Beyond Kargil: Indo-U.S. ties

By C. Raja Mohan appeared in "The Hindu" on July 8, 1999

The Kargil episode - in particular the contacts between New Delhi and Washington - should give India the confidence to deal with the United States on the basis of pragmatism unencumbered by the ideological baggage of the past.

AS HOPES rise for an early withdrawal of the Pakistani forces from the Kargil sector, India will have to come to terms with the fact that Washington has played an important role in forcing a difficult decision down the throat of Islamabad.

By ensuring the diplomatic isolation of Pakistan in the international arena and exerting considerable direct pressure on the military brass and the political leadership in Islamabad over the last few weeks, the Clinton administration has left the Pakistan Prime Minister, Mr. Nawaz Sharif, with no choice but to end the Kargil misadventure.

Although India would have cleared the aggression on the basis of its military strength over a period of time, the unexpected support from the United States and its forthright stand that Pakistan must pull back its forces from across the Line of Control (LoC) had created an unusually favourable international setting for India in managing the Kargil challenge.

To be sure, there will be an extended debate in India on the impact of American policy in ending the Kargil crisis, and its implications for the future of Indo-U.S. relations as well as the evolution of a broader regional dynamic involving Washington, New Delhi, Islamabad and Beijing.

It will take some time for the Indian political establishment to fully digest the significance the U.S. diplomacy on Kargil. But there is no question that it is one of those rare occasions when the U.S. ended up on the side of India in the many national security challenges it has confronted over the last five decades. It is also the first time that Washington has unambiguously backed India in the latter's series of confrontations with Pakistan over Kashmir since Independence.

Two broad lines have emerged in the Indian debate on the U.S. policy towards Kargil. Both these views are somewhat extreme - one based on fear and the other on hope. The former sees a fiendish American plot against New Delhi and the latter a ``paradigm shift'' of the U.S. policy towards the subcontinent in India's favour. Not surprisingly, many in India fear that the American support on Kargil may be the thin end of the wedge that will inexorably lead to internationalisation of the Kashmir dispute. There is anxiety in New Delhi that reliance on the U.S. support to quickly end the Kargil crisis will result in an inevitable American mediation in Kashmir and its imposition of a final solution on India and Pakistan.

Some of this thinking is based on a fundamental ideological conviction that the U.S. will always be inimical to India. But that thesis is as predictable as it is marginal to the mainstream Indian foreign policy thinking. But there can be no argument about the reality of a deep-seated suspicion in India of American motivations. Much of this is rooted in India's foreign policy experience which saw the U.S. inevitably align with Pakistan in our conflicts with that nation. Many Indians have come to believe that the U.S. has developed enduring interests in Pakistan, as part of the long alignment in the Cold War.

Rooted in the past as it is, this view finds it hard to explain the American behaviour in the case of the Kargil confrontation. This school either does not want to take into account the changes in the region that have taken place since the end of the Cold War or believes that there is no fundamental shift in the U.S. policy towards the subcontinent in the 1990s.

The second school, on the other hand, perhaps tends to read too much in the changes in the regional order since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Those who proclaim a radical change or a ``paradigm shift'' in U.S. policy towards India believe that Washington has good reasons now to end its past tilt towards Pakistan and begin a new alignment with India.

This school of thought assumes that the U.S. is attracted by the huge market of India and that it wants to counter Islamic fundamentalism spreading from Pakistan and looks at India as a possible balancer to China. There is a huge intellectual leap in this argument - in interpreting the potential for future changes in U.S. policy as having already occurred. All the factors mentioned in this view are of considerable importance for the future of Indo-U.S. relations. But none of them may have matured to the point where it begins to alter the foundations of Indo- U.S. relationship. The big emerging market of India is yet to materialise. The slow pace of India's economic reforms has long ended the hype in the U.S. during the mid-1990s about the attractions of the Indian market.

There are no real indications to suggest that the U.S. is anywhere near dumping Pakistan. The American struggle against Islamic radicalism is far too complex to be reduced to India- Pakistan terms. And in the case of China, there is more interaction between Washington and Beijing in every sphere of activity than between New Delhi and Washington. The Chinese trade surplus with the U.S. is almost five times larger than the two- way trade between India and America.

In contrast to the extreme views on U.S. policy towards Kargil, the official assessment remains cautious and balanced. There is a quiet satisfaction that Indian diplomacy has been able to work the all-important U.S. factor in the international dynamics of Kargil in New Delhi's favour. There is appreciation that throughout the crisis, the U.S. has been transparent about its approach and has constantly kept India informed of its policy and actions.

India certainly values the U.S. pressure on Pakistan; but there is some wariness too. While India may be pleased with the main ``product'' of the Clinton-Sharif meeting, there is some nagging irritation at the ``process'' which has produced it.

That the U.S. chose to dignify the aggressor in Kargil with a meeting in Washington on a major national holiday and a joint statement has left some unhappiness in New Delhi. It is also pointed out that the U.S. has found it necessary to offer a fig leaf - if not a face-saver - to Mr. Sharif in the form of an assurance from President Clinton that he will take a ``personal interest'' in accelerating the Indo-Pakistani dialogue. There is no anxiety in New Delhi that the U.S. is about to muscle in on a resolution of the Kashmir problem. Even at its weakest moments in the early 1990s, India successfully resisted the American attempts at ``internationalising'' the Kashmir question. There are enough assurances now from the highest level in Washington that the administration has no desire to either internationalise the issue or attempt mediation.

The real concern in New Delhi lies elsewhere - that Washington may continue to believe that Pakistan must be saved from itself. It is the repeated affirmation of this policy in Washington that has let Pakistan believe that it could get away with anything - whether it is nuclear proliferation or sponsoring narco-religious terrorism.

The U.S. must begin to see that the unprovoked aggression in Kargil is not an aberration or a miscalculation by rogue elements in Pakistan but as a conscious policy choice of a state that has become increasingly militant and ideological in its orientation.

Pakistan may indeed withdraw from Kargil under American pressure. But the leopard of radicalism that has been nurtured in that country is unlikely to change its spots. And it will remain the biggest threat to the people of Pakistan as well as peace in the subcontinent and beyond.

The time has come for Washington to review the core premises of its policy towards Islamabad and begin to address jointly with New Delhi the instabilities arising from Pakistan. India, on the other hand, needs to recognise that it will be a while before the U.S. can fully disentangle its past intensive relationship with Pakistan. The Kargil episode - in particular the contacts between New Delhi and Washington - should give India the confidence to deal with the U.S. on the basis of pragmatism unencumbered by the ideological baggage of the past.