Statement by Ambassador Savitri Kunadi, 
Permanent Representative of India in the Plenary meeting
of the Conference on Disarmament, August 6, 1998
 

         Mr. President, since this is the first time that I take the floor under your
         presidency, please allow me to express the satisfaction of my delegation at
         seeing you - a representative of Ukraine, with which my country enjoys warm
         and friendly relations - presiding over the Conference on Disarmament.
         Indeed at this particular juncture, when there are important and pressing
         issues before the Conference, we appreciate the manner in which you have
         been conducting our work. I also wish to express our appreciation for the
         way in which your predecessor, Ambassador Sungar of Turkey discharged
         his functions and his contribution in taking forward our work.

         Mr. President, on June 11, 1998 Ambassador Norberg of Sweden had
         presented in the CD Plenary, on behalf of the delegations of Brazil, Egypt,
         Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia, South Africa and Sweden, the
         Joint Declaration "Towards a Nuclea-weapon Free World : The Need or a
         New Agenda" issued on June 9, 1998. India noted that the declaration
         contains a number of valuable suggestions which deserve consideration by the
         international community. The Minister of State for External Affairs of India,
         Mrs Vasundhara Raje, on June 16, 1998, wrote separate letters to the
         Foreign Ministers of these eight countries expressing India’s readiness to
         co-operate with them in collective efforts for the establishment of
         nuclear-weapon free world.

         The Joint Declaration is a timely reminder that in spite of nearly 100
         resolutions of the UN General Assembly reflecting the will of the international
         community, decisive steps for creating a nuclear weapon free world have still
         not been taken. In her letter the Minister of State for External Affairs
         underlined that partial measures for non-proliferation will not work. The road
         map is clear - we have dealt with other categories of weapons by negotiating
         multilateral treaties that are comprehensive, universal and non-discriminatory.
         We need to adopt a similar approach to deal with nuclear weapons.

         Mr. President, India’s response to the Joint declaration underscores the fact
         that as a nuclear weapon state, our commitment to pursuing global nuclear
         disarmament in order to achieve a nuclear-weapon free world remains
         undiluted.

         Mr. President, I would now wish to set out our views on agenda item 4
         entitled "Effective international arrangements to assure non nuclear-weapon
         states against the use of nuclear weapons".

         India has consistently maintained that the only credible guarantee against the
         use or threat of use of nuclear weapons lies in their total elimination. Until this
         objective is reached, as an interim measure, there exists an obligation on part
         of the nuclear weapon states to assure non nuclear weapon states against the
         use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, as also that these weapons will not
         be used as instruments of pressure, intimidation and blackmail. This obligation
         should be of an internationally legally binding character, clear, credible,
         universal and without discrimination. We welcome the resumption of work in
         the CD after a pause of three years, on the basis of its decision contained in
         CD 1501. We also record our appreciation to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc
         Committee Ambassador de Icaza of Mexico from whose vast diplomatic
         experience and skills the Ad Hoc Committee has greatly benefitted.

         At the outset, it bears recalling that NSAs have been a longstanding agenda
         item of the Conference on Disarmament. Although much useful work was
         done during the previous Ad Hoc Committees, this fact also bears testimony
         to the inability of the Conference on Disarmament to successfully conclude its
         work on this item. We do not need to delve here on the reasons for the
         inability of the CD over the years to bring to a successful conclusion its
         consideration of NSAs. Suffice to mention that NSAs, a long standing
         demand of the non nuclear weapon states, was not accorded the same
         priority as other items on the nuclear non-proliferation agenda and in fact
         remained its poor cousin.

         The consideration of security assurances have been plagued from the
         beginning with linkages not with the objectives of nuclear disarmament but
         with that of non-proliferation. Seen in the latter perspective, security
         assurances remained confined to what the nuclear weapon states thought fit
         to provide at their discretion. There remained an unfulfilled need for these
         assurances to be multilaterally negotiated, legally binding and comprehensive.
         Securiy assurances remained interim measures without an objective, save that
         of finding a place in a framework that enabled the nuclear weapon states to
         retain in perpetuity their privileged possession of nuclear weapons.

         Partial and conditional pledges of non use of nuclear weapons, whether
         undertaken unilaterally or in separate undertakings cannot be the basis for
         credible guarantees for non nuclear weapon states. In 1965, along with a
         group of non-aligned countries, India put forward the proposal for an
         international non-proliferation agreement under which the nuclear weapon
         states would agree to give up their arsenals, provided other countries
         refrained from developing or acquiring such weapons. This balance of rights
         and obligations was not accepted.

         In the 1960s when there was a deepening of our security situation, we sought
         security guarantees but the countries we turned to were unable to extend to
         us the expected assurances. India expressed its strong reservations with the
         approach employed in the UN Security Council resolution 255, which was
         repeated in Security Council Resolution 984, adopted on the eve of the
         indefinite extension of the NPT. We believe that a continuation of the same
         approach will not yield fruitful results.

         India supported UNGA resolution 1653 of 24th November 1961 which
         called on the Secretary General to ascertain the views of the member states
         on the possibility of Convening a Special Conference for concluding a
         Convention on the Prohibition of Use of Nuclear Weapons. In 1978, India
         proposed negotiations for an international convention that would prohibit the
         use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

         The UN Charter does not discriminate between those that might adhere to a
         particular treaty or those that might not and the responsibility of the UN
         Security Council is to all member states of the UN without discrimination.
         The NPT as it stands today cannot reflect the ground realities and would be
         an inadequate framework for consideration of security assurances. Thus we
         do not recognise any linkage between the objectives of this ad hoc committee
         and the NPT.

         Consideration of Security Assurances in the narrow straightjacket of Nuclear
         Weapon Free Zones cannot do justice to the wide variety of concerns that
         emanate from the global nature of the threat posed by nuclear weapons.
         Besides, we do not consider the CD as the appropriate forum for the
         consideration of regional issues. We, however, respect the soverign choice
         exercised by non nuclear weapon states in establishing NWFZs on the basis
         of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned.
         At the recently concluded fifth session of the ASEAN Regional Forum in
         Manila, India stated that we fully respect the status of the Nuclear Weapon
         Free Zone in South East Asia and are ready to convert this commitment into
         a legal obligation. India will remain responsive to the expressed need for
         commitments to other nuclear weapon free zones as well.

         The delegation of Canada had posed the question in its working paper - CD
         1502, "who gives what to whom and how?" The Chairman of the Ad Hoc
         Committee had sought views of delegations on two questions: the scope of
         our deliberations and what is to be protected? May we suggest a third
         perspective, which is not exclusive from the other two. Our approach would
         be to seek answers to: What is the objective; and what is the combination of
         means that could provide a feasible internationally legally binding instrument
         providing security assurances in terms of current realities.

         Objectives:

         Negative security assurances are interim measures pending the elimination of
         nucleare weapons, which is the main objective. As interim measures, negative
         security assurances cannot be a substitute for genuine disarmament measures
         nor should they hinder the process of nuclear disarmament. However, in a
         world of nuclear proliferation, negative security assurances can facilitate
         confidence building.

         Means:

         We believe that a Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear
         Weapons could form the bedrock of security assurances - comprehensive,
         legally binding and irreversible. India has proposed for consideration a draft
         Convention on the Prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons as an annex to
         UNGA resolution 52/39C. We believe that such a Convention could
         contribute to the lowering of the nuclear threat and to the climate for
         negotiations leading to the nuclear disarmament, as was achieved with the
         other two weapons of mass destruction. This Ad Hoc Committee could also
         consider various proposals for the global de-alerting and de-targeting of
         nuclear weapons, with necessary verification mechanisms. We are also willing
         to discuss ways of strengthening in the context of current realities, and to give
         expression in a multilateral framework, the provisions contained in the 1973
         Agreement between the USA and the USSR on the Prevention of Nuclear
         War.

         As a responsible nuclear weapon state, India has stated that it does not
         intend to use nuclear weapons to commit aggression or for mounting threats
         against any country. The Prime Minister of India stated the following in the
         Lower House of the Indian Parliament on August 4, 1998;

         "India’s nuclear tests were not intended for offence but for self-defence. In
         order to ensure that our independence and integrity are never jeopardised in
         future, we will have a policy of a minimum deterrent. We have stated that we
         will not be the first to use nuclear weapons. We are also willing to strengthen
         this by entering into bilateral agreements on no-first use or a multilateral
         negotiations on a global no-first use. Having stated that we shall not be the
         first to use nuclear weapons, there remains no basis for their use against
         countries which do not have nuclear weapons."

         The extension of the negative security assurances must be seen as part and
         parcel of the commitment to achieve complete nuclear disarmament. There
         can be no effective guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear
         weapons if the nuclear weapon states cling to the notion that such weapons
         should be their exclusive and perpetual property, to the detriment of the
         security of other countries. The Colombo Declaration of the recently
         concluded Tenth SAARC Summit urged the Conference on Disarmament to
         "commence negotiations on a comprehensive, universal and
         non-discriminatory instrument prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear
         weapons as well as eliminating such weapons in existing arsenals."

         We believe that the efforts of the CD through the Ad Hoc Committee under
         agenda item 4, in negotiating an internationally legally binding instrument could
         act as a matrix within which measures could be undertaken and facilitated
         with the aim of preventing and prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons, paving
         the way for their elimination.

         Thank you.