By V. R. Raghavan
The writer is Director, Delhi Policy Group and a former Director-General of Military Operations

One must be thankful that the military can still produce in the mountains of Kargil the leadership and soldiers representing character - qualities not easily seen in our daily lives. The conflict in Kargil is one of closing in on the enemy for mortal combat and of physically evicting him. The developed world has already moved away from this form of fighting, taking recourse to distant combat through missile and air attacks coupled with electronic and cyber offensives.

The Kargil conflict shows up new strategic dimensions which need to be understood for better management of national security. This is the first direct military conflict between two neighbours possessing nuclear weapons. Exactly a year ago, India and Pakistan gave themselves the nuclear weapons status. It was felt by many at the time that the advent of nuclear weapons would bring an end to military conflict between India and Pakistan. The reality can be different. Nuclear weapons do little to either limit or prevent a conflict on the lower or even middle rungs of the military ladder. That, however, does not prevent the option of looking for a quick solution through nuclear weapons.

A political leadership unable to explain the justification for the conflict or to sustain public opinion in the face of mounting human and other costs is more prone to it. The call for using nuclear weapons from the political classes in India and Pakistan is an evidence of this. The ignorance displayed by these calls and the inability of the leadership to deny such intentions leave much room for doubt about the political understanding of what is essentially a political weapon.

The Line of Control (LoC) in Jammu and Kashmir is a critical factor in maintaining peace and separating the Indian and Pakistani armies from each other. The negotiations on J&K cannot even begin without the LoC remaining inviolate. The Indian resolve to restore the status quo ante is indicative of the importance it attaches not only to the location but also to the concept of the LoC. In other words, the LoC is one of India's national interests. The defence of this national interest, nevertheless, cannot justify a recourse to nuclear weapons. On the other hand, nuclear weapons did not deter Pakistan from launching the offensive. One can even conclude that nuclear weapons encouraged it to think otherwise. The limits of the ``currency of power'', which nuclear weapons signify in some circles, are made apparent by Kargil.

These are serious constraints which India has chosen to place upon itself because of the critical need for gaining international support for its cause. Amid a growing cry for crossing the LoC or for widening the conflict, the international dimension of modern conflict needs to be firmly kept in focus. International support is thus a strategic requirement for waging wars.

It is no longer feasible for any nation to exercise its right to defend itself in unlimited dimensions. The limits of national sovereignty in waging military operations, even in its own defence, are a factor which requires greater attention today. These limits place a new perspective on the nature of future conflicts and the forces required. International support and cooperation form an essential ingredient for the successful conclusion of conflicts. The possession of military hardware is merely one dimension of conflict and is wholly inadequate for strategic success. Integrating with the global security systems and regimes, in addition to economic and political engagement, holds the key to national security. The belief that possession of technological and military capabilities will itself ensure security or obtain influence needs to be tempered by the realities of the new security outlook emerging at the turn of the century.

Managing disputes wholly on a bilateral basis is another strategic outlook which influences conflict resolution. The Indian position on J&K has thus far been strongly in favour of bilateral resolution. There is no doubt that in the ultimate analysis, India and Pakistan would need to come to a bilateral conclusion. Bilateral processes work best in situations of trust and cooperation. That situation does not obtain, notwithstanding the attempts to build trust through confidence-building measures (CBMs) and bold political initiatives such as the Lahore Declaration. International opinion and economic-cum-political persuasion by major powers, therefore, have a role to play in the bilateral process. India has sought and successfully obtained that international advantage in the Kargil conflict. It has had to accept restraint on its military options as a trade-off to gain the support. There are strategic pointers in this development which can be ignored only to the disadvantage of national security interests.

The Kargil conflict throws up a number of disturbing possibilities for the future. Pakistan has chosen an area where the full power of the Indian military machine cannot be brought to bear. The strike corps, tank divisions, heavy artillery and air power are of little avail in the high mountains. Pakistan has also used a force in which the bulk of soldiery is provided by its Afghan involvement. This group has had years of war fighting experience and has close links with the Pakistani General Staff and the logistics-cum-intelligence structures. A moderate percentage of the military personnel of the army, with a large para-military ballast of the Taliban-Mujahideen-Lashkar force, provides Pakistan with an additional low cost army. Such an army has drawn and engaged a substantial part of the Indian army in intense combat and imposed a high cost. The conflict can be continued by Pakistan almost indefinitely at low costs. Its Prime Minister, Mr. Nawaz Sharif, is only stating the obvious when he talks of the possibility of many more Kargils in the future.

The people of India have been directly drawn into the conflict by the television and media coverage. Every home is aware of the reality of war, thanks to the pictures of troops and weapons in the battle area. Even more, every citizen knows and feels the pain of hundreds of Indian families losing their young men in battle. The great upsurge of sentiment for the fighting soldier in the form of unsolicited money and other support is significant. This popular pride can also turn into dismay and doubts about the government's ability to conduct statecraft if the costs rise in human and economic terms. When that happens, jingoism and calls from political leadership for sacrifice would carry little conviction with the people.

The new threshold of military challenge raised by Pakistan would require a multi-dimensional response. The military response in the short term will have to be the continuance of the ongoing operation. In the long-term, there is need to create a complete new range of military capabilities for high altitude warfare. These can no longer be based on force structures, whose low technology and shoe-string logistics are sought to be compensated by the outstanding valour and heroism of our officers and men.

What is needed is a new strategic outlook which will take into account the limited capacity of nuclear weapons to influence conflict outcomes, understand the importance of international support in the bilateral processes for conflict resolution and factor in the new range of war-waging capabilities necessary for the future.