| THE DECISION by India and Pakistan to test nuclear devices
is one of the defining events of the first post-Cold War decade. It tells
us that democracy and markets are no panacea, that American primacy is
not hegemony, and that while the world may be more whole economically,
it remains politically and militarily fragmented.
The tests are unwelcome and worrisome. Still, there are several scenarios that would be far worse for both South Asia and the world, including actual deployment of nuclear weapons, their use or their transfer to third parties. It must be the goal of American foreign policy to stop any of these from happening. However, returning to a non-nuclear South Asia is not a realistic option for the foreseeable future. U.S. policy toward this region must be one of management, not prevention. Current policy - the implementation of punitive economic sanctions - is almost certain to be irrelevant to this management challenge and could be counter-productive. The United States has important interests in both India and Pakistan, including promoting democracy and human rights, expanding economic cooperation and cooperating on a host of regional and global challenges. A policy that alienates both India and Pakistan makes no sense. In addition, we may need to provide India and Pakistan with incentives, and possibly assistance, to help them manage their new nuclear challenge. As a result, it makes no sense to introduce broad sanctions that could actually weaken political authority in Pakistan, a state already politically and economically burdened. A stable Pakistan in possession of nuclear weapons is reason enough to worry; an unstable Pakistan would be worse. The immediate objective of U.S. foreign policy should be to negotiate a package of measures that stabilizes the situation in South Asia and is acceptable to India, Pakistan, the Clinton administration and a majority in Congress. Diplomacy must provide the "exit strategy" that the relevant legislation fails to lay out. What might such a package look like? India and Pakistan could agree to rule out further testing; hold off deployment of missiles with nuclear warheads; and refrain from any transfer of nuclear or missile technology to third parties. In addition, they could enter into confidence-building measures such as regular high-level meetings, exchanges of observers at military exercises and a pause in flight testing their missiles. In return, the United States would remove the punitive sanctions and keep in place only those sanctions that block the provision of technology that has the potential to contribute to Indian and Pakistani missile and nuclear efforts. We should also consider providing technology and/or intelligence that could contribute to regional and nuclear stability. U.S. diplomatic assistance ought to be made available where both countries desire, such as in easing tensions over the disputed territory of Kashmir. There are two steps the United States should not take. We should not introduce additional political sanctions, including the cancellation of President Bill Clinton's long-planned trip to the region this autumn. Such a visit is an opportunity to address the problems caused by the recent tests and to build both bilateral relationships. Nor should the United States offer security assurances to either protagonist. It is not at all obvious that U.S. assurances would be enough to prevent a crisis from materializing - but they could be enough to draw us into a complicated and dangerous situation. The approach recommended here will not be enough for everyone. There is a desire to punish India and Pakistan and to send a message to other would-be nuclear states that proliferation doesn't pay. This desire to send a message is understandable but should be resisted. Further criticism from the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council - which consists of the same five countries already possessing nuclear weapons, one of whom, China, has assisted Pakistan in developing its nuclear capacity - will accomplish little. The reality is that we need to manage the situation in South Asia as it exists, not as we would like it to be. The good news is that there is no reason that a realistic policy of management for India and Pakistan would necessarily lead to proliferation elsewhere. We should continue to use all our foreign policy tools to discourage and prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to such countries as North Korea, Iran, Iraq and Libya. Discrimination has long been at the core of U.S. nonproliferation policy; after all, the Nonproliferation Treaty itself treats the five nuclear "haves" different from everyone else. The United States has always viewed the nuclear programs of Israel, India and Pakistan as something distinct from the programs of the so-called rogues. Such realism is what a successful foreign policy requires. |