By C. Raja Mohan appeared in "The Hindu" on June 4, 1999

NEW DELHI, JUNE 3. Trying to put aside the controversy over ``safe passage'' to the armed intruders occupying Indian territory, the Government has begun to define the parameters of the impending talks with Pakistan.

Apparent indications from the Defence Minister, Mr. George Fernandes, and the Prime Minister, Mr. Atal Behari Vajpayee, that India would be prepared to consider safe passage for the infiltrators from Pakistan had drawn flak.

Following the widespread criticism, the Government has firmly ruled out any consideration of safe passage to them. A Foreign Office spokesman said today that ``there is no question of safe passage to armed intruders who have committed aggression''.

Briefing the press here, the spokesman said, ``I have been authorised to state by the Government that the Prime Minister was misquoted and the Defence Minister quoted out of context.''

As it tries to douse the fires from the faux pas on the issue, the Government has begun to focus on the far more important task on the diplomatic front with Pakistan.

India and Pakistan are working out the dates for the visit of the Pakistani Foreign Minister, Mr. Sartaj Aziz, to New Delhi. Pakistan has offered June 7.

Pakistan's objectives

Meanwhile, the Government is carefully assessing the politico- military objectives of Pakistan in undertaking the aggression in the Kargil sector and the kind of diplomatic packaging that must now be expected from it.

Despite Mr. Aziz's eagerness to come to New Delhi, and Pakistan's diplomatic gesture in releasing Flt. Lt. K. Nachiketa, the Government has no evidence to believe that the fundamental objectives of Pakistan since its aggression have in any way changed.

These include a Pakistani determination to undermine the LoC that has served as a de facto border between the two nations in Kashmir for more than a quarter century.

The other objective of Pakistan is to push its military tensions to the nuclear brink and draw the international community into the Kashmir dispute.

The principal objective of Mr. Aziz in New Delhi could be to develop the case that talks with India are futile and demand that the international community intervene to force India to negotiate under pressure.

Meanwhile, Pakistan is stepping up its sabre-rattling and raising the ante all along the LoC. Reports from the battle front indicate that Pakistan is opening new zones of military engagement at the extremities of the LoC. Pakistan is intensifying the shelling along the Akhnur-Uri-Poonch alignment north of Jammu, and Chorbatla-Turtuk segments in Ladakh.

Projecting a failure on the diplomatic front and escalating the conflict in Kashmir are seen here as the two elements of Pakistan's strategy to challenge the very meaning of the LoC and seek international intervention in Kashmir.

Reports from Pakistan quote Mr. Aziz as raising questions about the very demarcation of the LoC. Though the major powers have so far emphasized the resolution of the current tensions in a bilateral framework, Pakistan may not have given up hopes for international intervention.

Islamabad might be betting that as it escalates tensions with India, it could raise the bogey of a ``nuclear flashpoint'' and step up the pressure on the international community to intervene.

Pakistan is resorting to nuclear blackmail against India and the international community to force the pace of diplomatic action on the Kashmir dispute. Highly-placed sources in the Government believe the recent implicit threat from Pakistan to use nuclear weapons in its conflict with India - issued by its Foreign Secretary, Mr. Shamshad Ahmad, may not be an empty one.

Officials here believe that the subsequent denial by Mr. Ahmad does not take away from the deliberate decision to introduce the nuclear factor into the current tensions. The Government, however, is firm in its determination to reject Pakistan's nuclear blackmail. The platitudes from the international community urging caution on both sides, it is believed here, would imply an acquiescence in Pakistan's nuclear blackmail. Urging caution on both sides or demanding a ceasefire from India and Pakistan would in fact be an endorsement of Pakistan's aggression.

On its part, India is likely to demand from Mr.Aziz a formal commitment to vacate aggression, restore status quo ante, reiterate the commitment to respect the LoC, and credibly reassure that aggression will not recur.