The folly of America's
nuclear diplomacy
US-China relations, not India-Pakistan,
are the real cause for concern in south Asia
By Ashutosh Varshney appeared in the Financial Times -
August 6, 1998
The author is an Associate Professor of political science at Columbia University
In its nuclear diplomacy and
rhetoric, the Clinton administration has seriously
underestimated the depth of
India's mistrust of China by focussing instead on
India-Pakistan relations, or
on the domestic imperatives of the new Indian
government.
The core of India's emerging
security dilemma is simple. The more China rises as a
power and the more the US government
emphasises friendship with China, the
stronger will be India's concern.
The Clinton administration has so far failed to see
the link between China's moves
and America's China policy on the one hand and a
burgeoning Indian concern on
the other.
Nothing can convey the depth
of India's mistrust of China more than a story
embedded in India's psyche and
resurfacing now as the US plunges into a
passionate affair with China.
After India's defeat in the 1962
war with China, a cultural event took place in Delhi.
Prime Minister Nehru was presiding
and Lata Mangeshkar, India's equivalent to
Frank Sinatra and one of the
greatest figures in the nation's popular culture, sang a
song that has since become known
to millions of Indians. "O my countrymen do you
have enough tears for those
who died for the country?" (Ai mere watan ke logon.)
As he heard the song, Nehru wept.
At the age of 73, a man who had spent more
than 10 years in jail for opposing
the British Raj, who nursed the nation back to
health after the wounds of partition
in 1947 and who worked 16-18 hours a day,
seldom complaining of fatigue,
broke down in full public gaze.
His tears reflected the fact
that India's defeat in the 1962 war with China was the
greatest failure of Nehru's
public life. In the 1950s, Nehru invented the slogan
"India-China brotherhood" and
turned it into a corner-stone of India's foreign policy.
He was fond of arguing that
in the new era China and India, the two great Asian
civilisations, both victims
of imperialism, were entwined in a fraternal embrace.
Mao's reply was war. India was
abysmally prepared. The strategic emphasis was
on peace, not fighting and India's
defence expenditure was paltry. Hundreds of
soldiers, most of whom did not
have even warm clothes, froze to death on the
Himalayas.
After the China debacle, Nehru's
health deteriorated rapidly and he died within 18
months. In October 1964, barely
four months after his death, China conducted its
first nuclear tests, rubbing
salt into India's wounds.
India's nuclear programme was
born in response. It is folly for the Clinton
administration not to recognise
this. India is determined to ensure that
unpreparedness never costs the
country another humiliation at China's hands. To put
it simply, a powerful, rising
and nuclear China, indulged by the US, requires a
nuclear India for four reasons:
The 2,000-mile-long border remains unsettled. The negotiations of recent
years
have shown a weaker India accommodating itself to a powerful China
for
the sake of peace. Since the opening of the Chinese economy, Marxist
ideology
is being increasingly replaced by culture as the glue of the Chinese
nation.
China's geography is part of that cultural view, according to which all
of Taiwan,
the South China Sea, Tibet and parts of India belong to the
Chinese
civilisation as it was constructed in the middle years of the last
dynasty.
Chinese officials claim Arunachal Pradesh, a north eastern Indian
state,
as part of China's historic territory". China also continues to occupy
part
of Kashmir, something rarely mentioned in American discussions of the
region.
The rising
energy needs of a growing Chinese economy are unlikely to be met
domestically.
In recent years, China's economy has grown at 10 per cent a
year,
but its oil production has grown at only 7 per cent annually. Middle
Eastern
oil remains the cheapest source of energy for China. Pipelines
through
central Asia are expensive and dangerous, for they will pass through
the
Moslem part of Chinese territory and China's Moslems are already
restive.
An enhanced Chinese naval presence off the coast of Burma is a
logical
consequence of this fact. A Chinese naval presence in the Indian
ocean
can only be a matter of concern for India.
China
has been the main supplier of nuclear technology to Pakistan. Pakistan
is not
and cannot be, a strategic threat to India without Chinese support. The
powerful
pro-China business lobby in the US makes matters worse from an
Indian
perspective. It leads Indian decision makers to doubt than in the event
of a
Chinese threat, America will provide security to India. Instead, given
its
business
interests in China, the US is likely to push India towards
compromises
with China. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Soviet
security
umbrella over India has disappeared. India must now look after itself.
Challenges
to China's current political elite are likely to increase, as a civil
society
is born out of rising prosperity. How will China's leaders respond to
internal
challenges to their rule? Bowing out, like Indonesia's Suharto, is
almost
inconceivable. External adventures have often been used to prop up
tottering
authoritarian regimes. Unless a legitimately elected government takes
power
in China, Chinese leaders are capable of inflicting at least as much
harm
on other nations as they do on their own people. Given that the Great
Leap
Forward of 1958-61 led to 25m-28m deaths from starvation, millions
more
were victims in the cultural revolution that followed and, even in the
post-Mao
period, tanks rolled out against protesting students in Tiananmen
Square,
this is an alarming thought. Apart from the Communist party, the
People's
Liberation Army is the only powerful nation-wide institution in
China.
With a domestic record and structure like this, can a non-democratic
China
be trusted to be an advocate of international peace? India, Vietnam,
Taiwan
and even Japan have reasons to be concerned. Until India believes
that
its security concerns with respect to an authoritarian China are
recognised,
peace in south Asia is impossible. Pakistan is not the primary
focus
of India's strategic thinking any more.
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