• Intruding aircraft was of the Atlantique type. It is well-known to defence forces, especially navy/air forces all over the world, that this is an advanced military aircraft with following essential capabilities:

- The aircraft can not only carry out marine reconnaissance but also do surveillance / aerial photography and electronic intelligence gathering.

- Can carry a substantial weapons load (3.5 tonnes in the case of Pakistan version). This includes bombs, air-to-surface missiles and weapons meant for anti-ship and anti-submarine role, as well as air-to-air missiles.

• Pak military aircraft came well into Indian air space (up to 10 km). This was clearly a deep intrusion and violation of our air space in contravention of universally accepted norms of conduct in bilateral relation.

• This intrusion was also a blatant violation of the 1991 Agreement between India and Pakistan on Prevention of Air Space Violations and for permitting over flights and landings by military aircraft. The crucial provision in this Agreement is that aircraft of this type will not fly within 10 kms of each other's air space, except by prior permission.

• Pakistan neither informed us nor sought prior permission as required by the Agreement.

• Details of intrusions, aircraft type (as described above), mode of activity including movements of the aircraft, and its conduct after it was engaged by our air force, Pakistan's own statements thereafter make it clear beyond doubt that this was in no way a case of an innocent entry or straying into Indian air space, but a deliberate, planned operation for surveillance/reconnaissance and intelligence gathering, using a sophisticated reconnaissance/combat aircraft for this purpose.

• It is crucial to recognise that surveillance / reconnaissance / intelligence gathering is an offensive military operation and a hostile activity. It cannot be passed off as harmless.

• The central issue therefore is not whether Pakistan aircraft was "armed" or "unarmed". The issue is that it was a military aircraft engaged in offensive and hostile military operation compounded by its combat capabilities.

• Pak Information Minister was quoted by BBC, soon after the incident, as stating that the aircraft was on a "surveillance mission". Subsequently, the Pak Government spokesman stated that it was on a training mission.

• Following points are relevant in this connection:

- A genuine, routine training mission would never operate in sensitive border areas, leave alone violate the air space of a neighbouring country especially at a time of tension. This is precisely what the Pak aircraft was doing.

- If the aircraft was flying out towards the high seas on a genuine mission, it could have traversed a more westward route away from the sensitive border areas

- If it was on a training mission, this would have to be linked with maritime reconnaissance. It was operating over a land area - covering part of our territory.

- The aircraft was at a height of 5,000-10,000 feet. This is an unusually low height for an aircraft supposedly on a training mission. Low attitude is, however, essential for carrying out photography of ground features.

• Area over which the Atlantique was executing its manoeuvres, is a sensitive border area and it has many ingress and infiltration routes. The indication is that the aircraft was engaged in reconnaissance, photography and surveillance over these features, as well as of ground activity on the Sir Creek area. Though the intrusion was not in this area, the aircraft is capable of photographing at an angle. Further, there are a number of sensitive defence installations and major civilian (industrial and scientific) centres on our side near the area of intrusion, and further beyond the western sea coast of India.

• The aircraft intruded four times into Indian air space. After first entry, it carried out a circular movement, exited and entered again making another circular movement, it was after the fourth return into Indian territory, that it was encountered and engaged.

• The intruder was given a further opportunity to prove his bona fides. This was done through an accepted signalling system. This involves two aircraft moving to the side of the intruding aircraft, conveying a visual signal i.e. wiggling of wings and leftward movement. These are universally recognised signals conveying that intruder is in our airspace, and asking him to follow and land as well as indicating to him the place he should land. The intruder is expected to respond indicating that the landing place conveyed to his is practical. This effort to communicate with him was sustained, and every opportunity was given to him to respond and land peacefully. The intruder could have proven his bona fides by responding and complying with the indications. Instead, he not only disregarded our aircraft signals, but also turned towards the interceptor aircraft in an aggressive, evasive movement. Given the unusual movements of the intruder over our territory, already monitored and described above and his subsequent conduct after giving him the opportunity to land safely, our Air Force could have reached no conclusion other than this was a hostile military operation, which required counter-action.

• There is no weakness in these rules of engagement. What they require is that both sides must observe them honestly. If one side decides to break them the system becomes unworkable, regardless of how refined and foolproof it might be.

• Pak conduct in this matter is a major violation of an important CBM. The 1991 Agreement was one of the 4 CBMs put in place from 1998 onwards, at our instance. We are committed to observance of CBMs.

• The Pak combat aircraft was hit on its left engine which caught fire. The indication is that, as a result it started moving in a leftward arc even though damaged. Apparently in its attempt to head back into Pak airspace, it cut an arc cross the border into Pakistan, and then seems to have impacted very near the border itself. As it moved, it would also have started breaking up which is why there has been wreckage found in both India and Pakistan. An aircraft such as this does not fall vertically but follows a trajectory based on constantly changing aerodynamics. This explains why there are pieces of wreckage that we have retrieved, and others that Pakistan has been displaying on TV.

• Precise location of pieces of wreckage in itself cannot in this instance, be correlated categorically with the movement of the aircraft on its flight path before it was hit. It is natural for wreckage to scatter and this does not in any way impinge on the basic issue that aircraft was in Indian airspace as indicated above.

• The crucial question is what then prevented the Pak aircraft from proving its bona fides when it had every opportunity to do so under the rules of engagement of which they are fully aware.

• The question again arises that if the aircraft was indeed engaged on an innocent, routine mission, why it could not prove this by complying with the mutually accepted procedures of engagement when every opportunity was given to it.

• The part of the border in Kutch where there is a divergence in interpretation of the boundary is the mouth of the Sir Creek, which is somewhat removed from the place where the air intrusions occurred. The essential point is that at one sector of the border where three intrusions took place, the boundary alignment is not in question at all. Therefore it cannot in anyway cast doubt on air space violation. In the other sector where the single fourth intrusion took place, the divergence in interpretation of boundary demarcation is very small (350 meters at maximum) and this does not in any way detract from the fact of the air space violation.

• The place where there is a substantial divergence was not the site of the recent air intrusion, and it is, therefore, not relevant.

• There have been violations in different sectors of the border over the past months and years. Many of them are high-speed aircraft entering and existing in minutes. It is not possible to intercept them but they are none the less intrusions and violations of the 1991 Agreement. Some may be inadvertent. The existing mechanism i.e. the 1991 Agreement, taken together with the rules of engagement provide for fool proof handling of all these possibilities. We have taken up all major cases with Pakistan government.

• Recent provocation is yet another serious undermining of what should be a common effort to reduce tensions and improve relations. It is clear that this incident was totally avoidable.

• It is unfortunate that they have compounded this with yet another provocation by firing missiles at our unarmed helicopters carrying civilians (journalists) while within our airspace (on Aug 12). We did not retaliate in this instance.

• We continue to operate in a larger consistent framework and vision of good neighbourly relations with Pakistan. We week to build cooperation and confidence and resolve issues through peaceful bilateral discussions, working towards realistic solutions. The Simla Agreement provides the framework. We seek to build a stable, broad-based relationship on this basis. We will continue our initiatives as in the past, including the composite dialogue and the Lahore process. We remain committed to the Lahore process and dialogue.

• The Lahore process and dialogue have been greatly undermined by Pakistan's adventurism in Kargil and by its renewed cross border terrorism. They have the responsibility of repairing damage and restoring trust. We call on Pakistan to take concrete steps for this purpose. This would facilitate resumption of Lahore process and composite dialogue. This requires reaffirmation of inviolability and sanctity of LOC. Sponsorship of terrorism across LOC in any particular sector, is violation of LOC, as indeed of Simla Agreement and Lahore understandings. This also prevents return of trust. Hence, Pakistan must abjure instigating, sponsoring, aiding and abetting cross border terrorism.