Brief on India's Nuclear Tests

Brief on India's Nuclear Tests
Ministry of External Affairs
Disarmament & International Security Affairs Division

Global Disarmament or Equal and Legitimate Security for All

The background to the decision taken by the Government to conduct a limited series of underground nuclear tests has been set out in the paper on "Evolution of Nuclear Policy" laid before Parliament on May 27. In brief, the tests were dictated by considerations of national security. Every country has the right and obligation to assess its legitimate national security concerns and work out appropriate policies in the light of factors, specific and unique to each country such as geographical configuration, location, regional and global developments and historical/political experience'. 'We have done so rationally, reasonably and objectively, in good faith and with restraint and in an open democratic system. Taking all these into account, we were obliged to conclude that for reasonable and assured national security, we needed to develop a minimal credible nuclear deterrent. This is an irreducible and essential requirement on which there can be no compromise.

In taking security linked decisions based on compelling and valid national interest, India is also acting as a consistently responsible member of the international community. India has not violated any international law through these tests, neither in 1974 nor in 1998. India has been in the forefront of efforts to promote and strengthen international cooperation - in development, the socio-cultural domain, and in particular, in disarmament. We have, through the decades been an active participant, and a pioneer in the international community's efforts to bring about universal, nuclear disarmament. We have done so because we are firmly convinced that a nuclear weapons free world is the ultimate guarantee for our own national security as well as that of other nations. In keeping with this approach, we would have preferred to build our national security through the alternative path of working towards universal nuclear disarmament. It is because the effort to establish credible global nuclear disarmament did not make headway, and because there was an unabated increase over the years of nuclear/missile presence in our own immediate neighborhood that we were left with no choice but to establish our nuclear weapon capability, through a minimum program of tests.

Nuclear weapon states who are critical of us have worked rigorously over the years to take care of their own security requirements, in a maximal manner, taking care of all eventualities. They have also periodically reaffirmed the continuing relevance of nuclear weapons, deterrence, etc. to their national security, and made it clear that they intend to maintain these instruments. As yet there is no credible movement towards comprehensive nuclear disarmament. NWS are also modernizing and qualitatively improving their arsenals, even while numbers are being reduced. If they insist on their security assessments, they cannot equally deny us the right to work out our own security policies. The leading non-nuclear weapons States who have shown an insufficient understanding of our concerns enjoy the protection of nuclear umbrellas or alliances or such arrangements. This is being spelt out and confirmed in specific terms by many of these countries. Australia" for example, has confirmed the need for nuclear weapons for security but explained that it does not require to develop them on its own because of its security umbrella. Some of these alliances and such arrangements have been renewed in recent years. We have not had the benefit of such protection while living in an increasingly adverse nuclear environment.

The Imperative of India's Security Environment

The evolution of our security assessments and concerns has been elaborated in our statements; to recapitulate:

Deteriorating regional security environment, especially from the 60's onwards (appearance of nuclear weapons/missiles in neighborhood and their progressive growth and global nuclear build up in subsequent years).
We did not then go in for a nuclear weapons/ missile response to this development although we could have done so. Instead, in good faith, we first sought security assurances and guarantees from the major nuclear weapon states( i.e. in the mid 60's). These were not forthcoming.
We also reinforced our efforts, initiated in the 50's, for working towards universal nuclear disarmament, e.g. by joining in the global negotiations to institute a non-discriminatory nuclear non-proliferation regime in the hope that this would lead to a denuclearisation within a reasonable period of our neighborhood as well. These efforts did not make progress. We found that the NPT that emerged was a distortion of the genuine non-proliferation agenda.
Taking this situation into account, we developed a nuclear option in 1974. However, for 24 years we refrained from exercising it. This patient, utmost effort for building security through means other than the established method of developing national nuclear capability is a unique instance of nuclear restraint. We also consistently maintained the most stringent control on export of nuclear/missile related materials/technology/equipment and know-how. Our impeccable record speaks for itself and is better than that of many of the countries who are now instructing us on non proliferation.

We found over these years, that despite the active endeavour of India and some other countries, there was little genuine progress towards comprehensive, universal nuclear disarmament Meanwhile, nuclear and missile arsenals in our neighbourhood continued to grow steadily over the 80s and 90s to the detriment of our security. In specific terms, this involved the continuing and clandestine transfer of nuclear weapons technology/missiles to Pakistan throughout the 1980s and 1990s. This development has been extensively documented. This offensive nuclear/missile capability acquired clandestinely over many years (by Pakistan) was directed solely against India. Thus, by the 1990s, we had to reckon with the presence in our immediate neighbourhood an overt declared nuclear weapons state, as well as a clandestine, covert nuclear weapon state, and a nuclear presence in the Indian ocean. We have also been the target of aggression and for several years, of unrelenting terrorism and militancy sponsored in India by Pakistan.

Timing of India's Decision

There has also been criticism that there is no evidence of the sudden emergence of a substantial new threat in the neighbourhood which compelled India to go nuclear at this moment. The essential point is that there was indeed a serious and compellig threat. This did not appear overnight but was the result -of evolution. over the years as described above. We could perhaps,- have taken earlier action, but acting in our best judgement at that time we did not do so for the reasons indicated. Instead we exercised restraint and resorted to operationalising the nuclear option, as a last resort. We had also repeatedly and clearly drawn the attention of the NWS and others to what was happening in our neighbourhood -and the compulsions we were living under - as well as our determination to retain the freedom of choice of doing what we considered to be necessary in our legitimate interest. This was neither acknowledged nor action taken to address the concem.

Another impression which needs to be promptly coffected is that because Pakistan's tests followed ours, it was a reaction to India's action. Again, as the evolution of events makes clear, it was India that was obliged to react to a progressive build up of nuclear weaponry and missiles in our neighbourhood. Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme predated ours and was built after years of clandestine acquisition. While we are mentioning the Pakistan factor, there is no obsession with Pakistan. Our security concerns go far beyond Pakistan and South Asia.

These concerns, set out in our statements after our tests ' had already been made known earlier. We had repeatedly shared our security assessments and anxieties in full detail and in a transparent manner with other countries which had been expressing concern at the danger of proliferation, especially the nuclear weapons States. We drew attention to the steady growth of nuclear and missile presence over the years, in our region, at cost to our vital security interests. What we said was not heeded. Instead we were given no credit for our restraint and repeatedly told that our concerns were exaggerated and were also subjected to restrictions on peaceful technology transfer. The countries that were in a position to prevent the proliferation of nuclear capability and missiles in our neighbourhood did not act.

Addressing Internadonal Concerns

We have noted the reactions from different countries - as well as collective reactions (P-5, G-8, etc.) to our nuclear tests. We understand that these responses centre around two basic themes - (a) ensuring that the international nuclear nonproliferation disarmament regime does not unravel and (b) reducing regional tensions. We would like to address these concerns through a serious dialogue with the countries concerned.

India has had a strong and consistent commitment to working to set-up a comprehensive, universal, non-discriminatory, global, nuclear disarmament system. We believe that this is the ultimate guarantee for national and global security. We remain fully committed to this approach in the new situation. We are not seeking to undermine or destroy the global nuclear disarmament / nonproliferation system. What we have been conveying unambiguously over the decades, and are repeating now is that this system which the NWS have put in place centring around the NPT, is badly flawed. Ironically, it failed to achieve the very purpose. for which it was devised, i.e. it has not prevented the proliferation of nuclear weapons and missiles. One of the major regions where this has taken place is our own. It is also blatantly discriminatory because it uses a contrived categorisation of the world into nuclear and non'-nuclear weapon states to deny technology for legitimate peaceful purposes to the latter, if they have not signed the NPT. India is a major target in this regard. We have borne the brunt of its defects. The system ignores our genuine security concerns. We have repeatedly drawn attention of the international community to our strong and legitimate reservations on this discriminatory, NPT-based regime and called for rectification of its flaws which would take care of every nation's security interests. If our calls had been heeded, we would not have had to conduct nuclear tests. We remain an integral part of the global nuclear disarmament effort; but we are, on entirely reasonable and unassailable grounds, calling for its rectification.

It appears that these countries have reacted neptively to our tests, because we are questioning the finely constructed system they have put in place and, which they thought was going to be consolidated, following the NPT and subsequent measures spearheaded by the nuclear weapon states. Our questioning of the existing regime is not meant to be a militant challenge, but a call on the entire international community, in particular the NWS, to recognise that this system is defective and needs substantive modification.

We are aware that there is need to find practical solutions to the problem of proliferation. Any solution would have to take into account the point that if some nuclear powers are here to stay, including those in our immediate neighbourhood, then India has no choice, i.e. as long as the existing strong regional and global nuclear/missile presence continues, India will have to maintain its minimal assured nuclear/missile capabilities. This factor -will have to be incorporated in the discussions on setting up a rational, non-discriminatory, global nuclear disarmament system. In working out answers, we have to keep in mind that a non-proliferation programme cannot be pursued in a narrow South Asian regional framework. A contrived so-called "South Asian" non-prolfferation programme, which does not take into account its immediate external linkages will not work. It is precisely because the existing NP regime has persisted in a constricted programme limited to South Asia, that we have the present position.

Keeping all this in mind, we have now made a number of policy announcements and put forward well considered proposals and initiatives which provide a sound framework for discussion / dialogue with other countries, especially the nuclear weapon states, which would enable a rational, universal,, non-discriminatory nuclear disarmament system to be put in place, which would meet everybody's concerns. These are:-

We have clarified that our tests are intended solely for-assuring our -own security. Their only purpose is to prevent nuclear threats to us, and coercion, and thus preserve peace and stability. We have declared that we will not be the first to use nuclear weapons against any state, and are willing to enter into treaty obligations in this regard.

2. Our tests are not directed at any particular country. We are only reacting rationally to a nuclearised environment - as other countries have.

3. We have clarified that our sole objective is to ensure our own security through a minimal and credible deterrent cgRabilLty. We are not striving to achieve nuclear parity with any other country. India does not wish to enter into any kind of nuclear arms race with any country.

4. immediately after completing our tests programme on May 13, we announced a unilateral voluntary moratorium on further nuclear tests. Despite the subsequent tests carried out by Pakistan, we have reaffirmed that our moratorium will be maintained. We have also made known our willingness to explore ways and means by which this commitinent can be formalised de jure

5. Under the CTBT, States parties are prohibited from conducting "any nuclear test explosions or any other nuclear explosion". Our voluntary moratorium on finther testing and indication of willingness to move towards de jure formalisation of this moratorium, meets the basic requirements of the CTBT. In 1996 there as a strong national consensus against our signing the CTBT as it was felt that the treaty text did not address our security concerns. There have been significant changes in the situation since then in particular, the fact that we have since 1998 conducted our own tests which have given us the basic capability for assured security. This is the rationale for the voluntary moratorium. We are now prepared to move forward on discussing adherence to the CTBT.

6. We have indicated our willingess to engage in negotiations on a FMCT in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. In consultations that we have had on this issue since 1993, when India and US co-sponsored the resolution- on an FMCT in the UN General Assembly, there has been a degree of understanding between Indian and US positions. After our negative experience during the CTBT negotiations, our willingness to engage in FMCT negotiations is a step forward.

7. We have declared that we will continue to undertake stringent export controls on nuclear and missile related technologies as well as those relating to other weapons of mass destruction. Our record on this area is impeccable (as against that of some states party to the NPT including P-5 members). We'are ready to make these controls more stringent in keeping with international guidelines on the basis of discussions with relevant interlocutors. An important, relevant aspect here is that We- are also seeking India's integration into the international civilian, high technology areas in commerce and industry, in which we have faced obstacles due to inadequate appreciation of our security concerns and restraint. We have noted concerns expressed by some countries about our tests possibly triggering off proliferation in other regions, Middle East. We will not contribute to such proliferation. Further responsibility for this hes primarily with NWS and others whose actions in the past have in fact encouraged proliferation. It is also pertinent to note that except for India, Pakistan and Israel who are not parties to the NPT, these countries are and would be in violation of these obligations. Further, these countries have acquired some limited capability only from nuclear weapon states and other of NPT.

India is concerned with security and national interest and not status. It is, therefore, a trivialization of our motives to say that we are desperately keen to join the nuclear club. The reality is that we are a Nuclear Weapon State. A substantive point relates to the implications of denials of technology etc. on this ground that we are seen as NNWS and a non-NPT signatory. This will be one of the questions, for discussion in our dialogues.

Continued commitment to Nuclear Disarmament

India's strong commitment to global nuclear disarmament and our' conviction that our security as well as that of the rest of the world would be best ensured in a nuclear weapons free world, remains the principal element and formulation of our nuclear policy. Accordingly, we will continue working on effective programmes and initiatives - including participation in collective initiatives to reach this objective. In particular, we will continue working actively for a Nuclear Weapons Convention on the pattern of the CWC and the BWC in the UN, NAM and other forums. This is by no means a utopian proposition. It is an idea that has wide support. We are in touch with like-minded countries which have recently articulated the importance of global nuclear disarmament. We have responded positively to the joint declaration issued by the Foreign Ministers of 8 countries (Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia, South Africa and Sweden) - "Towards a Nuclear Weapon Free World : The need for a new Agenda" and Minister of State has written to these eight countries reflecting our desire to work closely towards achieving this mutually shared objective. India is the only nuclear weapon state to have responded to this Declaration.

Experience of negotiations in dealing with other weapons of mass destruction (chemical weapons and biological weapons) indicates that the only successful way is to negotiate agreements and treaties which are comprehensive in scope, universal in applicability, non-discriminatory in charaoter and effectively verifiable. We are convinced that such an approach is also necessary in dealing with nuclear weapons.

India's reladons with its neighbours

India continues to seek good relations with all its neighbours, to work with them to build on our commonalties, and shared aspirations for development, making use of the many possibilities of mutually agreed cooperation, and building trust and confidence. Differences should be resolved in a rational, factual manner,

peacefully and through bilateral negotiations. Direct bilateral dialogue is the proven and the only means to achieve these objectives. The purpose of dialogue is to identify the possibilities of cooperation and indicate ways of implementing them, to building confidence and settle outstanding differences. We have consistently been in favour of a serious sustained dialogue on these lines. Re. differences, it should be kept in mind that many of them are complex and require time and patience to resolve. Further, bilateral issues should be dealt with bilaterally. Third parties have no role whatsoever. They cannot be aware of the nuances and intricacies of our problems. Nor can they gain the confidence of the people of the area. Experience makes it clear that third party involvement brings in new complications - and special interests. The best contribution outside powers can make is to allow countries of the region to sort out the problems without outside interference.

Concern has also been expressed about possible heightened tensions in the region following our nuclear tests (and thereafter Pakistan's), that this could begin an uncontrolled arms race, that this region is even more a "flash point" than hitherto, that border frictions would be nuclearised etc. We have noted these concerns and are looking at them in a business-like manner. In the first place, no constructive purpose is served by exaggerating or dramatising them. Indeed, there are vested interests who are keen to do so. It is essential that these developments should be seen with a sense of proportion and focus. The fact is that there are no heightened tensions in the region, or an enhanced danger of war, leave alone nuclear war. While it is true that there is a certain level of friction and tension which is also reflected in India-Pak border incidents, the fact is that this is at a low and entirely manageable level. It is also a well established fact that Pakistan is working systematically to create border tension and LoC/border firing as a proven method for attracting attention and encouraging the "flash point" theory. Indeed, it is precisely such talk, either well-intentioned or motivated, which could "heighten tensions". Our actions make it clear that there is no question of any intention -on our part to destabilise the region. On the contrMy-, India remains a major force for stability in the region. We look forward to further discuss with Pakistan, China and other countries in the region to reinforce confidence building and security structures.

Fears that border clashes might escalate to a nuclear level are groundless. This has never happened anywhere in the world. For example, border clashes between China and the former USSR did not escalate in this manner. Global experience is that nuclear weapons minimise the risk of major war. USSR and the US with vast differences in their political systems had successfully kept the nuclear peace for over five decades. There is no reason why we in South Asia cannot do as well. Indeed, we have a tradition of good sense that equip us to do this. There have been concerns regarding safety. As a responsible country, India will pay due attention to all these aspects. We expect that all others concerned will do likewise.

We are committed to building a relationship with China based or, cooperation and non-confrontation and mutual respect for concerns. There has been progress over the last decade - economic and fimctional cooperation, high level exchanges, people-to-people contact, border Wks based on search for a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable solution; high level CBMs are in place and are working, border is largely tranquil. We want to build on this. It is in the interest of both countries that the CBMs continue'to be implemented meaningfully, and peace and tranquility is maintained in the border areas. Our concerns regarding China's nuclear and missile transfers to Pakistan remain. Even if it is diminishing, damage has been done. China has to pay attention to the depth of feeling on the Indian side. The Indian people must feel assured that friendship with China is a factor for peace and stability and will contribute in enhancing our security. We remain committed to the process of dialogue to resolve outstanding differences, and to the development of a friendly, cooperative, good neighbourly and mutually beneficial relationship with China.

Assuring a minimum deterrent without compromising the primary goal of economic development

Concerns have also been expressed that our nuclear tests and its follow-up will impose a heavy financial burden on us, which a poor country like India should not take on. The facts are as follows :- our defence budget in. absolute as well as in terms of GDP percentage, is in the lower range by global standards (the current figure is 2.5% of GDP); in the 50's and 60's, it was a lower figure but we had to then increase defence expenditure, in the wake of our experience in 1962. Since the mid-80's, our defence expenditure has come down from about 3.5% of GDP to a present level of 2.5%. (Equivalent figures for China and -Pakistan are -much higher. Much of our defence outlay goes on payment of salaries and establishment). Security, economic growth and the peoples welfare are not mutually exclusive. One has to reconcile economic demands with the minimal requirements of security. Also, the NWS are. themselves not exempt from this dilemma. This applies not only to the poorer ones among them like China but even to the more affluent.

As far as the likely additional expenditure due to exercising the nuclear option is concerned, the fact is that India already has large and well established civilian, nuclear power sector as well as a sound industrial (engineering) infrastructure. Developing a minimal deterrent will, therefore, involve incremental and manageable expenditure.

A Continuing Dialogue

The Government is engaged in a dialogue with key interlocutors particularly with the US. The Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission, Shri Jaswant Singh has met W. Strobe Talbott, US Deputy Secretary of State in Washington on June 12, in Frankfiirt on July 9 and in Delhi on July 20-21. A further round is scheduled for the end of August. Principal Secretary to PM has had discussions with the leaders of Russia, France, UK and South Africa. MOS's visits to South East Asian countries, to NAM Ministerial meeting in Cartagena, extensive official level visits and contacts in Africa, Gulf, West Asia-North Africa, Europe, renewed contacts at Heads of State/Government level within the SAARC region as well as at the official level and contacts in the UN, including UNSG are also part of this process. While communicating with the NWS and other industrial countries which are NNWS, we have also paid due attention and given emphasis to the Non-aligned world. Our representatives were well received in all capitals. While expressions of concern, particularly from Western countries continue, there has also been an appreciation of the compelling security rationale of India's decision, and the validity and relevance of the steps taken by us to address these concerns. In recent meetings of NAM countries, the ASEAN Regional Fonun at Manila or the SAARC Summit at Colombo, our role, our interaction with other countries has been constructive. Nowhere has India been isolated. We value our relations with members of the international community who have shown understanding of our bona fide requirements and the reasonableness of our policy. Our dialogue with key members of the international community is continuing.