By V. R. Raghavan appeared in "The Hindu" on June 5, 1999
The writer is Director, Delhi Policy Group and a former Director-General of Military Operations.

A Week after the Indian response to the Pakistani intrusions, there is meaningful progress towards a military resolution of the Kargil situation. While it will be some time before the final denouement is witnessed, the outlines of some possible outcomes are visible through the haze and dust of combat. The air attacks have had a dramatic impact, notwithstanding the loss of a few aircraft. Pakistan's inability to explain the bullet wounds on the body of an Indian pilot and its earlier churlish behaviour in holding on to another pilot further placed it in a poor light internationally (he has since been released). There is widespread international bewilderment and regret at its Kargil adventure within months of the Lahore Declaration. The Indian military response has stabilised the front. It is beginning to squeeze the intruders into isolated pockets, unable to help one another. In the next phase, these pockets would be destroyed and eliminated piecemeal.

The Indian resolve to remove the intrusions regardless of costs has created an embarrassment to the Pakistan Government. It cannot allow hundreds of the so-called Mujahideen, including its military personnel mixed up among them, to be physically eliminated. It would have a disastrous effect on Pakistan's credibility among the ranks of its hired mercenaries. It cannot also support them in their precarious positions held in Indian territory, without wholly blowing whatever little pretence there is left of its non-involvement. A political and military frustration is the most likely outcome. It could end up diminishing the Prime Minister, Mr. Nawaz Sharif's stature and Pakistan's military suffering another let-down. Islamabad's urgent need, therefore, is to extricate its jihadic warriors from their hapless condition. The Foreign Minister, Mr. Sartaj Aziz's visit is part of that exercise.

There are specific political and military purposes which India should achieve - after the costs it has borne to end the Pakistani aggression. As much as the costs in lives and limbs of our soldiers and airmen, there are interests which need to be safeguarded. The question is no more simply of halting the military offensive now under way. This would in any case have to continue for some time for the eviction of the intrusions.

Pakistan would first want a halt to the Indian military action. It would put out the usual arguments of the need for creating the right environment and for cooling tempers and of its not being able to negotiate under the threat of military action, et al. It would be wise to understand that operational success leads to negotiation. While talks can start, India's larger political and military interests should be borne in mind. This was lost sight of in 1971 and India had to bear incalculable costs since then.

The first and cardinal Indian interest to be ensured after Kargil is the status of the Line of Control (LoC). Pakistan has for far too long trespassed on and violated the LoC in Jammu and Kashmir while India has consistently restrained from doing so. That emboldened Pakistan to attempt to realign the LoC in the Kargil sector. It might well be a test case, which if works, will be attempted with greater frequency and emphasis elsewhere in the future. Pakistan may have calculated that if it does not work out, an easy pullback from the intrusions can be managed through parleys. That is where the question of costs comes in. In Kargil, Pakistan's costs would be marginal if it pulls back the intrusions, while India would have paid a heavy price in terms of men and material. It is not only in Kargil that India has had to bear a heavy price for accepting Pakistani violations .

The talks must lead to a Pakistani reassertion of the inviolability of the LoC. It should also lead to its commitment to abide by the LoC alignment. It cannot be allowed to plead that it has no control over the so-called freedom fighters. It is in both countries' interests to abide by the LoC while efforts get going for resolving the J&K issue through negotiations. The formal reiteration once again, and a renewed commitment to the LoC, would become the first major step towards stabilising the situation as a whole. Such a commitment would make it incumbent on Pakistan to maintain peace and tranquillity on the LoC. It would also commit it to taking measures to ensure that the LoC is not transgressed from its territory by armed militants. The political commitment would ensure that its military is kept reined in. This would be a fair and reasonable outcome of the Kargil venture. If Pakistan is not amenable to this, its position will remain compromised. It can then no longer claim a locus in seeking a resolution of the J&K issue.

The Kargil aggression has inevitably ended the good faith and trust, which was painstakingly built over the last few years. Pakistan may well have misread India's attempts to work for the resolution of the Kashmir issue. It could have concluded that 10 years of mayhem through militants in J&K has softened up the Indian state. It might therefore have felt that a new dimension to J&K's status could be added by shifting the LoC unilaterally through armed intrusions. The importance of reasserting the status of the LoC as a binding instrument on Pakistan, as much as on India, cannot be overemphasised. That would be the essential first step in rebuilding the regime of trust and good faith between the two countries. It would also be the easiest step to take, if Pakistan is genuine about maintaining peace and stability.

Talks are an essential medium for understanding each other's needs and demonstrating the willingness to go the extra mile. The Indian decision to welcome Mr. Aziz is a commendable step. Talks have unfortunately been misused in the subcontinent over many years, as a means of evading issues which are seminal to the problems affecting the region. It is time to infuse a new seriousness into the mechanism of talks, to build structures which would sustain peace and not sabotage it. India would, as the Prime Minister has said, be willing to accept a pullback by the Pakistani-sponsored militants. That should not mean the LoC remains the line of contention it has been turned into by Pakistan for a long while. It should not also mean that India is required to continually occupy positions on high mountains in future, to defend a clearly-delineated LoC due to Pakistani intransigence.

There is need for clarity of the purpose to be achieved by the operations being conducted by the Indian military in Kargil. That purpose goes beyond merely throwing the intruders out. The costly operation must also obtain a national interest. The inviolable status of the LoC is one such interest. It is central to peace and stability in J&K. India's military response should aim at obtaining that purpose. In the meanwhile, ground operations should continue. The military has taken control and is poised to push the intruders back and inflict losses on them. If Pakistan wants to save its militants through talks and a pull-out, it can be its need alone. It should, however, be on a formal reassertion of its acceptance of the LoC as a Line of Control and not as a Line of Conflict.