By C. Raja Mohan appeared in "The Hindu" on June 26, 1999

While there is growing Indian appreciation of the American decision to step up the pressure on Pakistan to vacate its aggression in Kargil, the government would like to see the Clinton Administration match its words with deeds.

As the government gets ready to be briefed first hand about the latest American mission to Pakistan, India would want to know whether the Clinton Administration is prepared to add some bite to its bark against Pakistan on Kargil.

All accounts from Washington and Islamabad suggest that General Anthony Zinni, the C-in-C of the U.S. Central Command who was in Pakistan in the last couple of days, may have delivered a tough message to Pakistan demanding that it withdraw its forces from across the Line of Control.

But it is no by no means clear that the Pakistani establishment is in a mood to be persuaded by the United States on Kargil.

Mr. Gibson Lanpher, a U.S. State Department official who was part of the Zinni mission to Pakistan, is scheduled to arrive here tomorrow to brief the Indian Government on the talks with Pakistan.

Mr. Lanpher, a Deputy Assistant Secretary in the South Asian Bureau, will meet his counterparts in the Ministry of External Affairs.

There has been no shortage of recent American communication with the Pakistani leadership - through letters and telephone calls from the highest political level in Washington.

And there could have been no doubt about the message itself - that Pakistan pull back the armed intruders to its side of the Line of Control.

The significance of the Zinni mission to Islamabad lies in the fact that it was an attempt by the Clinton Administration to communicate directly with the Army General Headquarters(GHQ), which has a unique role in Pakistan's security decision-making.

If it is the Pakistan Army that may now have the key to a de- escalation of the conflict in Kargil, there is no one better positioned in the U.S. to talk to the brass in Pakistan than Gen. Zinni, the theatre commander of American forces in South West Asia and the Middle East.

Gen. Zinni, who travels to Pakistan frequently as part of his job, is familiar with the leadership of the Army. Although Gen. Zinni called on the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mr. Nawaz Sharif, it is his conversations with the brass that might have been critical.

Possible outcomes

Informed sources here are speculating on three broad possible outcomes from Gen. Zinni's trip to Islamabad. The least likely result would be Pakistan's unambiguous acceptance of American demarches on Kargil.

A second outcome could be Pakistan's total rejection of the American proposal to withdraw troops. A third possibility could be an attempt by Pakistan to link the de-escalation of the Kargil situation to the broader Kashmir dispute and American assurances on its internationalisation.

India is likely to make it quite clear to the United States that there can be no dilution of its demand for an unconditional withdrawal of Pakistani aggression. Everything else will have to wait until Islamabad pulls back the armed infiltration.

India will not accept any suggestion that will seek to fuse the Kargil confrontation with the larger issues of Kashmir dispute. Any suggestion of sops to Pakistan, India believes, will amount to politically rewarding Pakistani aggression.

The general assessment here is that unless the Clinton Administration is prepared to add some real teeth to its attempted persuasion of Pakistan, Islamabad will have no incentive to end its aggression in Kargil.

There have been reports from Washington that the Clinton Administration is considering a list of sanctions that could be imposed if Pakistan refuses to budge. But no decisions have apparently been taken until now.

Hesitation on the part of the United States to enforce such measures, in the name of saving Pakistan from itself, will only embolden the adventurists in Islamabad to further escalate the Kashmir situation and employ nuclear blackmail against India and the international community.