USA Today
Tuesday, July 26, 2005

Editorial: Rewarding India

President Bush controversially promised to help India build nuclear power plants last week. With that step, he essentially welcomed India to the elite club of recognized nuclear powers in all but name. In doing so, he raised a flurry of disturbing — but timely — questions about containing nuclear weapons in an age of terrorism.

First things first.

Without a doubt, having good relations with India makes great sense in today's world, for three reasons:

• With 12% of its population Muslim, and in a terrorist-infested neighborhood that includes Pakistan and Afghanistan, it can help with intelligence.

• As the world's most populous democracy, yet still a member of the Third World, it can also be a powerful example of just the kind of democracy the United States is aiming for worldwide as a terrorism antidote.

• And it can provide a counterweight to the growing regional dominance of China. India is a bit like China without the repressive government: a billion or so people; an economy, and middle class, growing fast.

Unfortunately, there's a strong "yes, but" element. As in yes, it makes sense, but it risks unraveling restraints on countries developing nuclear weapons — including at talks with North Korea, restarting today, and Iran.

"If India, why not us?" they can ask.

Indeed. Helping India with nuclear power plants flouts the main treaty that, for 35 years, has slowed the spread of nuclear weapons. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty prohibits countries other than the five declared nuclear powers — the United States, Britain, France, China and Russia — from developing nuclear weapons and sets rules for safe development of nuclear energy.

Countries can only get help building nuclear power plants if they sign the treaty. India didn't, and it has developed and tested nuclear weapons since the 1970s. So the more pertinent questions become: Can India's deal be prevented from slowly killing the treaty? Or more optimistically, can it be used to redraw the treaty for the terrorist age? Maybe.

The India deal did spotlight the treaty's big flaw: It's outdated. The nuclear club has grown, and not just with India. Pakistan, Israel and North Korea have also secretly developed nuclear weapons. Iran is doing so. In a sense, the deal rewards India for handling its weapons responsibly. And in doing so, it sets a tentative new standard: Others have not. Pakistan's top nuclear scientist marketed his knowledge to Libya and, possibly, terrorists.

Standing in the way, though, is the administration's go-it-alone tendency, which has alienated allies vital to the war on terrorism, non-proliferation and other common interests. They did not know of the India deal until it was announced. The administration has shunned formal efforts to strengthen the treaty, even while citing it to oppose Iran's and North Korea's nuclear programs. That's too bad, because it has some good ideas.

The India deal, for one. Proof: Arms-control advocates and allies offered muted criticism, if at all. Another is a U.S.-led group of countries interdicting shipments of banned nuclear equipment or materials.

The India agreement is not yet clinched. Congress and allies first need to lift a web of restrictions. In the process, perhaps they can force a broader discussion of just how to update the rules, realistically, for controlling the still-exclusive — but growing — nuclear club. In ways that keep terrorists out.