By V. R. Raghavan appeared in "The Hindu" on May 28, 1999
The writer is Director, Delhi Policy Group and a former Director-General of Military Operations.

The intrusions across the Line of Control in the Kargil sector by well-armed and equipped groups from Pakistan is a disturbing development. Kargil has been in the news for some years for the heavy exchange of artillery fire between Indian and Pakistani forces. This month's developments are, however, significantly different. Nothing since the 1971 war has matched this level of effort and planning from the Pakistan side. The Indian response to this major and unwarranted military intrusion would have to be both multi-dimensional and carefully thought-out.

Kargil's military and strategic significance to India and Pakistan can be gauged from the battles fought for its control. In 1947, Kargil and the heights around it were occupied by Pakistani marauders and Ladak was effectively sealed off from the rest of the country. These forces were held off almost within the artillery range of Leh. The Indian response had to wait until a column reached there walking over the high passes of Rohtang and Baralacha La, from what is today Himachal Pradesh and the clearance of the Zoji La pass. The ground and air effort required for it took almost a year to prepare.

In 1965, Indian infantry battalions clambered the rocky mountain slopes around Kargil to push back Pakistani posts, which could look into the Kargil bowl and fire into it. Some of these posts were later handed back as part of the Tashkent Accord. There is an obelisk built by soldiers on the Kargil airfield with a moving inscription for a Major from Tamil Nadu, who died fighting for the mountain heights which were returned to Pakistan. In 1971, Indian battalions again attacked to push back Pakistani forces further and even took more territory to make Kargil safe from interference. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Pakistan resorted to heavy artillery firing in the area which intensified further during the last few years.

Pakistani headquarters are far removed from this area. Its logistic and communication routes are long and pass through the Northern Areas, which witnessed political unrest in the past. It would also be difficult to sustain these intrusions in the face of a determined Indian thrust to evict them. The answer to Pakistan's Kargil conundrum has to be found outside the logic of military operations.

The current intrusions are spread over a wide stretch of the LoC. The intruding groups are separated and cannot support one another. They will need administrative back-up, including air maintenance, if they are to remain there for long. The groups are visible to the Indian side and can be effectively fired upon. The intrusions have all occurred simultaneously. Unlike the earlier ones, these are apparently not for moving infiltrators further into the valley but to remain there. This is clearly and unacceptably in violation of the agreements on the LoC, including the Lahore Declaration.

There was a reported statement by a spokesman of Pakistan that it no longer recognised the sanctity of the LoC. If this is correct, it places an altogether new interpretation on the inviolability of the LoC. So far the LoC had been violated by sending infiltrators or firing across it. An attempt to change the status by force, by occupying territory across the LoC, is a grave matter. It can lead to serious consequences if the LoC's status as a separator of forces is allowed to be blurred. It would lead to a free-for-all situation, leading to occupation of each other's territory.

The Indian options in this provocative situation need to be worked out at different levels simultaneously. The positions held by the intruders inside Indian territory would have to be speedily undone. Allowing them time would only enable them to get stronger by the day. However, reasonable time would also have to be given to ensure that unnecessary Indian casualties are not incurred. Simultaneously, diplomatic efforts would need to be intensified to reassert the commitment of both sides to the LoC. It is likely that Pakistan would prefer to delay this through parleys. The military option to undo the intrusions would nevertheless have to be put into effect soon. The Indian military operations against intruders need not and should not be dependent on others' approval. It is obvious that political will and military capabilities need to be urgently synergised to get the right message across.

The availability of nuclear weapons with India and Pakistan is a factor which will impact on policy and the decision processes involved in managing the situation in Kargil. A U.S. Republican party report assessed as far back in 1995 that, ``nuclear weapons have become the key to Pakistan's strategy in Kashmir.'' The challenge now lies in keeping the military operations against the intrusions firmly at the low-intensity conflict threshold. Any attempt by Pakistan to replicate the ``Brasstacks'' build-up would have to be countered through effective and pro-active diplomacy. The Prime Minister's telephone conversation with Mr. Nawaz Sharif is part of that exercise.

The route to success lies in firm action on the ground and retaining control of the situation as it develops. The calls for hot pursuit and for proactive military initiatives in areas of our own choosing are more likely to muddy the waters. Perhaps the most important need would be for the political leadership of the government to evolve a code for public pronouncements, an area in which its record has been indifferent at best and chauvinistic, at worst.

It is possible that the military establishment in Pakistan is sending specific messages to its own polity through the Kargil venture. It is apparent that even as the two Prime Ministers were working for peace through the Lahore Declaration, planning and preparation for the Kargil adventure were under way in Rawalpindi. In a situation where an Army Chief was asked to retire and where there were reports of differences between the present incumbent and the Prime Minister, it is not unreasonable to wonder whether the military is doing its own act in Kargil. If so, it would not be for the first time. The choice of Kargil, away from the Kashmir valley, and in an area not likely to invite a general mobilisation of forces would be the perfect one to test the political will to bring the military to order in Pakistan. A settlement involving a pullback by the intruders would demand political skills that may have been assessed as being beyond that of a weakened leadership. The Indian political scene is more likely to have been incidental in such calculations.

The situation created by Pakistan's military-backed intrusion in Kargil offers unique challenges. It allows for the reassertion of the LoC as the basis of restraint and stability. It permits asking Pakistan's political establishment to curb its military's penchant for unilateral actions, by removing the intrusions or face a military response. The situation facilitates showing up Pakistan's intransigence, and its less than dependable assurances of international conduct, on as straightforward a matter as the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir. A strong but controlled military-cum-diplomatic response would be the key to success. This will effectively demonstrate that India can handle such challenges through the turbulence of democratic process.