Elements of External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh's speech
in Rajya Sabha on bilateral discussions with United States

December 16, 1998

There is only one, and one criterion alone, that shall determine the approach that India takes in regard both to the enunciation of policy and the practice of diplomacy, post-May, 1998, and that principle, that fundamental, remains unaltered. It is national interest and it is national security alone that will and that has guided our deliberations.

The step that was taken by the Government on 11th May, 1998, was a continuation and was a demonstration of India's determination to break the shackles of nuclear apartheid because they were simply not acceptable to us. It was also a response to a new nuclear paradigm that had come into existence - post 1989. It was an attempt by this Government to obtain for itself and for India the needed strategic space, post-Cold War, and it was also this strategic space and the required strategic autonomy of decision making, that lay at the foundation of the May 11-13, 1998 blasts. We find a demonstration of astonishing arrogance that countries preach to us precisely the opposite of what they themselves practice.

India's nuclear status is not of 1998 vintage. It goes back certainly to 1968 when we declined to join the NPT and demonstratedly to 1974 when we conducted the first test at Pokhran. India did not enter the nuclear world in 1998. What it did was to validate and update its technology in May 1998.

As far as Pakistan is concerned, it is a myth that Pakistan's May tests were in response to those conducted by India. The nuclear tests, as claimed by Pakistan, cannot be undertaken within a fortnight. Pakistan was a self-declared nuclear weapon state from 1987 onwards. Since 1990, the US President has been unable to certify Pakistan's non-nuclear status.

India's stand on the FMCT has remained consistent. We had supported multilateral negotiations on this subject leading to a non discriminatory treaty which will prohibit the production of fissile material for weapons purposes. What we are advocating is a treaty which will control future production and not stockpiles. There is no question of bringing the stockpiles within the scope of FMCT. As far as a unilateral moratorium on fissile material production is concerned, it is not possible for India to agree to it.

What is the minimum credible deterrent? The minimum is not a fixed physical quantification. It is a policy approach dictated by and determined in the context of our security environment. There is no fixity. Therefore, as our security environment changes and alters and as new demands begin to be placed upon it, our requirements too are bound to be re-evaluated. Both in the determination and in the reevaluation, India shall not accept any other criteria but national interests and it shall not any intrusive or sovereignty violative suggestions. It has been made clear to every interlocutor. We have engaged with.

As far as the Export Control Regime is concerned, India's record has been impeccable and, indeed, better some of the P-5 countries themselves. India's export control record has been impeccable because successive Governments have approached this issue. With a very high sense of responsibility and have approached the issue of non-proliferation weapons of mass destruction as a discharge of international and human obligations. The Prime Minister had in May itself announced that we shall, wherever necessary, make our export control more stringent. The Chemical Weapons convention is a recent example of how our export control mechanism has been brought up to-date. The Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act authorises the Government to restrict the exports and these provisions have been used to place sensitive equipment, technologies and materials on the control lists. These lists are notified in the Exim Policy annually. It is an open document for the world to see and the country to see. We have nothing to hide in this regard. These lists can be expanded and, wherever necessary, shall be expanded. New licence forms can be devised; follow-up, monitoring and use can, of course, be strengthened and must be strengthened. All these are ways of making our system more stringent. This is precisely what the Prime Minister had meant when he made this announcement earlier and this is precisely what we intend to do in future. In this regard, if somebody is willing to make suggestions as to how we can make our system better, how we can make it more effective, certainly we will listen to him. We will take advice from whoever can give advice in this regard because in the realm of weapons of mass destruction what has guided me as a brief from the Prime Minister is that we must conduct ourselves as an ancient civilisation and as a great nation which now ha ' a an even greater responsibility to the rest of the international community.

The Prime Minister's approach towards CTBT is explicit. India has always been a non-proliferationist. The natural constituency to which India belongs is the constituency of disarmament. That has been the approach that the successive Governments have taken. Within the constituency of disarmament - our natural tendency is to be a non-proliferationist what we have done is we have obtained for ourselves the needed strategic autonomy and space. So far as the limited point of our approach to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is concerned, what guides this Government is the building up of a consensus. Till that consensus is built up, the approach and the position that remains is as explicitly stated in the statement, as stated by the Prime Minister in the UN General Assembly.

I must explain what is the procedure for any Government to move towards subscription to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Firstly, there has to be a decision that we have now decided to subscribe to CTBT. For that decision the needed consensus is necessary. That is precisely what the Government has attempted to find out where we should go. After that decision there cornea the actual subscription. After the subscription, there is ratification where necessary. After the ratification, it has to be announced. Then the final step is, depositing of the ratified documents with the United Nations. There is a great distance which India has yet to travel. In travelling that distance what will guide this Government is the -national interest and for that national interest, building up of the needed consensus is necessary. Therefore, if, in this process, we ought to examine the aspect of ratification or if whenever and at whatever stage we wish to add to this Treaty such conditionalities as we feel are necessary for the national interest, in the manner that other nations have done, certainly, we shall examine that possibility.

We are engaged in discussions on a range of issues and as indicated in the statement, are seeking a positive environment. The positive environment has to be an environment free of acrimony and free of admonitory statements. This positive environment has begun to come about. Statements made by different groups such as the P-5 joint communique or the G-8 Summit Statement or the Security Council resolution etc., to which the US is a party, sought to make prescriptions to India. They called upon India to sign the NPT, to sign the CTBT without delay and without conditions, halt the nuclear weapon development program, refrain from weaponisation, cease development of ballistic missiles, refrain from deployment of nuclear weapons, cease further production of fissile material etc. What we are discussing are the issues of CTBT, FMCT negotiations, export controls and the defence posture. On other points, our interlocutors have understood that there is no "give" in the Indian position. This reflects some understanding of our security concerns. The future of Indo-US relations is, however, neither confirmed to nor bound by simply these four issues. These are components in the totality of Indo-US relations and it is the totality that we will be dealing with.

We have made it absolutely clear that (a) India shall not accept a third-party mediation in what are essentially bilateral issues 'and (b) we will not countenance a situation in which our near neighbor, Pakistan, is permitted to ride piggyback into the Valley of Kashmir on the back of non-proliferation. Since we made it absolutely, unambiguously and explicitly clear, in none of the rounds of talks has this issue featured.

Regarding the suggestion for amending the Atomic Energy Act, let me clarify that the Atomic Energy Act of 1962 actually requires no amendment. It entitles the Government, and only the Government, to use, develop, exploit, nuclear materials and technology for transfer or for other purposes in national interest. The Act of 1962 provides for every eventuality, and it does not constrain any future course of action.

After the Strategic Defense Review is finalized by the National Security Council, it will have to come to the Cabinet. Once the Cabinet approves it, it will be a document that will come to Parliament and Parliament shall have the right to discuss it.

On the question of technology denial regimes, the philosophy that governs the Government's thinking is that India must be prepared to stand on its own. We are realistic enough to understand that no country will share strategic technologies with India. On non-strategic technologies, it is possible that the technology available to us may not be the state-of-art. Therefore, just as we have broken free from the shackles of nuclear apartheid, we will have to do the same with regard to strategic technologies.

Granting of the nuclear weapons state status is a fact which cannot be disinvented. The fact has been established. Nuclear weapon state status is not granting of recognition by anybody. It is a right conferred upon India, an ancient civilisation, by its scientists and engineers.

We found the talk given by Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott at Brookings Institute unacceptable. One of the ground rules of the negotiations was to maintain confidentiality regarding the contents of the negotiations. Mr. Talbott did not go into contents but did start drawing a contour map of US concerns. It was made clear during the Rome round of talks that this was a violation of the rules. It was also made clear that we had engaged in dialogue with the US on a bilateral basis and that therefore for the. US to go on reaffirming the multilateral agenda would not work.