a significant level. The first is West
Asia, where no player other than the USA can contribute to lowering the temperature, and
assist in resolution of the conflict situation. The second is Europe, which is best left
to the machinations of the European Union or the NATO. And the third is Africa, in which
context, Dr Ali A Mazrui. the Director of the Institute of Global Cultural Studies, and
Albert Schweitzer Professor in Humanities at the State University of New York at
Binghampton, had proposed during a seminar in Vienna in March 1995, that the United
Nations place a moratorium on any peacekeeping operation outside Africa for the following
fifteen years, he argued that the United Nations could make a bigger difference in Africa
than in any other continent.
International peace operations are the best area for
effective and increased military to military cooperation, which if properly orchestrated,
could lead to better understanding and appreciation even between otherwise hostile armed
forces. There are any number of examples of the understanding and camaraderie built up
between otherwise antagonistic armed forces personnel when operating under the United
Nations Flag.
With the nomination of "stand by" forces by
member countries for deployment in United Nations peace operations, the scope for periodic
inter-action and training increases; thus laying the foundations for more effective joint
participation in international operations; compatibility of equipment, particularly
communication equipment will make for greater understanding of common operating
procedures.
Should the suggestions for establishment of United
Nations regional cells for collection of data and monitoring of activity within regions,
find favour with the international community, there will be closer inter-action between
representatives of neighbouring states, who may well form the nucleus of mission
headquarters set up at short notice when required; alternatively, such staff may be found
from United Nations regional training centres or a United Nations Staff College, if set
up. The investment would more than pay for itself in terms of better understanding and
rapport between personnel of countries of specific regions.
As we look into the 21st century, it is essential
that we do not allow the perceived inadequacies of some recent operations to cloud our
judgement, and swing from one extreme of attempting to undertake too much, to undertaking
too little. There is so much the international community can do to ensure the maintenance
of international peace and security, and there is no way it can absolve itself of that
responsibility. |
