Wall Street Journal
Thursday, July 21, 2005

India's New Global Role

By SWAPAN DASGUPTA

Seven years is a long time in politics. On May 12, 1998, some 24 hours after India tested a nuclear device in the Rajasthan desert, an angry President Bill Clinton began a meeting in the Oval Office with a menacing threat: "We're going to come down on those guys like a ton of bricks." Last Monday afternoon in Washington D.C., a few hours after President George W. Bush showered Prime Minister Manmohan Singh with platitudes and praise, a joint statement recorded Mr. Bush's belief that "as a responsible state with advanced nuclear technology, India should acquire the same benefits and advantages as other such states."

Washington has virtually conceded New Delhi the status of a legitimate nuclear power, and the Bush administration will now do its utmost to persuade Congress to remove India from the pariah list and signal to America's allies the need to effectively endorse India's candidature to the select five-member club of world nuclear powers. Receiving such high-level endorsement is no small accomplishment; there are still plenty of nonproliferation ayatollahs on Capitol Hill. So it comes as no surprise that the Indo-U.S. "global partnership" has a price tag attached. Is New Delhi willing to be the Washington's new "hedge" against China?

Indian decision-makers realize that there's no such thing as a free lunch. When a U.S. State Department official stated in his briefing on March 25, following Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's visit to India, that the U.S. was anxious to evolve a "decisively broader strategic relationship" which would help India become a major world power in the 21st century, it was greeted with some skepticism in New Delhi. Despite an awareness of India's growing importance as an economic power, conventional wisdom suggested that the U.S. was unwilling to shed its "hyphenated" approach-viewing India through the prism of its relationship with Pakistan. India's expectations from the U.S. were invariably tempered by a wariness born of history.

This week, Indian officials accompanying Prime Minister Singh are openly admitting that the outcome of the Washington visit exceeded their most optimistic hopes. It is readily conceded that the White House more than walked the extra mile to give greater substance to the new "global" and "strategic" partnership. Having worn its contempt for a nuclear "apartheid" practiced by the five big powers as a badge of honor for over three decades, New Delhi is overwhelmed by President Bush's readiness to create an extra space on the high table.

In the coming weeks, questions are certain to be raised over some of the fine print. It is also likely that the Indian left, without whose support Prime Minister Singh cannot function, will invoke the larger issue of India getting sucked into the American orbit and compromising its "independent" foreign policy. However, the gravest concerns are reserved for Washington's underlying motives. The discussion Indian Defense Minister Pranab Mukherjee had with the U.S. defense establishment last month did not center on Pakistan-the traditional Indian bug-bear. Instead, it concentrated disproportionately on what an Indian official called "our northern neighbor."

Senior U.S. officials who interacted with India's opposition Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) prior to Prime Minister Singh's visit made no secret of Washington's concerns over Beijing's growing attempts to ease the U.S. out of Asia and the rapid modernization of China's armed forces. A recent Carnegie Endowment report on U.S.-India relations by Ashley Tellis stresses that "strong states on China's periphery" are a critical U.S. security interest: "Countries like Japan and India will hedge against growing Chinese capabilities, through a mix of domestic exertions and external balancing, because their national interests demand it." In its annual report released on Tuesday, the Pentagon too has alerted other regional powers of a "credible" long-term military threat from China.

On paper at least, Sino-Indian relations could not be better. The vexed boundary dispute has been put on the slowest of slow burners; in April the two countries agreed on a strategic partnership program; bilateral trade is more than $15 billion and to many in India, Tibet is now just a Hollywood cause. At the same time, India is concerned by Beijing's policy of encirclement and containment. Whether it is Burma, Nepal or Pakistan, China's influence in the region has grown exponentially, with economics complimenting political influence.

But the real picture may not be so rosy. Following the kerfuffle over the expansion of the U.N. Security Council, New Delhi has reason to fear that although its ire is directed against Japan, China will not countenance any other Asian country acquiring a great power status. Finally, there is concern in India at the brazenness with which China manipulates communist parties in India to pursue its diplomatic objectives, leading to the apprehension that China will fish deeply in Indian domestic politics to undermine, if not subvert, the New Delhi-Washington partnership.

Having been sedated by nonalignment for too long, Indian foreign policy is relatively unaccustomed to playing the balance-of-power game. Yet, the requirements of its new status in Washington may compel New Delhi to take a more proactive stance. India has long recognized China as its foremost competitor in Asia. It has also pretended that competition is not tantamount to rivalry while quietly acquiescing to being used by Washington as a balancing force in Southeast Asia.

After last Monday's agreement, New Delhi will have no choice but to recognize that a knighthood from Washington comes with new responsibilities in both Asia and the world.

Mr. Dasgupta is a New Delhi-based political columnist.