India's decision to conduct nuclear tests was a step taken in response to five interrelated developments, said Jaswant Singh, Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission of India, at a press concerence held at Headquarters this morning. Those developments were the legitimization of nuclear weapons by declared nuclear Powers, a global nuclear paradigm from which India was excluded, trends towards disequilibrium in the balance of power in Asia, unchecked nuclear and missile proliferation in the region and the presence of nuclear weapons in neighbouring countries. 

In conducting its nuclear tests, India had only brought the existing nuclear reality, previously ignored, into the open, he said. In the absence of any viable alternative, India asserted that either the international nuclear security paradigm be reviewed or that it be made inclusive. India could not accept a semi-colonial and inferior status as a nation that must be satisfied with an inferior security standard. He appealed to the international community to join in re-examining the present international nuclear security regime. "We must find ways and means of moving towards global nuclear disarmament by progression -- step by step", he said. 

India faced a nuclear environment without parallel with two nuclear Powers in its immediate neighbourhood, he said. The 1990s brought about a deterioration in the security situation in India. That was due to both global realignment of power as well as complicity by the guardians of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Nuclear technologies have been used as commodities of international strategic political and economic commerce. Seen from India, non-proliferation efforts had been seen as selective and as malleable. Large parts of the world enjoyed the benefits of extended deterrence of nuclear weapons Powers, but India did not. 

Missing in the flood of commentary on India's decision to test nuclear weapons were informed assessments of India's own security predicament, he said. The people of India were seen only as objects in the security perceptions of others, and they were assigned a place in the world order as objects instead of subjects responding to their own security environment. While other nuclear Powers justified their own nuclear weapons against perceived, non-nuclear threats, others with legitimate security concerns were denied such a right even as a contingent option. India could not accept differentiated standards of national security or a regime of international nuclear apartheid. 

India had made several assurances and offered displaying restraint in the use of the nuclear weapons, Mr. Singh said. India had made it clear that it would not be the first to use nuclear weapons. It had announced a moratorium on testing and would be willing to proceed towards converting that voluntary moratorium into a de jure obligation. It also strictly adhered to controls on exporting nuclear and missile technology. What was required in non-proliferation efforts was a balance of rights and obligations in the entire field of disarmament. The way ahead was through the evolution of a universal security paradigm of the entire globe. 

A correspondent asked what triggered India's nuclear tests at this time, when many of its security concerns had existed for years? 
Mr. Singh said that, among other reasons, India tested because it had two nuclear-capable neighbours. It had hoped for success of the disarmament process. When that failed, however, India took the minimum necessary steps for its national security interests. 

Would India exercise a preemptive or offensive use of its nuclear weapons in an effort to assert itself in the region? a correspondent asked. 
He responded that India had never said it would take preemptive actions, but it did have the right to exercise proactive policy for its national security. Proactive policy did not mean in any sense a preemptive policy or a policy of interference in neighbours' affairs. 

What was India's relationship with the Russian Federation since the end of the cold war and how had that affected security concerns? a corespondent asked. 
Mr. Singh said the treaty of peace and friendship remained between India and the Russian Federation. The nuclear security paradigm was basically a club that extended from Vancouver to Vladivostok. While other parts of the world were protected by the nuclear Powers, there was a security vacuum at the southern part of the former Soviet Union and in northern Africa. What India had to do was fill that vacuum -- not as an assertion of extended power but an assertion of the minimum steps necessary for its security. 

What was India's response to Pakistan's offer of creating a no-war pact over the issue of Kashmir? a correspondent asked. He also asked what countries Mr. Singh was referring to when he said there were two nuclear Powers in India's region, because Pakistan had only become a nuclear Power in the last two weeks. 
In response, Mr. Singh said that Pakistan really began its nuclear programme in 1987. On India's policy towards Pakistan, he said India believed that a stable, progressive, prosperous, and democratic Pakistan was in everyone's interest. India's nuclear capability was a contingency and it was not directed against any particular country. It would be best for both countries not to remain mired in past conflicts, and India was ready to engage in talks with Pakistan at any time and in any place. It would be willing to talk on any issue and at any level of government. In regard to Kashmir, India was ready to talk about that issue as well, but talks could not change or alter the status of Kashmir, which was an integral part of the Indian Union. 

Were there any indications from the Permanent Five of the Security Council that they might be willing to reconsider non-proliferation policies? a correspondent asked. 
Mr. Singh responded that, in light of recent events, the new reality of global non-proliferation should be addressed by the Permanent Five. 

Would India consider signing on to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)? a correspondent asked. 
Responding, Mr. Singh said India believed in non-proliferation and disarmament. The CTBT, however, was not a disarmament treaty and did not sufficiently address the principles of non-proliferation. Therefore, there was a need for the international community to address that problem. But India could not subscribe to a treaty under duress. However, India was ready to engage in serious, purposeful discussions in that regard. 

What was Mr. Singh's response to the statement by United States Secretary of State Madeleine Albright that India had dug itself into a hole in regard to its security situation? a correspondent asked. And, what were the implications for India under Security Council resolution 1172 (1998), which was adopted on 6 June? 
On Ms. Albright's statement, Mr. Singh said that, culturally, Indians did not dig holes to bury themselves. Even metaphorically the statement exemplifies, yet again, a fundamental lack of comprehension about the Indian stand or about Indian sensibilities. In regard to the Security Council resolution, he said India's position was that the Council resolution addressed a perceived threat to the international community from a narrow, horizontal proliferation perspective. The problem of non-proliferation could not be confined to a narrow geographical area, arbitrarily determined. It could be addressed only in a global framework.