Editorial from "The Times of India" appeared on May 27,  1999

The Indian response to the calculated and deliberate intrusion in the Kargil area by trained Pakistani infiltrators by way of air strikes is both measured and restrained. Prime Minister Vajpayee had spoken to his Pakistani counterpart before the strikes were launched and had made it clear that intrusions on this scale would not be tolerated; the Pakistani action is a blatant violation of the Shimla pact. Infiltration at such high altitudes, in uninhabited areas, cannot be attributed to mercenaries and Jehadis sympathising with Kashmiris; these infiltrators have been trained and armed in a manner which could not have been possible without direct Pakistani army support. They cannot operate in this area without continuing back-up from the Pakistani forces, and there are grounds to believe these are indeed Pakistani commandos operating without uniforms. The operation must have taken time to prepare, which raises the question whether it was mounted by the Pakistani army with the prior approval of their prime minister or is a case of the army operating on its own. It would seem that while Mr Vajpayee and Mr Sharif were busy exchanging Jhappis in Lahore, the first infiltrator was already on his way to Kargil. The first reactions across the border suggest that Islamabad was in the know. If this is indeed so, it would be in the interest of both countries that the Pakistani army's adventurism is contained at this stage and it is made to realise that further escalation would be counter-productive.

The large-scale intrusion was discovered accidentally, thanks to the early melting of snow which brought forward by a month the preparations to resume the army convoys on the vital Srinagar-Leh highway. The Pakistani army had adopted similar tactics in 1965 when the Indian army chose to strike the assembly points of infiltrators across the line of control. This time a more restrained approach has been adopted of targeting the infiltrators from the air, within Indian territory. This is not only compelled by the nature of the terrain but is presumably also intended to avoid escalation. Pakistan should have recalled that its attempt to cut the Akhnur Jammu road in 1965 evoked the resolute Indian response in the counter attack towards Lahore. The use of air power is a signal to Pakistan to abandon this confrontation and withdraw its personnel. Since the Pakistanis are not in uniform, a withdrawal would not involve any loss of face. The Pakistani prime minister may at the same time be reassured by Mr Vajpayee that New Delhi's aims are restricted to clearing infiltrators from the Indian territory. In 1947 and in 1965, Islamabad tried to take India by surprise in Kashmir; on both occasions Pakistan had to come to terms with failure. This time too their calculations to catch India unawares by cutting the Leh-Srinagar road have failed and the Pakistani army must accept that and defuse the situation. Any attempt at escalation will have adverse impact on the economies of both countries. While India will be hurt, Pakistan will be ruined. As a businessman, Mr Nawaz Sharif should understand that simple bottom line and exercise greater control over his unruly army.