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Ambassador Naresh Chandra Meets Members of India Interest Group

September 10, 1999

The Ambassador, Naresh Chandra, held a meeting with members of the India Interest Group. A large number of representatives of US companies and business organisations attended the meeting. Senior officials of the Embassy and representatives of FICCI, CII and State Bank of India were also present.

Briefing members on the current political and economic scene in India, the Ambassador mentioned that in spite of the Kargil conflict and the announcement of parliamentary elections, the share market index was up and the economy continued to do well. Most macro-indicators have been favourable in the last few months. Inflation, for example, is at an all-time low and the rising stock market index reflects continued investor confidence in the economy. The reform process did get interrupted in some cases where legislation was involved, like the opening up of insurance sector, but this is likely to be temporary. India would have a new parliament soon and whichever party formed the Government, it was likely to carry forward the programme of liberalisation, the Ambassador emphasised.

Touching on key issues in Indo-US relations, Ambassador Chandra mentioned that Senator Brownback and Congressman Gilman have proposed waiver of US sanctions under the Glenn Amendment and the matter would now be decided in conference between the Senate and the House. While these moves are welcome, he said, there are two concerns relating to waiver of sanctions which should be noted. First, there is a strong feeling among the Indian American community here that Pressler Amendment should not be repealed. Most analysts also agree that it would send a very wrong signal so soon after the misadventure in Kargil. Secondly, the entities list issued by the Bureau of Export Administration is so long and wide in its scope that it is a major hurdle in developing a more fruitful economic relationship between our two countries. This had adversely affected US exports to India.



*Ambassador
Naresh Chandra*

In the interaction that ensued, members of India Interest Group raised issues regarding the likely political scenario after elections in India and its effect on economic policies. Ambassador Chandra pointed out that the Indian political situation is undergoing a transformation and all parties appeared to have broadened their perspectives. Two important political groupings have emerged, but on economic issues there is a clear consensus on continuing the policy of liberalisation in the country's best interest.

There was discussion on the entities list issued by the Bureau of Export Administration. Some members stated that they have been pointing out to the US Administration that it is disproportionately wide in its scope that hurts business interests on both sides. They felt that there should be an exit policy that enables entities to get off the list and stated that they have been emphasising this need with the US Administration. The Ambassador welcomed these observations and stated that the Embassy and the US corporate sector can work together on this.

Some members representing US telecom and energy companies felt that India should take a more positive line in the WTO negotiations. Given India's increasingly liberal economic policy at home, the somewhat rigid approach taken in the multilateral trade forums, they felt, reflected a needlessly rigid and narrow approach. The Ambassador pointed out that the Government of India has been moving quite rapidly in removing trade restrictions and stated that the Embassy would be happy to work with US companies to develop an approach which will be in conformity with India's national interests and include all WTO-related issues, including transnational movement of persons. At the Seattle Conference in November 1999, India's Commerce Minister would be leading the delegation and some positions could be formulated before that meeting.

In his concluding remarks, Mr. Michael Gadbaw, President of India Interest Group, appreciated the initiative of the Ambassador to regularly meet with the US corporate sector. He stated that it provided a very useful forum for exchanging views. He proposed for Ambassador Chandra's consideration that the next meeting be held soon after the formation of the new Government. This was agreed to.

Draft Report of National Security Advisory Board on Indian Nuclear Doctrine

August 17, 1999

Preamble

1.1. The use of nuclear weapons in particular as well as other weapons of mass destruction constitutes the gravest threat to humanity and to peace and stability in the international system. Unlike the other two categories of weapons of mass destruction, biological and chemical weapons which have been outlawed by international treaties, nuclear weapons remain instruments for national and collective security, the possession of which on a selective basis has been sought to be legitimised through permanent extension of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) in May 1995. Nuclear weapon states have asserted that they will continue to rely on nuclear weapons with some of them adopting policies to use them even in a non-nuclear context. These developments amount to virtual abandonment of nuclear disarmament. This is a serious setback to the struggle of the international community to abolish weapons of mass destruction.

1.2. India's primary objective is to achieve economic, political, social, scientific and technological development within a peaceful and democratic framework. This requires an environment of durable peace and insurance against potential risks to peace and stability. It will be India's endeavour to proceed towards this overall objective in cooperation with the global democratic trends and to play a constructive role in advancing the international system toward a just, peaceful and equitable order.

1.3. Autonomy of decision making in the developmental process and in strategic matters is an inalienable democratic right of the Indian people. India will strenuously guard this right in a world where nuclear weapons for a select few are sought to be legitimised for an indefinite future, and where there is growing complexity and frequency in the use of force for political purposes.

1.4. India's security is an integral component of its development process. India continuously aims at promoting an ever-expanding area of peace and stability around it so that developmental priorities can be pursued without disruption.

1.5. However, the very existence of offensive doctrine pertaining to the first use of nuclear weapons and the insistence of some nuclear weapons states on the legitimacy of their use even against non-nuclear weapon countries constitute a threat to peace, stability and

1.6. This document outlines the broad principles for the development, deployment and employment of India's nuclear forces. Details of policy and strategy concerning force structures, deployment and employment of nuclear forces will flow from this framework and will be laid down separately and kept under constant review.

2. Objectives

2.1. In the absence of global nuclear disarmament India's strategic interests require effective, credible nuclear deterrence and adequate retaliatory capability should deterrence fail. This is consistent with the UN Charter, which sanctions the right of self-defence.

2.2. The requirements of deterrence should be carefully weighed in the design of Indian nuclear forces and in the strategy to provide for a level of capability consistent with maximum credibility, survivability, effectiveness, safety and security.

2.3. India shall pursue a doctrine of credible minimum nuclear deterrence. In this policy of "retaliation only", the survivability of our arsenal is critical. This is a dynamic concept related to the strategic environment, technological imperatives and the needs of national security. The actual size components, deployment and employment of nuclear forces will be decided in the light of these factors. India's peacetime posture aims at convincing any potential aggressor that:

- (a) any threat of use of nuclear weapons against India shall invoke measures to counter the threat: and
- (b) any nuclear attack on India and its forces shall result in punitive retaliation with nuclear weapons to inflict damage unacceptable to the aggressor.

2.4. The fundamental purpose of Indian nuclear weapons is to deter the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons by any State or entity against India and its forces. India will not be the first to initiate a nuclear strike, but will respond with punitive retaliation should deterrence fail.

2.5. India will not resort to the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against States which do not possess nuclear weapons, or are not aligned with nuclear weapon powers.

2.6. Deterrence requires that India maintain:

- (a) Sufficient, survivable and operationally prepared nuclear forces,
- (b) a robust command and control system,
- (c) effective intelligence and early warning capabilities, and
- (d) comprehensive planning and training for operations in line with the strategy, and
- (e) the will to employ nuclear forces and weapons

2.7. Highly effective conventional military capabilities shall be maintained to raise the threshold of outbreak both of conventional military conflict as well as that of threat or use of nuclear weapons.

3. Nuclear Forces

3.1. India's nuclear forces will be effective, enduring, diverse, flexible, and responsive to the requirements in accordance with the concept of credible minimum deterrence. These forces will be based on a triad of aircraft, mobile land-based missiles and sea-based assets in keeping with the objectives outlined above.

Survivability of the forces will be enhanced by a combination of multiple redundant systems, mobility, dispersion and deception.

3.2. The doctrine envisages assured capability to shift from peacetime deployment to fully employable forces in the shortest possible time, and the ability to retaliate effectively even in a case of significant degradation by hostile strikes.

4. Credibility and Survivability

The following principles are central to India's nuclear deterrent

4.1. Credibility: Any adversary must know that India can and will retaliate with sufficient nuclear weapons to inflict destruction and punishment that the aggressor will find unacceptable if nuclear weapons are used against India and its forces.

4.2. Effectiveness: The efficacy of India's nuclear deterrent be maximised through synergy among all elements involving reliability, timeliness, accuracy and weight of the attack.

4.3 Survivability:

- (i) India's nuclear forces and their command and control shall be organised for very high survivability against surprise attacks and for rapid punitive response. They shall be designed and deployed to ensure survival against a first strike and to endure repetitive attrition attempts with adequate retaliatory capabilities for a punishing strike which would be unacceptable to the aggressor.
- (ii) Procedures for the continuity of nuclear command and control shall ensure a continuing capability to effectively employ nuclear weapons.

5. Command and Control

5.1. Nuclear weapons shall be tightly controlled and released for use at the highest political level. The authority to release nuclear weapons for use resides in the person of the Prime Minister of India, or the designated successor(s).

5.2. An effective and survivable command and control system with requisite flexibility and responsiveness shall be in place. An integrated operational plan, or a series of sequential plans, predicated on strategic objectives and a targeting policy shall form part of the system.

5.3. For effective employment the unity of command and control of nuclear forces including dual capable delivery systems shall be ensured.

5.4. The survivability of the nuclear arsenal and effective command, control, communications, computing, in-

telligence and information (C4I2) systems shall be assured.

5.5. The Indian defence forces shall be in a position to, execute operations in an NBC environment with minimal degradation;

5.6. Space based and other assets shall be created to provide early warning, communications, damage/detonation assessment.

6. Security and Safety

6.1. Security: Extraordinary precautions shall be taken to ensure that nuclear weapons, their manufacture, transportation and storage are fully guarded against possible theft, loss, sabotage, damage or unauthorised access or use.

6.2. Safety is an absolute requirement and tamper proof procedures and systems shall be instituted to ensure that unauthorised or inadvertent activation/use of nuclear weapons does not take place and risks of accident are avoided.

6.3. Disaster control: India shall develop an appropriate disaster control system capable of handling the unique requirements of potential incidents involving nuclear weapons and materials;

7. Research and Development

7.1. India should step up efforts in research and development to keep up with technological advances in this field.

7.2. While India is committed to maintain the deployment of a deterrent which is both minimum and credible, it will not accept any restraints on building its R&D capability.

8. Disarmament and Arms Control

8.1. Global, verifiable and non-discriminatory nuclear disarmament is a national security objective. India shall continue its efforts to achieve the goal of a nuclear weapon-free world at an early date.

8.2. Since no-first use of nuclear weapons is India's basic commitment, every effort shall be made to persuade other States possessing nuclear weapons to join an international treaty banning first use.

8.3. Having provided unqualified negative security assurances, India shall work for internationally binding unconditional negative security assurances by nuclear weapon states to non-nuclear weapon states.

8.4. Nuclear arms control measures shall be sought as part of national security policy to reduce potential threats and to protect our own capability and its effectiveness.

8.5. In view of the very high destructive potential of nuclear weapons, appropriate nuclear risk reduction and confidence building measures shall be sought, negotiated and instituted.

Frequently Asked Questions about Indian Parliament

The composition of Parliament of India

According to Article 79 of the Constitution of India, the Parliament consists of President of India and the two Houses of Parliament known as Council of States (Rajya Sabha) and House of the People (Lok Sabha).

Who elects the President of India?

The President is elected by the members of an electoral college consisting of the elected members of both the Houses of Parliament and the elected members of the Legislative Assemblies of States and the Union Territories of Delhi and Pondicherry.

What is the maximum number of members of Rajya Sabha?

The maximum number of members of Rajya Sabha can be 250.

What is the present strength of the Rajya Sabha, including the nominated members?

The present strength of Rajya Sabha is 245 (233 elected and 12 nominated).

What is the life of Rajya Sabha?

Rajya Sabha is a Permanent House and is not subject to dissolution as per Article 83 (1) of the Constitution of India. But as nearly as possible, one third of its members shall retire every 2nd year and an equal number of members are chosen to replace them.

Who elects the members of the Rajya Sabha?

Elected members of the State Legislative Assemblies Article 80(4) of Constitution of India provides that members of Rajya Sabha shall be

elected by the elected members of State Legislative Assemblies through the system of proportional representation by means of the single transferable vote.

Who nominates the members of the Rajya Sabha?

The President of India nominates 12 members of Rajya Sabha.

Is there any special qualification for nomination?

Article 80 (3) of the Constitution of India provides that the members to be nominated by the President to Rajya Sabha should have special knowledge or practical experience in matters like literature, science, art and social service. Article 84 (b) stipulates that a person shall be of not less than 30 (Thirty) years of age.

What is the term of Lok Sabha?

Article 83 (2) of the Constitution stipulates that Lok Sabha shall have a normal term of 5 years from the date appointed for its first meeting and no longer. However, the President may dissolve the House earlier. For instance, the present Lok Sabha was dissolved on April 26, 1999, although it had not completed its normal term of 5 years.

What can be the maximum number of members of the Lok Sabha?

The maximum number of elected members of Lok Sabha is 550. Article 81 of the Constitution provides that not more than 530 members will be elected from the States and not more than 20 members from Union Territories. Article 331 of the Constitution provides that not more than 2 members from the Anglo Indian Com-

munity may be nominated by the President of India, if in his opinion that community is not adequately represented in that House.

What is the present strength of the Lok Sabha?

The present strength of Lok Sabha is 543 elected members.

How are the members of Lok Sabha elected?

Under Sec 14 of Representation of People Act 1951, the President of India by a notification will call upon the constituencies to elect their members to the House of People. Thereafter the electors of the Parliamentary Constituencies will directly elect the Lok Sabha members. As per article 326 of the Constitution of India, elections to the House of the People shall be on the basis of adult suffrage.

How many members are elected by the electors of a Parliamentary Constituency?

Each Parliamentary Constituency will elect only one member.

What is the number of the present general election to Lok Sabha?

This General Election being held in September-October 1999 is the 13th general election to constitute the 13th Lok Sabha.

When was the 1st general election held in India?

The first general election was held in India during 1951-1952.

At that time, what was the total strength of the Lok Sabha?

The total strength of Lok Sabha at that time was 489.

Excerpts from Ambassador Naresh Chandra's live chat on MSNBC

September 7, 1999

MSNBC: What are the defining issues in this election, and can we expect to see substantial change from the next government?

Naresh Chandra: The main issue concerns resolving economic questions. They are in the forefront, followed by security, and law & order. Underlying all that is the strong demand by different factions for better standard of living and education and health.

Question: What are the areas in which India and US can work together when the new Government is elected next month? Is there any high optimism prevailing towards an outstanding growth in business as well as security relationship between the two biggest democracies in the world?

Naresh Chandra: We have had very good progress in our trade and investment relations since 1991-92. We are sure that this is going to be a very productive area. We have also been having a strategic dialogue at a high level. These discussions are going on and both sides have been able to narrow down differences. I think there is much better understanding now in US about India's security concerns and the great role that India can play as a very responsible factor for peace and stability in Asia and the world.

Question: India is about to become the second nation on earth to achieve a population of 1 billion. Is India near the breaking point in terms of food production, medical care, etc.?

Naresh Chandra: I think the population needs to be properly managed and controlled. Higher population is not a goal we're trying to achieve. But on the other hand, our food production have ensured that there is no problem with availability. There have been vast improvements in healthcare. Some states have done very well. In many areas there is need for improvement.

Question: Why can't India draw closer to the U.S. With China growing in power and Pakistan no longer a bulwark against the USSR, isn't that in both country's interests?

Naresh Chandra: I think from our side we have always attempted to maintain as much progress as possible in strengthening India-US relations. We

should now be able to work together much more. We feel that with the dissolution of the old USSR and the opening up of the Indian market the chances are even greater. We wish for better relations with China, our great neighbour to the North. We also don't look at Pakistan as an enemy or even as permanent adversary. We would like to cooperate with all the people in our neighbourhood. We have a large number of Indian-American families who act as a bridge between India and US. This has been extremely helpful in strengthening this relationship.

MSNBC: Do you think India will ever win a seat on the UN Security Council?

Naresh Chandra: Yes, I think it would. It's not a case of putting up a line of argument or making a strong case. What has to be seen is India has no aggressive design on any country. It has always come forward to take part in UN peace-keeping operations. India has also proved despite its diversity it can rule according to law in a democratic manner. We have also shown that the Indian people are capable of contributing in every field of human activity including science and technology. It will be extremely odd if 1/6 of the human race with such potential and history is kept out of the Security Council in the 21st century. Without India the Security Council would not be properly representative.

MSNBC: A lot of technical folks are coming to work in the U.S. What can India do to maintain it's own high-tech industry in the face of this exodus?

Naresh Chandra: There has been some exodus, but there has also been some return. Therefore, we have derived some benefits also. We have been keeping an eye on it but since we have thousands of trained and technologically qualified persons, the drain is not high enough to hurt India's interests. With this kind of exchange of technical personnel, we have derived much mutual benefit in the growth of high-tech business between India and US.

MSNBC: Final Thoughts...

Naresh Chandra: I would like to thank all of you for your questions. We are in the process of general elections and the exercise will show that we have a strong democratic tradition. Thank you and good evening.

Note on Violation of India's airspace by Pakistan's Atlantique aircraft and consequent action

On August 10, 1999, a Pakistani Naval Anti-Submarine Warfare and maritime reconnaissance aircraft, called Atlantique intruded 10 Kms into Indian Territory in the Area of KORI CREEK.

The intruding aircraft was detected by IAF ground radars and was intercepted 10 Kms south of the International Border. When the IAF fighters closed in to identify and signal the intruding Pakistani aircraft to force it to land at an Indian base, the Pakistani aircraft acted in a hostile manner by turning into our fighter. At that stage the Atlantique was shot down by an air-to-air missile from a MIG-21 of the IAF, which hit the aircraft on the port engine which caught fire.

Following is a comprehensive note on the incident:

- Intruding aircraft was of the Atlantique type. It is well-known to defence forces, especially navy/air forces all over the world, that this is an advanced military aircraft with following essential capabilities:
 - The aircraft can not only carry out marine reconnaissance but also do surveillance / aerial photography and electronic intelligence gathering.
 - Can carry a substantial weapons load (3.5 tonnes in the case of Pakistan version). This includes bombs, air-to-surface missiles and weapons meant for anti-ship and anti-submarine role, as well as air-to-air missiles.
- Pak military aircraft came well into Indian air space (up to 10 km). This was clearly a deep intrusion and violation of our air space in contravention of universally accepted norms of conduct in bilateral relation.
- This intrusion was also a blatant violation of the 1991 Agreement between India and Pakistan on Prevention of Air Space Violations and for permitting over flights and landings by military aircraft. The crucial provision in this Agreement is that aircraft of this type will not fly within 10 kms of each other's air space, except by prior permission.
- Pakistan neither informed us nor sought prior permission as required by the Agreement.
- Details of intrusions, aircraft type (as described above), mode of activity including movements of the aircraft, and its conduct after it was engaged by our air force, Pakistan's own statements thereafter make it clear beyond doubt that this was in no way a case of an innocent entry or straying into Indian air space, but a deliberate, planned operation for surveillance/reconnaissance and intelligence gathering, using a sophisticated reconnaissance/combat aircraft for this purpose.
- It is crucial to recognise that surveillance / reconnaissance / intelligence gathering is an offensive military operation and a hostile activity. It cannot be passed off as harmless.
- The central issue therefore is not whether Pakistan aircraft was "armed" or "unarmed". The issue is that it was a military aircraft engaged in offensive and hostile military operation compounded by its combat capabilities.
- Pak Information Minister was quoted by BBC, soon after the incident, as stating that the aircraft was on a "surveillance mission". Subsequently, the Pak Government spokesman stated that it was on a training mission.
- Following points are relevant in this connection:
 - A genuine, routine training mission would never operate in sensitive border areas, leave alone violate the air space of a neighbouring country especially at a time of tension. This is precisely what the Pak aircraft was doing.
 - If the aircraft was flying out towards the high seas on a genuine mission, it could have traversed a more westward route away from the sensitive border areas
 - If it was on a training mission, this would have to be linked with maritime reconnaissance. It was operating over a land area - covering part of our territory.
 - The aircraft was at a height of 5,000-10,000 feet. This is an unusually low height for an aircraft supposedly on a training mission. Low attitude is, however, essential for carrying out photography of ground features.
- Area over which the Atlantique was executing its manoeuvres, is a sensitive border area and it has many ingress and infiltration routes. The indication is that the aircraft was engaged in reconnaissance, photography and surveillance over these features, as well as of ground activity on the Sir Creek area. Though the intrusion was not in this area, the aircraft is capable of photographing at an angle. Further, there are a number of sensitive defence installations and major civilian (industrial and scientific) centres on our side near the area of intrusion, and further beyond the western sea coast of India.
- The aircraft intruded *four times* into Indian air space. After first entry, it carried out a circular movement, exited and entered again making another circular movement, it was after the fourth return into Indian territory, that it was encountered and engaged.

- The intruder was given a further opportunity to prove his bona fides. This was done through an accepted signalling system. This involves two aircraft moving to the side of the intruding aircraft, conveying a visual signal i.e. wiggling of wings and leftward movement. These are universally recognised signals conveying that intruder is in our airspace, and asking him to follow and land as well as indicating to him the place he should land. The intruder is expected to respond indicating that the landing place conveyed to him is practical. This effort to communicate with him was sustained, and every opportunity was given to him to respond and land peacefully. The intruder could have proven his bona fides by responding and complying with the indications. Instead, he not only disregarded our aircraft signals, but also turned towards the interceptor aircraft in an aggressive, evasive movement. Given the unusual movements of the intruder over our territory, already monitored and described above and his subsequent conduct after giving him the opportunity to land safely, our Air Force could have reached no conclusion other than this was a hostile military operation, which required counter-action.
- There is no weakness in these rules of engagement. What they require is that both sides must observe them honestly. If one side decides to break them the system becomes unworkable, regardless of how refined and foolproof it might be.
- Pak conduct in this matter is a major violation of an important CBM. The 1991 Agreement was one of the 4 CBMs put in place from 1998 onwards, at our instance. We are committed to observance of CBMs.
- The Pak combat aircraft was hit on its left engine which caught fire. The indication is that, as a result it started moving in a leftward arc even though damaged. Apparently in its attempt to head back into Pak airspace, it cut an arc cross the border into Pakistan, and then seems to have impacted very near the border itself. As it moved, it would also have started breaking up which is why there has been wreckage found in both India and Pakistan. An aircraft such as this does not fall vertically but follows a trajectory based on constantly changing aerodynamics. This explains why there are pieces of wreckage that we have retrieved, and others that Pakistan has been displaying on TV.
- Precise location of pieces of wreckage in itself cannot in this instance, be correlated categorically with the movement of the aircraft on its flight path before it was hit. It is natural for wreckage to scatter and this does not in any way impinge on the basic issue that aircraft was in Indian airspace as indicated above.
- The crucial question is what then prevented the Pak aircraft from proving its bona fides when it had every opportunity to do so under the rules of engagement of which they are fully aware.
- The question again arises that if the aircraft was indeed engaged on an innocent, routine mission, why it could not prove this by complying with the mutually accepted procedures of engagement when every opportunity was given to it.
- The part of the border in Kutch where there is a divergence in interpretation of the boundary is the mouth of the Sir Creek, which is somewhat removed from the place where the air intrusions occurred. The essential point is that at one sector of the border where three intrusions took place, the boundary alignment is not in question at all. Therefore it cannot in anyway cast doubt on air space violation. In the other sector where the single fourth intrusion took place, the divergence in interpretation of boundary demarcation is very small (350 meters at maximum) and this does not in any way detract from the fact of the air space violation.
- The place where there is a substantial divergence was not the site of the recent air intrusion, and it is, therefore, not relevant.
- There have been violations in different sectors of the border over the past months and years. Many of them are high-speed aircraft entering and existing in minutes. It is not possible to intercept them but they are none the less intrusions and violations of the 1991 Agreement. Some may be inadvertent. The existing mechanism i.e. the 1991 Agreement, taken together with the rules of engagement provide for fool proof handling of all these possibilities. We have taken up all major cases with Pakistan government.
- Recent provocation is yet another serious undermining of what should be a common effort to reduce tensions and improve relations. It is clear that this incident was totally avoidable.
- It is unfortunate that they have compounded this with yet another provocation by firing missiles at our unarmed helicopters carrying civilians (journalists) while within our airspace (on Aug 12). We did not retaliate in this instance.
- We continue to operate in a larger consistent framework and vision of good neighbourly relations with Pakistan. We seek to build cooperation and confidence and resolve issues through peaceful bilateral discussions, working towards realistic solutions. The Simla Agreement provides the framework. We seek to build a stable, broad-based relationship on this basis. We will continue our initiatives as in the past, including the composite dialogue and the Lahore process. We remain committed to the Lahore process and dialogue.
- The Lahore process and dialogue have been greatly undermined by Pakistan's adventurism in Kargil and by its renewed cross border terrorism. They have the responsibility of repairing damage and restoring trust. We call on Pakistan to take concrete steps for this purpose. This would facilitate resumption of Lahore process and composite dialogue. This requires reaffirmation of inviolability and sanctity of LOC. Sponsorship of terrorism across LOC in any particular sector, is violation of LOC, as indeed of Simla Agreement and Lahore understandings. This also prevents return of trust. Hence, Pakistan must abjure instigating, sponsoring, aiding and abetting cross border terrorism.

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