India's nuclear weapons tests pose a major dilemma to the Clinton administration. It is important that the United States react -- but not overreact. India has
confronted us with a challenge, but not as yet a catastrophe. Our goal must be to see that none comes about. 

India's decision to detonate five nuclear devices for the first time in nearly a quarter of a century removes much of the veneer shrouding its nuclear weapons
program. Still, India remains a de facto nuclear weapons state -- only more explicitly than was the case a week ago. 

The tests reportedly came as a surprise to U.S. officials. But this action was consistent with India's longstanding refusal to sign the Nuclear Non Proliferation
Treaty, its attempt to block the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and the political platform of the newly elected Bharatiya Janata Party. 

The motivation for going ahead with tests at this time likely reflected a desire to develop warheads that could fit on India's growing missile inventory. The tests also
appear to be a message to both China and Pakistan, both of which have nuclear programs of their own. One should also not rule out the possibility that the tests
were a political statement by a country that has always rejected and resented being left outside the nuclear club. 

The U.S. need to react negatively is obvious, lest we communicate the message to other would-be nuclear weapon states that there is no cost if they go down this
path. It would also be harder for us to build international support against Iraq's or Iran's nuclear program if we were seen to look the other way on this occasion.
But it is no less important to keep our powder dry. There are worse outcomes than India or even Pakistan testing nuclear devices. These include a decision by
China to resume nuclear testing (which would leave the Test Ban Treaty stillborn) or, even more seriously, India and Pakistan racing to field a significant number of missiles armed with nuclear warheads. 

As a result, we should direct the lion's share of our efforts to preventing major instability in South Asia. The goal should be to discourage additional testing by
anyone and to establish a new plateau -- one that does not involve actual deployment of Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons. It is also important that we act to
preserve the U.S.-India relationship. What is at stake here are ties with a country with a billion people, a large and growing market and a robust democracy.
Isolating India will not serve U.S. economic or strategic interests; nor would it weaken a government that has taken a step applauded by most Indians, who wonder why the world is prepared to live with China's nuclear arsenal but not India's. 

What, then, should the United States do? We should work to build international support for narrow sanctions that target the immediate problem -- namely India's
nuclear and missile programs -- but that do not go so far as to turn a friend in to a foe. It is difficult to see how the same sanctions that fail to deter India from testing will now cause it to back away from a nuclear weapons option. 

Just as important is what we do not do. The United States ought not to cancel diplomatic contacts with India; recalling our Ambassador is a natural but not necessarily wise reaction. More important, the president's planned trip to India this fall should go forward. Consultations are more important than ever when we disagree; indeed, going to India gives Mr. Clinton an opportunity to make his case to the Indian government and public. 

The administration should also work to hold off the sort of wholesale economic sanctions called for by existing legislation. Cutting off all American and international economic support for India risks turning this enormous country into the newest Asian problem. President Clinton should take advantage of the 30-day waiting
period provided by U.S. law to strike a deal with Congress on a limited set of penalties. 

A good many people in Congress and beyond will reject this proposed approach as too mild, fearing that the limited sanctions will not dissuade India or others from further proliferation. This view is understandable but flawed. The reality is that not all proliferation is equally bad. We have long held that nuclear weapons in
responsible hands such as our own can be stabilizing, a deterrent to the use of conventional, chemical, biological or nuclear weapons by others. 

Indeed, discrimination is at the heart of the entire non-proliferation regime in that it treats five countries (the United States, Russia, China, Great Britain and France) different from everyone else. We also long viewed India, as well as Pakistan and Israel, as in a different category than Iran, Iraq, Libya and North Korea. Double standards-- and triple standards if need be - are what a realistic and successful foreign policy is all about. 

 © Copyright 1998 The Washington Times