By J.N. Dixit appeared in "The Hindustan Times" on July 21, 1999

Satisfaction verging on euphoria is characterising Indian reaction both at the government and public levels on the vacation of aggression in the Kargil sector by Pakistani troops.

The pull-back of the Pakistani troops and the successes of the armed forces are being described as a “victory”. A victory, no doubt, it is, in purely operational military terms, the credit for which goes entirely to our armed forces who have fought an extremely difficult campaign.

The coordinated, systematically structured and determined manner in which our counter-offensive against Pakistan was launched and successfully completed is entirely due to the thoughtful leadership of our service chiefs, General Malik, Air Chief Marshal Tipnis and Admiral Sushil Kumar.

But this was not a declared war in which we came out successfully. It was a counter-offensive in which we succeeded after being initially caught by surprise.

There is need for a thorough and critical introspection about what we have gone through, so that we don’t face such a situation again. Pakistan agreed to withdraw primarily because of the decisive and determined counter-offensive undertaken by the Indian armed forces.

External criticism of Pakistan and American pressure were only a secondary factor. Had Pakistan succeeded in its military operations and strategic plans, barring some mild criticism, the world powers would not have categorically advised Islamabad to withdraw.

They would instead have called for a ceasefire and resumption of dialogue. Pakistan itself would not have succumbed to external pressure had we allowed it to succeed militarily.

Another point is the two operational elements in the Clinton-Nawaz Sharif statements of July 4 in Washington. The relevant elements in the statement are: “They (Clinton and Sharif) also agreed that it was vital for the peace of South Asia that the line of control in Kashmir be respected by both countries in accordance with their 1972 Simla Agreement” and “It was agreed between the President and the Prime Minister that concrete steps will be taken for the restoration of the line of control in accordance with the Simla Accord. The President urged an immediate cessation of hostilities once these steps are taken”.

It would be pertinent to anticipate the Pakistani interpretations of these two elements in the commitment which Sharif gave to Clinton in the light of the pronouncements of Nawaz Sharif and other government figures of Pakistan over the last fortnight.

Both the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Pakistan as well as Pakistan’s military leaders have expressed doubts about the location of the line of control. Pakistanis withdrew their troops — only the troops — to their side of the LoC to points where they were before the current conflict occurred, and that only in the Kargil sector.

The LoC stretches over 700 km to its northern cartographic grid reference point in NJ 9842. The agreement states that the LoC will extend north towards the glaciers without any cartographic details or any ground delineation. There is no formal line of control beyond this ground reference point.

This portion of the line is called AGPL relating to the location of actual military posts of both countries. Our positions in Siachen fall in this sector. Pakistan would desire negotiations on the entire LoC with view to changing its location to their advantage, which we should firmly resist.

Our demand should be that Pakistani forces pull back to positions which have existed and which have been acknowledged by both sides over the last 27 years, or at least over the last two decades.

Furthermore, respecting the LoC and restoration of it within the framework of the Simla Agreement should lead to a categorical demand that Pakistan respect the sanctity of the line by withdrawing all secessionist intruders from our side of Jammu and Kashmir, stop all subversive activities in all parts of our country and dismantle all training camps for mercenaries and terrorists in its territory, giving the additional commitment that Pakistan will desist from such activities threatening the territorial integrity of India, as it had agreed to in the Simla Agreement. (Sub-clauses 1 to 6 of Paragraph 1 of the Simla Agreement of 1972).

Two prospects are clearly to be anticipated by us. First, there would be insistence from Pakistan and pressure from the international community, particularly the US, to enter into talks with Pakistan on the substantive issues related to J and K. Secondly, we should expect not a decrease but an increase in subversive activities by Pakistan not only in Jammu and Kashmir, but also in other parts of India.

Nawaz Sharif, in all his public pronouncements on the issue, has called for an immediate resumption of dialogue at the high political level. We must also note the significant statement he made in the National Assembly that “though the volcanic eruption in Kargil has been brought under control, if India does not discuss Kashmir in a meaningful manner (meaningful means ‘responsive to Pakistani demands’), other volcanoes will erupt”.

This statement has to be noted with his earlier comment that there can be many more Kargils if India does not come to terms with Pakistan. The spokesman of the ISI, Brigadier Qureshi, when asked whether the so-called Mujahideen are withdrawing, gave the ambiguous response: “I do not know. We have appealed to them. May be they are dispersing towards Srinagar.”

Our sense of relief at the recent conflict coming to an end should be tempered with a consciousness that the prospects of India-Pakistan relations remain uncertain and are fraught with possibilities of continuous covert subversion against India.

The military and political leadership of Pakistan are projecting the Kargil episode as a victory on the following grounds: (a) that Pakistan troops and Pakistani-supported Mujahideen have successfully confronted Indian military forces; (b) Pakistan withdrew voluntarily for the cause of peace; (c) Pakistan achieved its chief political objective through reactivating international attention on the Kashmir issue, with the United States pledging active interest by ensuring that a solution was an Indo-Pak dialogue. Nawaz Sharif cannot but indulge in this kind of projection, given the failure of his government’s misadventure.

How then should we respond to these prospects? First and foremost, we will have to structure higher levels of security arrangements all along the international border, the LoC and beyond. Parallel to this, we must be more alert and make more effective arrangements against possible internal subversion by Pakistan.

Second, any detailed discussion on bilateral issues should be preceded by a discussion of what guarantees Pakistan can give us to restore trust in the context of its repetitive breach of trust after the Tashkent and Simla Agreements and the Lahore declaration.

Despite the provocation and aggression which we have been subjected to, we may agree to resume the dialogue with Pakistan, not for propaganda and publicity purposes, which seems to be Pakistan’s aim. The dialogue should be resumed in a structured manner. We could agree to the resumption of Foreign Secretary-level talks, perhaps late in August or early in September.

But the agenda for these talks will have to be recast in the context of what Pakistan has done in Kargil. The focus should be on the main point of the Nawaz Sharif-Clinton statement respecting the sanctity of the LoC. Only after this is achieved could we proceed to discuss the substance of the issues related to Jammu and Kashmir.

There is no place for euphoric or assertive self-confidence in our attitude towards resuming our dialogue with Pakistan. It should be firmly rooted in the experience that we have had of Pakistani manoeuvrings over the last 50 years on the Kashmir issue and comprehending Pakistan’s long-term objectives regarding Kashmir and the basic attitude of important powers like the US on the issue.