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A deal on Kargil

Editorial from "The Hindustan Times" appeared on July 06, 1999

THE RECAPTURE of Tiger Hill on a day when Mr Nawaz Sharif was trying to save face in Washington can only boost the morale of Indian troops battling the Pakistani invaders. The fall of the vital mountain peak is the latest in a string of recent Indian military successes including the seizure of several major ridges known as points 4700, 5000 and 5100.

The military successes, however, do not mean that India is close to regaining control over the entire swath of territory surreptitiously captured by Pakistan in Ladakh’s Kargil and Drass sectors. Having consciously adopted a long-haul approach by eschewing what the Pakistanis have done — cross the line of control — India has still a long way to go. Its military victories, however, add pressure on Pakistan. It speaks for itself that the beleaguered Prime Minister of Pakistan called the White House on Saturday and sought an urgent meeting with President Bill Clinton to personally convey some ideas. Equally significant is that the meeting was hastily held on US Independence Day and that Mr Clinton spent three hours with Mr Sharif, calling Mr Vajpayee midway to tell him what was being discussed. This reflects both the serious risks of escalation and the demands that Mr Sharif brought to Washington. The Kargil fighting has given Mr Clinton an opportunity to play the role of a peacemaker on the subcontinent soon after his self-trumpeted Kosovo ‘triumph’ in a war in which 22,000 bombs were rained on Yugoslavia. By wisely declining the invitation for a hurried visit to Washington, Mr Vajpayee has denied Mr Clinton the chance to exploit his mediatory role in the current crisis.

It is apparent that Mr Sharif has insisted on some demands being met, an impression reinforced by Mr Clinton’s telephone call to Mr Vajpayee in the middle of the meeting. Had Mr Sharif been willing to unconditionally withdraw his forces from the Indian side of the LoC, he would not have travelled to Washington. US officials have reported that a deal on an early Pakistani withdrawal emerged from the meeting. That raises several questions: How will the withdrawal proceed? Has Pakistan agreed to pull back its forces fully or will it try to retain control of some vantage points on the pretext that the LoC is not clearly defined? Will the powerful Pakistan Army listen to Mr Sharif? What Pakistani demands, if any, have been accepted? The only concession cited in the joint US-Pakistani statement is Mr Clinton’s pledge — once the “sanctity” of the LoC has been restored — to “take a personal interest in encouraging an expeditious resumption and intensification of” Indo-Pak talks. Unlike the forthright US statements in the past asking Pakistan to undo the intrusion, the joint statement is less clear. It merely says that “concrete steps will be taken” to restore the LoC as per the Simla Agreement. Since Islamabad has consistently maintained that India’s Siachin control violates the LoC as agreed upon under the Simla Agreement, the statement creates room for Pakistan to possibly link its Kargil-Drass withdrawal to an Indian pullout from Siachin. With so many unanswered questions, India needs to hold its judgement on whether Pakistan is genuinely willing to de-escalate the situation. As for the US, it has taken the centre-stage as the peace broker.