Chicago Tribune
Saturday, August 06, 2005
Editorial:
Inviting India to join the club
India became the world's sixth
nuclear power when it exploded a bomb in 1974. While the Indians celebrated
their technical prowess, the rest of the world shuddered over the possibility of
a nuclear arms race in developing countries. Canada, the U.S. and other
countries had been helping India develop civilian nuclear capabilities. But they
angrily halted further assistance with the proof that India had siphoned off
some of that help to build a bomb.
Ever since, India has been a
nuclear pariah.
Now that is changing. Recently
President Bush announced that the U.S. would help India get parts and import
fuel for nuclear power plants. In essence, India would be welcomed into the
rarefied club of bomb-wielding nuclear powers, in all but title. In return,
India would allow international inspections and safeguards on its civilian
nuclear program, refrain from further weapons tests and also from transferring
arms technology to other countries.
This is a stunning deal that
carries some risks, but also the potential for far larger rewards.
Many non-proliferation
advocates are outraged because they say the deal reneges on the basic bargain of
the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. That deal is simple: If you promise not to
build weapons, those countries with nuclear expertise are encouraged to help you
develop peaceful nuclear power. The treaty has been largely successful in
persuading countries not to acquire nuclear weapons since the 1970s.
If India is able not only to
build the weapons but also to get the help allowed in the treaty, why should
other governments not aim to do likewise, the critics ask. That's potentially
troubling, but not likely to happen. Almost every nation in the world already
has signed the treaty; they're unlikely to back out now.
Pakistan, India's neighbor and
arch-rival, now seems almost certain to seek the same blessing for its nuclear
status. But the U.S. and other nuclear states can easily parry that request,
given Pakistan's abysmal record as a nuclear outlaw whose chief nuclear
scientist ran a black market in weapons technology for years.
More worrisome is whether the
deal could undercut U.S. and European efforts to disarm North Korea and blunt
Iran's nuclear ambitions. Put it this way: It won't help. It will likely be used
for propaganda by those countries' negotiators. But here's the reality: Those
nations have been developing nuclear expertise and weapons for decades in what
they perceive as their national interests. What India gets, or doesn't get, is
largely irrelevant to those calculations.
The deal makes sense for
several reasons.
First, India is a rising global
power. It is in America's interest to forge closer ties. Second, India already
has nuclear weapons and has had them for a long time. No amount of argument from
the U.S. will change that. Third, the point of international non-proliferation
efforts is to stop the spread of nuclear weapons, particularly to terrorists, by
imposing tough safeguards, enhanced security and better controls over the export
of dangerous technology. With this deal, India would join many of those critical
efforts.
Under the deal, India would
refrain from transferring nuclear technology that would allow nations to enrich
uranium or reprocess plutonium, both key to bomb making, if those nations didn't
already have such equipment. India also would support a worldwide halt in
production of fissile material for bombs and a moratorium on further nuclear
testing. Those are all important steps that have been delayed by political
squabbling for too long.
The Bush administration may
have a steep road ahead, to persuade not only Congress but also 40-plus
countries in the Nuclear Suppliers Group to go along with the deal. The track
record on this is not promising.
The U.S., India and the other
nuclear countries face common foes: North Korea, Iran and terrorists around the
globe seeking nuclear weapons. Making India a full partner in efforts to stop
the spread of weapons is bound to help.