JULY 1, 1999

Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to express my concern for the ongoing conflict in the Kashmir region of India . This crisis is nearing a turning point for which the outcome is far from being clear. It is extremely important that in addressing this turning point, the United States should act pursuant to its own national and strategic interests rather than succumb to the allure of simplistic short-term `arrangements.'

The conflict in Kashmir has been unfolding for nearly two months now. The Kargil crisis erupted in early May when the Indian Army discovered the infiltration of Pakistani regular troops and an assortment of ISI-sponsored Mujahideen into the northern parts of Indian Kashmir . From these captured positions, the Pakistani forces were close to being able to disconnect India's national highway--the blood line to the country's uppermost northern regions. In the fighting that has since ensued, the Indian Army was able to first contain the infiltration and then doggedly evict the Pakistani forces from positions inside India . This fighting, conducted in the extremely rugged and high-elevation terrain of the Himalayan mountains, still continues as Indian troops climb one mountain after another to dislodge the Pakistani forces sheltered at the peaks. The Indian government is determined, and rightly so, to evict all the infiltrators.

While taking place in a remote and desolate part of the world, the Kargil fighting is not conducted in isolation. In threatening the Indian national highway, the Pakistani intrusion has been of strategic significance--and so is its defeat. Therefore, the stakes are very high for both New Delhi and Islamabad. Indeed, fully aware of the explosive character of the Kargil crisis, New Delhi has instructed the Indian Army to operate only within Indian territory in removing the infiltrators, despite the military expediency of operating in the rear of the enemy and a higher cost in Indian casualties due to frontal assaults on towering peaks.

Presently, with the fighting in the Kargil area stabilizing in India's favor, Pakistan is in dire need for a dramatic breakout to salvage some achievements from an otherwise doomed strategic gambit. Moreover, Beijing--Pakistan's closest ally and strategic patron that has its own territorial claims for parts of Indian Kashmir --is expressing growing interest in the outcome of the crisis. The People's Republic of China (PRC) is ready to intervene in the crisis in order to safeguard its own strategic interests.

In order to meet the prerequisites of such a breakout Pakistan has been pursuing a twin track policy:

On the one hand, Islamabad has been threatening the escalation of the crisis into a major war that, given the declared nuclear status of both protagonists, might escalate into a nuclear war. In order to ensure that Islamabad's threat of war is considered credible, the Pakistani Armed Forces have undertaken several steps since mid June. Pakistan put the Armed Forces on `red alert', sent the Navy out to sea, is moving military reinforcements to the border with India , parading units through the streets of cities and towns, is conducting civil and home defense exercises for the population, as well as deploying air defense forces to all airports and key civilian sites.

On the other hand, Pakistan , with Beijing's active support, has been raising the possibility of a `negotiated settlement' to the Kargil crisis. In these political initiatives, the Pakistanis stress the need to resolve the crisis before it escalates out of control and a major, and potentially nuclear, war erupts. In reality, Islamabad is desperate to extract tangible gains from the cross-border intrusion of its forces before they are defeated and evicted by the Indian Army. And it is in these circumstances that the proposed negotiated solutions for the Kargil crisis are being offered.

The most popular `package deal' which the Clinton administration seems to favor at this juncture calls for Islamabad's quiet an un-acknowledged withdrawing of the Pakistani troops in return for the opening of an international negotiations process over the entire Kashmir problem. Such dynamics, the deal's proponents tell us, will provide Pakistan with a `face-saving' outlet out of the armed conflict before it escalates into a wider war.

However, there are many pitfalls in this approach. In all political discussions to-date, the Pakistani forces involved are still formally defined as `militants'--thus absolving Pakistan of the formal responsibility for what can otherwise be termed an act of war. Further more, the mere international acceptance without challenge of the Pakistani excuse that these `militants' are operating in an area where the Line of Control (the Indo-Pakistani cease-fire line in Kashmir) is not properly delineated and that therefore these `militants' are actually on Pakistani soil, contradicts the 1972 Simla Agreement between India and Pakistan . This argument is therefore making a mockery of any such bilateral agreements at the very moment both New Delhi and Islamabad are being urged by the international community to negotiate and ultimately sign yet another agreement on the `Kashimer problem.' Then, the commonly discussed percept of the `Kashmir problem' refers to the conditions of the Muslim population living in the Kashmir valley. Thus, the negotiations will delve on the fate of the Indian held part of Kashmir even though India , Pakistan and even the PRC each controls wide segments of the British-era Kashmir .

Ultimately, international acceptance of these principles will reward Pakistan for its armed aggression and punish India for its self-restraint in evicting the intruders. Moreover, any political outcome in which Pakistan's interests are met will also reward Beijing. The PRC, one should note, has just tested in a major military exercise in nearby Tibet, a quick reaction intervention force optimized for the region's rugged terrain. Moreover, the new strategic posture at the heart of Asia that will emerge from these negotiations will serve as a precedent for similar aggressive wars-by-proxy that could then be repeated and adopted throughout the developing world to the detriment of the interests of the United States and its Western allies.

Mr. Speaker, in our pursuit to defuse a brewing crisis before it escalates into a war we should not ignore the overall enduring strategic interests of the United States. The United States does have long-term vital interests in Asia. Democratic and pro-Western India is a bulwark of stability in a region rife with such anti-U.S. forces and mega-trends as the hegemonic ascent of a PRC determined to become the regional supreme power at the expense of the United States, the spread of radical militant Islam and Islamist terrorism, as well as the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction and long-range delivery systems by rogue states. At the same time, free access to the energy resources of Central Asia is crucial for the long-term economic development of the United States, while the sea lanes of communications in the Indian Ocean sustain the West's commercial relations with East Asia.

Thus, any `Kashmire' agreement based on the principles mentioned above will weaken India , reward and encourage the anti-U.S. forces, and will thus adversely affect the long-term national interests of the United States.