The Hindu
July 22, 2005
EDITORIAL
Some caveats on a constructive deal
There is bound to be a contentious debate on the bargain struck by India and the United States on nuclear energy cooperation and trade that is the most substantive part of the Joint Statement issued from Washington D.C. Unfortunately, this deal, like so much else in the realm of strategic affairs and foreign policy in recent years, including the Indo-U.S. defence framework agreement, has been sprung on the people of India — forsaking the method of democratic discussion and consensus-building in advance rather than after the deal is done. But the substance of the Indo-U.S. nuclear bargain, which has constructive potential for the non-military, peaceful side of India's nuclear energy programme and offers the prospect of the country coming out of its post-1974 isolation in the international nuclear energy arena, must not be missed in the name of criticising the method.
Let us be clear about the nature and specifics of the bargain. For a start, it is conditional, with nothing guaranteed. It is also meant to be worked in phases and holds some imponderables. What precisely is on offer for India? It is obvious that President George Bush has broken away from long-term U.S. non-proliferation policy towards India. Recognising it as "a responsible state with advanced nuclear technology," he has committed himself to working to achieve "full civil nuclear energy cooperation with India as it realises its goals of promoting nuclear power and achieving energy security." Towards this end, he will seek agreement from the U.S. Congress to adjust domestic laws and policies. He will also work with friends and allies to adjust restrictive international regimes so that India can benefit from "full civil nuclear energy cooperation and trade." The policy relaxation has factored in "expeditious consideration of fuel supplies for safeguarded nuclear reactors at Tarapur."
What is the `price', the quid pro quo, the United Progressive Alliance Government has agreed to in the Joint Statement? Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has committed India "reciprocally" to segregating, "in a phased manner," the country's military and civilian nuclear facilities; "voluntarily" placing its civilian nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards; signing and adhering to an Additional Protocol with respect to civilian nuclear facilities; continuing the "unilateral'' moratorium on nuclear testing; working with the U.S. to help conclude a multilateral Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty; continuing with stringent non-proliferation export control policies; and "harmonisation [with] and adherence to" the guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime and the Nuclear Suppliers Group. It is a formidable list of conditionalities accepted, but some of them must be recognised as the product of the interminable Jaswant-Talbott `dialogue' during the six-year rule of the National Democratic Alliance Government.
Is the deal a net gain or loss for India? It is probably a loss from the standpoint of the hawkish votaries of India's post-May 1998 nuclear weaponisation, which derailed India's longstanding policy and twisted out of shape its independent character as well as its peace and disarmament orientation. If the deal means "capping" dangerous ambitions of developing India's so-called minimum credible deterrent, that `loss' will clearly be to the benefit of the people of India and the region. The idea of `dual-using' the unsafeguarded heavy water nuclear power reactors — actually 11 of 15 operational reactors — to make bombs and, in the meantime, generate power cost-efficiently, as a way of avoiding unduly expensive stockpiling, is so completely over-the-top as to qualify as Strangelovian. At a practical level, while exploitation of the plutonium produced by reprocessing the spent fuel of heavy water reactors to make nuclear weapons is technically feasible, the result will be low-yield, `dirty' bombs. It is too much to believe that India will ever be in need of such stuff for `deterrence' or `second strike' or whatever.
In sum, the Manmohan-Bush nuclear deal is to be understood as a constructive, although clumsily non-transparent, preference exercised by the UPA Government in favour of the civilian nuclear programme. In the trade-off, the economist in Dr. Singh seems to have come to the fore, although even here not without controversy. The Mid-Term Appraisal of the 10th Five Year Plan (2002-2007) by the Planning Commission presents a gloomy picture of the prospects of stepping up the generation of nuclear energy, as "an important tool for de-carbonising the Indian energy sector," given the below-par performance. While total installed nuclear power capacity remains as low as 3310 Mwe (against an officially proclaimed target of 10,000 Mwe for the end of the 20th century), the Plant Load Factor for nuclear power plants has actually declined over the past few years, "primarily due to non-availability of nuclear fuel because the development of domestic mines has not yet kept pace with addition of generating capacity." If India can forgo the option of nuclear power on a large scale, there is no problem. However, if the country is determined to expand, as it must, its civilian nuclear power programme to a capacity of, say, 20,000 MWe and then 30,000 MWe, there is no way of getting either enriched or natural uranium fuel other than through a quid pro quo arrangement that will enable the Nuclear Suppliers Group to relax its stringent regime and make a constructive exception for India. In fact, the trade-off agreed to in the Joint Statement for a resumption of full civilian nuclear cooperation and trade is not radically different from the supply-related safeguards accepted by India at four operating nuclear power reactors. There is of course a need to ensure that the country's independent research activities oriented to peaceful purposes, including the fast breeder programme, are not obstructed or slowed down. The bigger worry is over the question of whether there are hidden linkages — compromises wrested from India in the realm of foreign and security policies, for example, on the Iranian gas pipeline or in the cooperation proposed in the global `war against terrorism' — that go with the nuclear deal. The other serious problem is that while `non-proliferation' concerns figure in the Joint Statement, the UPA Government has regrettably failed to show the slightest interest in returning to India's traditional policy of promoting nuclear disarmament on the world stage. The Government owes it to the country to provide clear and straightforward answers to these caveats, breaking with the secretive manner in which it did the nuclear deal.