PAKISTAN’S AGGRESSION AGAINST INDIA

The hostility with which successive establishments in Pakistan have viewed India since partition in 1947, has manifested itself, over the past five decades, in a policy of sustained aggression against India coupled with disingenuous ploys to mask its machinations.

In 1947, prior to the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India, Pakistan sent in well organised raiders claiming they were acting spontaneously in response to reports that Muslims were being persecuted in Jammu and Kashmir. The reality was exposed by none other than Major General Akbar Khan, the officer charged with the task of organising the raids. In his book ‘Raiders in Kashmir’ he has stated "...We had assumed that Kashmir would naturally join Pakistan ... That the Maharajah, a non-Muslim, wished to avoid accession to Pakistan had been obvious, but now the fear was that his hands were likely to be strengthened also by Sheikh Abdullah, a Muslim Leader of Kashmir, hero of the Indian National Freedom Movement, who had previously opposed the conception of Pakistan. Our own safety and welfare also demanded that the State should not go over to India .. Pakistan’s military security would be seriously jeopardised if Indian troops came to be stationed along Kashmir’s western border.

"...The authorities needed a lot of assistance from the Army in the shape of plans, advice, weapons, ammunition, communications and volunteers. They did not ask for it, because the whole thing had to be kept secret from the Commander-in-Chief and other senior officers who were British. There were, however, also senior Pakistani officers in the Army who could have been taken into confidence - and these were in a position to help a great deal...

"...Ultimately, I wrote out a plan under the title of "Armed Revolt inside Kashmir". As open interference or aggression by Pakistan was obviously undesirable, it was proposed that our efforts should be concentrated upon strengthening the Kashmiris themselves internally—and at the same time taking steps to prevent the arrival of armed civilian or military assistance from India into Kashmir...

"...Lieutenant Colonel Masud (latter Brigadier Tommy Masud) of the Cavalry, offered to help with collecting and storing the condemned ammunition...

"...The Prime Minister also promised to obtain some light machine guns (Brens) from a war dump in Italy or somewhere abroad..."

When the first UN Resolution of January 17, 1948 called "..upon both to refrain from doing or causing to be done or permitting any acts which might aggravate the situation.." and further requested "..each to inform the Council of any material change in the situation .." Pakistan omitted to inform the UN of its direct involvement in the fighting and it was only in July 1948 that Sir Zafarullah Khan admitted to the UNCIP that Pakistan’s regular forces were engaged in Jammu and Kashmir since May 1948. Accordingly in an oblique reference to Pakistan’s obfuscation the UNCIP Resolution of August 13, 1948 Part II A (1) stated "As the presence of troops of Pakistan in the territory of the State of Jammu and Kashmir constitutes a material change in the situation since it was represented by the Government of Pakistan.."

The direct involvement of Pakistan found mention in the first interim report of the UNCIP which said that "..the Azad movement, which constitutes an organised political and military body, is assisted by the Pakistan High Command, and is engaged in active revolt against the existing government. This movement has cooperated since October 1947 with the invading tribesmen and individual Pakistan nationals.." The report recognised the legitimacy of the Government of Jammu and Kashmir and debunked Pakistan’s claims that the raids were a spontaneous venture.

In defence of its actions Pakistan claimed that it had sent its forces to safeguard its own security and to counter the Indian forces offensive against the "raiders" - a very curious admission indeed, for when the Indian forces started their offensive against the raiders on October 27, 1947, Pakistan had then claimed that it had not sent any assistance. They also claimed that when the Indian forces were about to repel the invaders, Pakistan sent in its army! Moreover, rather than using its armed forces to just hold the line, which it claimed was the rationale for their deployment, Pakistan extended its military control over the Northern Areas between August 1948 and January 1949.

The period of relative quiet on the Indo Pakistan border was again shattered by Pakistan with its misadventure in 1965; the launching of Operation Gibraltar to foment insurgency and sabotage in Jammu and Kashmir becoming the prelude to all out invasion.

Lt. General Gul Hassan writes in his "Memoirs" "...In 1963 our government decided to extend some form of moral support to the people of Indian-held Kashmir. Consequently, the Army was ordered to train volunteers in carrying out sabotage activities across the Cease-fire Line...

"...We were told that the President had ordered that GHQ was required to prepare two sets of plans - first, intensification of the firecracker type of activity that was already current, but the embargo on regular troops crossing the Cease-fire Line remained. The second task given to GHQ was to plan all-out support for any guerrillas who were inducted into the Indian-held part of Kashmir...

"...The decision to mount guerrilla operations in Indian-held Kashmir was taken shortly after the Kutch affair...

"...The task assigned to the Army was two-fold; one, to train locals to enable them to embark upon sabotage in the India-held part of Kashmir; two, to train guerrillas and induct them across the Cease-fire Line, with a view to disrupting conditions in the Valley and eventually arming the locals and helping them rise against the Indian Army occupation. As the saboteurs in the first instance had not produced the desired results, our Government decided to set in motion the second option to launch guerrillas into Indian-held Kashmir. This decision was taken in May 1965 soon after the Kutch skirmish...

"...The guerrilla operation was named Gibraltar..." It would bear repeating that he acknowledges that since the first group of saboteurs had not produced the desired result, it was decided to launch guerrillas into Jammu and Kashmir. The Operation had in fact found little Kashmiri support.

Altaf Gauhar former Secretary Information and Broadcasting Government of Pakistan, writing about Operation Gibraltar states in his book "Ayub Khan Pakistan’s First Military Ruler" "...The aim was to take such action that will defreeze the Kashmir problem, weaken Indian resolve and bring her to the conference table without provoking a general war.."

This obsession with wresting Jammu and Kashmir by force led to the 1965 India-Pakistan war resulting in eventual discomfiture for Pakistan. The Tashkent Declaration signed at the end of the war enjoined on both sides to exert all efforts to create good neighbourly relations in accordance with the United Nations Charter and not to have recourse to force and to settle their disputes through peaceful means and not to interfere in each other’s internal affairs. The implication was clear: that any dispute, including on the Jammu and Kashmir question, should not provide a pretext for the use of force in any form whatsoever.

The refusal of the authorities of West Pakistan to countenance the victory of Mujibur Rehman’s Awami League in the elections in 1971, led to protests which were met with brutal repression of the Bengalis of East Pakistan by the Pakistan Army. India, deluged by 10 million Bengali refugees fleeing the cruel oppression in East Pakistan, found itself again embroiled in a war of Pakistan’s making. The outcome of the war was the emergence of independent Bangladesh and the signing of the Simla Agreement of 1972 which required both India and Pakistan to put an end to the conflict and confrontation, promote friendly and harmonious relations for a durable peace in the subcontinent, settle their differences by peaceful means through bilateral negotiations or by any other peaceful means mutually agreed upon, respect each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty and not interfere in each other’s internal affairs.

Many analysts and commentators have suggested that the desire for revenge for the defeat in 1971, provided an additional thrust to Pakistan’s established policy of seeking to destabilise the Indian polity and to secure Jammu and Kashmir by force. In complete and deliberate disregard for what it had agreed to in Tashkent and Simla, Pakistan resumed its aggression and its interference in Indian affairs. The only change that took place was that, having failed through conventional wars to achieve its aims, Pakistan decided to change tack, and go for a low intensity proxy war.