Washington Post
Sunday, July 24, 2005
Bush's Bold Bet
On India
By Jim Hoagland
The United States and India have put aside their troubled past to reach far into
the future with a visionary bilateral agreement that challenges both nations and
the rest of the world to treat nuclear weapons and nuclear energy with greater
realism than they do under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
If Congress agrees to the
changes in law sought by the Bush administration to put the agreement signed
last week into force, nuclear energy will take center stage from nuclear weapons
in the new order of U.S.-Indian relations, which now become crucial to
constructing a post-Kyoto consensus on climate change.
Energy vs. arms has been an
atomic trade-off dictated by the nuclear treaty for nearly a half-century --
before global warming became a major international concern, and before rogue
states showed they were not interested in such a trade.
New Delhi and Washington give
impetus both to the growing acceptance by environmentalists of nuclear energy as
a lesser evil and to the Bush Doctrine of post-Sept. 11 security.
The odd status of nuclear
energy as a combination risk (at least since the Three Mile Island disaster in
1979) and reward (for developing countries) mutates as fossil fuel pollution
becomes a greater threat. For differing reasons, the United States, India and
China are outside the restrictions of the Kyoto Protocol. Until that changes, a
global climate change system will not work.
For the Bush administration,
this accord demonstrates the peaceful application of a national security
strategy that holds that the nature of regimes, rather than the nature of the
weapons they possess, will determine their relations with Washington.
This is the first important
diplomatic accomplishment of the George W. Bush presidency, which was as bare as
Old Mother Hubbard's cupboard in its first four years. President Bush needs to
do much more to become convincing on both nuclear strategy and climate change.
But it is important to recognize that his second-term team has put into place a
cornerstone for far-reaching change -- and did so while resisting India's
demands for formal recognition as a nuclear weapons state.
Not everyone will think that is
progress. Viewed from the peculiar and selective morality embodied in the
nuclear treaty, the United States has now surrendered both the moral and
practical high grounds by agreeing to support India's right to buy and develop
the reactors, fuel and technology it needs for an effective national nuclear
energy program.
The Non-Proliferation Treaty,
which took effect in 1970, offers such advantages only to states that do not
develop nuclear weapons, which India did in 1974. Along with effective
diplomatic pressure from the United States and the nuclear suppliers cartel, the
treaty has helped delay or prevent a number of other states from acquiring
nuclear arsenals.
But the pact was based on a
fiction that was temporarily useful. The five declared nuclear states of 1970
granted legitimacy to their arsenals in return for pledging insincerely "to
pursue good-faith negotiations" to abolish them. Washington, London, Paris,
Moscow and Beijing intended to maintain the code of the nuclear priesthood on
their own terms, as India pointed out in refusing to sign the treaty. That
approach has been overtaken by the ability of other states to make nuclear
weapons without the help or permission of the Big Five.
Instead of making the treaty's
shortcomings the issue, as Bush did with Kyoto and with the Anti-Ballistic
Missile Treaty with Russia, which he abrogated, the president has simply placed
the Indian-U.S. relationship outside the treaty's most restrictive conditions.
This is realism of a high order, particularly for a president often accused of
lacking realism in his foreign policy.
Bush accepts the premise that
the world's largest democracy has nuclear weapons and technology that it does
not intend to use against U.S. interests. The United States has long tolerated
Israel's nuclear arsenal on the same basis and can reasonably oppose the
programs of the hostile regimes of Iran and North Korea by the same standards.
Pakistan occupies a difficult, and highly dangerous, middle ground for U.S.
interests.
Little in life is as
theoretical as the overdrawn discussion of the importance of realism and
idealism in shaping U.S. foreign policy. All administrations apply a mixture of
both that is determined as often by unexpected events abroad and political
pressures at home as by grand, fixed designs. What is described as
"realism" is frequently pure cynicism in semantic disguise, while
"idealism" can be grievous misjudgment dressed up as good intentions.
See Chile, 1973, as an example of the first tendency; Iraq today of the second.