When India and Pakistan crossed the portals into the nuclear sanctuary, which has 
     been sacrosanct for decades, it elicited doomsday scenarios of a subcontinent 
     locked in nuclear war with fall-out drifting around the world. Pundits deplored the 
     fact that the United States is helpless to do anything other than impose sanctions. 
     This is wrong on both counts. While relations between India and Pakistan are 
     strained, there is no reason to believe that either side plans to launch nuclear missiles 
     at the other. The greatest danger of that happening is by miscalculation, not by 
     design. And the United States can play a role in making sure it does not happen. 

     India and Pakistan are led by mature statesmen, who do not take war, particularly 
     nuclear war, lightly. There is no reason to believe that in possession of nuclear arms 
     they will act any less responsibly than the other five declared members of the nuclear 
     club - all of which see the nuclear card as essential to both their security and their 
     standing on the international scene. While the world may abhor the spread of 
     nuclear weapons, it cannot deny the legitimacy of responsible sovereign state to see 
     to its own interests. 

     This is the case on the subcontinent. From a sense of national pride and insecurity, 
     India and Pakistan have opted to go nuclear even if it means they must suffer 
     condemnation and economic deprivation as a result. Economic considerations count 
     for little when national self-interests come into play. 

     The United States has a diplomatic and, equally important, a technical role to play in 
     defusing the current crisis. Having gone on record as deploring the emergence of 
     two new nuclear powers the United States must come to terms with its reality and 
     not treat the two nations as pariahs. It must use its influence and good offices to 
     dispel suspicions and reduce tensions between the two sides, and so reduce the 
     possibility of war by miscalculation. 

     Until now, the subcontinent has been treated with benign neglect. Notwithstanding 
     Indian suspicion of the United States, the Administration must become engaged in a 
     positive way as an honest broker and not as a punitive voice. This will take time. 
     Meanwhile the region is in a period of danger marked by bellicose rhetoric and 
     emotionalism. Steps should be taken to steady both their nuclear trigger fingers. 
     Miscalculation by both sides can be avoided by sharing lessons from the Cold War 
     and our nuclear stand-off with the Solvet Union for over half a century. 

     Currently, neither side has many weapons, although India has the potential of 
     manufacturing about 30 and Pakistan 12. Both sides have aircraft that can deliver 
     nuclear bombs, but only a primitive missile capability, India with its short range 
     Prithvi and longer range Agni missiles, Pakistan with its fairly sophisticated, and 
     recently tested 900 mile missile called the Ghauri. 

     But neither side yet has management mechanisms to govern their nuclear weapons 
     and delivery systems. 

     The small number of weapons and missiles and only an embryonic control 
     infrastructure is what makes the near term situation dangerous. In a crisis in the 
     contested Kashmir, for example, both sides may fear a first nuclear strike by the 
     other to take out its own existing nuclear weapons. This could give rise to what is 
     known within the military as the "Use them or lose them" mentality, i.e. the need to 
     preempt for fear of being preempted. 

     Ironically enough, an antidote to that mentality is a substantial arsenal of nuclear 
     weapons. The logic is that the greater the number of weapons, the more tolerant to 
     the loss of small number. This was the backbone of American and Soviet nuclear 
     strategy. Both side had sufficient nuclear missiles to destroy the other, regardless of 
     who fired first, Mutually assured destruction resulted in stalemate. 

     This is not to encourage large arsenals for India and Pakistan, something that 
     diplomacy should discourage. There are other steps we, and the other declared 
     nuclear states, can take to help the two countries minimize the chance of war by 
     miscalculation or accident. 

     For example, both sides should be assisted in defining and refining their policy on 
     the use of the weapons, including how, when and under what circumstances will 
     they be used and who has release authority. They should be made privy to the 
     command, control and communications infrastructure, processes and equipment 
     necessary to make sure that their arsenals remains under firm, yet responsive control 
     of the proper authorities. Additionally, they should be introduced to the variety of 
     fail-safe procedures necessary to avoid accidental or rouge launchings. We should 
     help them develop the intelligence and early warning systems to permit sufficient 
     "transparency" on both sides so that neither will misinterpret military moves of the 
     other as they relate to nuclear weapons.